The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism. by Harris, Ian Charles
THE CONTINUITY OF MADHYAMAKA AND 
YOGACARA IN INDIAN MAHAYANA 
BUDDHISM
by IAN CHARLES HARRIS
Submitted for the degree of PhD 
DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11003643
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 




To my wife Gwen, without whose support this would not 
have been possible, and to my supervisor, Andrew 
Rawlinson,for his helpful comments, criticisms 
and comradeship.
Authors Ian Charles Harris
Titles The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogaoara in 




In the history of Buddhist scholarship it has been the convention 
to treat the Madhyamaka and Yogacarip strands of the Mahayana as . 
separate and fundamentally opposed schools of thought. This thesis 
represents an attempt to explore the relationship between the two 
in some detail and comes to the conclusion that earlier assessments 
are not justified by either textual evidence, or by underlying trends 
in the history of the development of Buddhist thought as such.
The overall substance of the thesis is a general reappraisal of 
the ontological and epistemological doctrines contained in the writings 
of Nagirjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu with particular reference to 
the earliest Buddhist philosophical texts available. By turning 
to the texts themselves, and assigning a lesser significance to 
the commentarial literature of a later period, it is possible to 
show considerable overlap in all areas of doctrine, but particularly 
the treatment of the levels of truth, the understanding of the enlight­
ened and the unenlightened states and their relation to an indeterminate 
existence realm, the nature of that real^1, and finally the function 
and status of language and thought.
As a result of these investigations it is possible to erect a new 
theory to explain the proliferation of Indian Mahayana Buddhism 
which does not operate on a schismatic basis, but rather accounts 
for variety as the consequence of individual authors addressing 
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VERITAS SEQUITUR ESSE RERUM - AQUINAS
In the first chapter the intention will be to demonstrate that 
Nagarjuna accepts the distinction between the enlightened and the 
unenlightened state. These states may be understood implicitly
in terms of states of mind. The former will then be represented
A —  w.—  _
by jnana/prajna, while the latter corresponds to vijnana. The
tA  _
essential difference between the two is that vijnana is contaminated 
by a variety of mental concomitants such as prapanca and vikalpa;
_ _ vt _
jnana is not. Conditioned by avidya, vijnana is unable to reproduce 
a true picture of things. The world appears to be constructed 
of substantial entities. Jnana results in the destruction of this 
erroneous world view. Through jnana things are understood not 
as independent, but as interdependent (pratityasamutpanna). However, 
and this is a discussion which is examined in more detail in Chapter 
5, since language is itself a form of expression entirely implicated 
in the distorted world view, it follows that the truth about reality 
must be inexpressible.
Chapter 2 examines the logical stance taken by Nagarjuna. This
clearly shows that he does not adhere to the prasahga method often
associated with him. His method is based on certain axioms common
to Buddhist tradition as a whole, and one would be wrong, in consequence,
in assigning him the status of seminal thinker. It is the view
of this thesis that Nagarjuna both adheres to the doctrine of the
vi
inexpressibility of truth, and maintains the existence of an onto­
logical truth realm, ie.he is not a nihilist. Truth is revealed 
beyond the borders of language. In a sense then it would be correct 
to say that for Nagarjuna the true nature of things lies midway 
between the dichotomies of language - between existence and non­
existence. The structure of language cannot exhaust the way things 
truly are. This being so one cannot deny the existence of reality 
nihilistically, and in consequence, one will be forced to admit 
an ontologically indeterminate realm, a realm which cannot be 
determined in terms of existence or non-existence. The doctrine 
of sunyata is intimately tied to this. The true nature of things 
is dependently originated (pratityasamutpada). This state is 
falsely cognised in the unenlightened state. Bodhi therefore rep­
resents the enlightened mind purged of avidya, etc. Bodhi then 
is sunyati in the sense that it is empty of the defilements of 
ignorance. Sunyata is not an ontological state, but rather a state 
of mind in which there is a true identification of cogniser and 
cognised - a state incapable of articulation.
In Chapter 3 we analyse Nagirjuna’s connection with early Buddhism 
and find a general continuity of thought. We go on to contrast 
the nirvapa/samsara dichotomy with what we have already discussed.
As a result nirvana can be clearly associated with bodhi - that 
state of mind in which the dichotomies generated by prapanca have 
been eradicated, while samsara becomes identified with the world
A  — —-
picture composed through the agency of vijnana. Both nirvana and 
samsara then do not represent ontological states. On the contrary,
they are shown to be orientations to one ontological,
vii
though unpredic-able realm, which is itself the base for the arising 
of both vijnana and jnana/prajna.
With chapter 4 we turn our attention to the Yogacira. We question 
the view of the older generation of scholars who wished to establish 
radical differences between this school and the position of Nigarjuna. 
We show that many of these attempts are based both on an interpretation 
of Nagarjuna’s teaching passed down through Candrakirti, and on 
certain presuppositions inherited from the history of Western thought. 
Candrakirti’s understanding of Yogacara was that it was preliminary 
to the study of Madhyamaka. We are able to show that this is simply 
not so. Candrakirti misunderstands the basis of the Yogacara teachings 
and attributes positions to them which they do not hold. In fact 
the axioms of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara are common. The idea 
of an initiatory scheme of Buddhist teaching, with the Madhyamaka 
at the top is exposed as a very late development in the history 
of Indian Mahayana Buddhism.
The important doctrine of the levels of truth as it crops up throughout
the history of Buddhist thought is explored in Chapters 5 and 6.
We discover a bewildering assortment of differing formulations which
can however be simplified quite consistently. Two strands can be
identified in the early material. Both are underpinned by a theory
of language, though these theories are divergent. In the first
two separate areas of discourse may be identified; implicit (nitattha)
language about things, and that which is termed explicit (neyattha).
The former is in accordance with conventional usage, while the latter
reflects the Buddhist understanding of things. The latter is therefore
viii
accurate and supplies a true picture of the world. This particular 
teaching is the forerunner of the dharma theory of the Abhidharma 
which seems to be refuted in the writings of the Mahayana. In the 
Abhidharma language which takes into account the dharmic constitution 
of things is said to be ultimately true (paramattha), while that 
which does not is only conventionally so (sammuti).
The theory of truths which is developed in the Mahayana can also
be found in the early tradition. This theory is entirely consistent
with the understanding of language discussed in Chapters 1 and 2
and accepted by both the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara. According
to this particular strand of thinking, whatever is expressed is
*\ —
essentially contaminated by vijnana and its mental concomitants,
and as such constitutes a false picture of things. Ultimately truth,
and hence the teaching of the Buddha, is equated with silence.
It may not be attained through the processes of thought, but rather
through their elimination. The problem with this particular formulation
is that by accepting it one must automatically hold to the corrolary;
that everything which is expressed is false. The doctrine of three
v\_ _ _
natures (trisvabhava) expounded in the Prajnaparamita and by the 
Yogacara is an attempt to show that the two truth doctrine should 
not be taken in such a manner. There are no essential differences 
between the two and three nature formulations - the latter simply 
makes explicit what was implicit in the former. This takes us back 
to our distinction between an ontologically indeterminate realm 
and the two orientations towards it. In the Madhyamaka
it is quite clear that the ultimate (paramartha) and the conventional
ix
(saipvrti) truths refer to the perspectives associated with jnana 
and vijnana respectively. Now, it has already been noted in Chapter 
3, these viewpoints only have efficacy because they relate to the 
ontological realm identified with pratltysamutpada. The Madhyamaka 
clearly has a hidden central term therefore. Hidden of course because 
it cannot be articulated. The three nature theory consequently 
supplies this seeming missing term, while at the same time recogn­
ising its essential non-predic-ability. One cannot hold that the 
teachings of Madhyamaka and Yogacara are at odds on this particular 
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Chapter 7 looks at the nature of the base for the appearance of 
the defiled and purified visions of things in more detail and finds 
that the Buddhist tradition as a whole again supports the stance 
taken by the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara. Pratltyasamutpada is 
the key concept in the Buddhist systems. It is identical to the 
way things truly are and as such is inexpressible. It provides 
the rational for the workings of the Four Noble Truths and hence 
for the attainments of samsara and nirvana. Two separate treatments 
of pratityasamutpada are actually found in Buddhist literature.
x
Firstly, the fundamental doctrine itself which was discovered by, 
though is seemingly independent of the Buddha, and secondly the 
12-linked formula. While the former is itself identical^the inexplic­
ably true state of things, the 12 fold formula is a rationalisation 
of the two epistemic orientations and as such helps to explain the 
Four Noble Truths. The forward sequence corresponds to the first 
and second truths, while the reverse is connected with the third 
and fourth. These different treatments of pratityasamutpada exactly 
mirror the two and three-fold truth formulations as expounded in 
the previous two chapters.
The body of this thesis is an attempt to argue against the traditional,
scholarly view that the Madhyamaka and Yogacara present two radically
opposed sets of doctrines. It is demonstrated that on a number
of grounds the traditional view cannot be sustained. One further
problem remains however. A great number of scholars believe that
what distinguishes the Yc^cara from the rest of Buddhism is its
idealistic tendencies. The final chapter represents an attempt
to test such an attitude. By examining early materials associated
with the notion of mind it is shown that, while taken out of context,
certain sections of texts may seem idealistic, this is not so when
seen against the proper background. From the earliest times Buddhism
has recognised the distinction which was treated in the first chapter;
namely the distinction between the defiled and the purified mind.
Remembering the fact that ultimate truth is inarticulable, one may
equate, from the conventional point of view, Bodhi with the purified
mind, and the unenlightened state with defilement. Talk of a luminous
mind (prabhasvara citta) in the Nikayas and at other places is a
xi
clear reference to bodhi. However at various stages in its history 
has found the need to explain to its critics how karma, and general 
mental continuity may be maintained, without falling into the trap 
of holding a permanent, unchanging mind. This is the function of 
terms like bhavanga, and in the Yogacara, alayavijnana. Both of 
these concepts should not be confused with a Brahmanical absolute 
such as atman. They both perform an explanatory function while 
at the same time avoiding the pit falls of absolutism, which all 
Buddhisi> must steer clear of. This being so, the charge of idealism 
does not stick. The sole difference between the Yogacara and Madhyamaka 
on this point is that for the former questions of mental continuity 
are crucial in an attempt to argue against Brahmanic tendencies, 
while for the latter they are not. However the Yogacara follows 
the traditional line on this matter, and does not in the case of 
the alayavijnana, introduce a novel concept. Chapter 8 then provides 
the final link in the thesis. There is a continuity of thought 
from the early period, through Madhyamaka to the Yogacara. In the
_  IA _
doctrine of alayavijnana there is no deviation from tradition, and 
in consequence no establishment of a novel position. In fact the 
only dissimilarities between these individual elements^tradition 
may be shown to be ones which are basically indicative of preoccupation 
and not of essential disunity.
Chapter One
A Preliminary Examination of Madhyamaka Ontology
In the past many assumptions have been made concerning the relation­
ships between the Madhyamaka and Vijnanavada schools of Mahayina 
Buddhism which on further analysis may prove to be unfounded.
Typically the Vijnanavadin is seen as someone who wishes to 
hypostatise consciousness (vijnana, citta, vijnapti)leading 
to the conclusion that consciousness is the sole reality (vijnaptimatra), 
whereas on the other hand the Madhyamaka maintains a non-commital 
attitude towards ontology. It is very easy, particularly given 
the present nature of scholarship into the subject, to be led 
into adopting such an attitude but, on further reflection one 
is forced to ask a number of questions.
In the first place when we speak of the Madhyamaka school of
thought we ordinarily think, mainly because of its dominant
position in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, of the Madhyamaka-
Prasangika school founded sometime in the 7th century A.D.
-  (1 )by Candrakirti . That Candrakirti was an opponent of a particular
point of view regarding the doctrine of consciousness only
_ — ^  —
(cittamatra) and the existence of a store-consciousness alayavijnana
both of which are generally associated with the Vijnanavadins,
(2 )there can be no doubt . However two questions follow from 
this statement;- (a) Has Candrakirti faithfully reproduced the 
doctrines of his root texts which in this case are the writings 
of Nagarjuna, and (b) in his argument with the Vijnlnavada has 
he adhered to his prasanga method of reasoning and therefore
- 2 -
not ascribed to his opponents' doctrines which they do not in 
fact hold?
The second major query concerns the doctrinal position of Nigarjuna
and in particular the range of Nigarjuna's authorship. It has
been paradigmatic among the older generation of scholars, when
dealing with the works of Nigarjuna to brush aside the evidence
of the Buddhist tradition and treat only those works which deal
exclusively with the doctrines of emptiness (sunyati) and the
non-existence of the self nature of dharmas (dharmanihsvabhavati)
as being exclusively authentic works of our author. T.R.V.
Murti is a good case in point. In his study of the Madhyamaka
he lists the works of Nagirjuna ascribed by the Tibetan and
(3)Chinese tradition and then abandons all but two, the Madhya-
- - ( A )  - - (5)makakarika and the Vigrahavyavartani in the elucidation
of the distinctive Madhyamaka philosophy, irrespective of the
fact that many of the other texts firmly held to be works of
Nagarjuna by the Buddhist tradition express ideas which in some
respects would lead to an attenuation of the overall doctrine.
Such a state of affairs could be compared to one in which for
many years a group of researchers based all their knowledge
of Shakespeare's work, life and times solely on the sonnets
simply because as a corpus a certain underlying theme runs through
them all. As a consequence the plays being formally different
and treating disparate themes are relegated into being the works
of others, fraudently ascribed to the bard.
- 3 -
There seem^s to be a number of objections to such judgements.
In the first place why would someone having produced a major
work of literature, and in our case elevating religious discourses,
wish to deny authorship and in so doing pass this distinction
on to someone whose output was meagre (2 works) and in any case
died possibly hundreds of years before? In the second place
the judgement of authenticity based on doctrinal accord with
an axiomatically authentic text, such as the Madhyamakakarika
is really just as unsound as judgement based on other criteria,
since we have no knowldge of Nagarjuna*s intentions when he embarked
on his writing career. This situation has been noted by Buddhist
scholars of the younger generation and the tide now seems to
be turning in the field of Nagarjuna studies. The recent public-
(6)ation of a book by Chr. Lindtner perhaps exemplifies more 
than any others this change of thinking. Although he regards 
the authenticity of the karikas as axiomatic he nevertheless 
applies a number of important criteria to arrive at his list 
of Nagarjuna's works. Firstly a work may have been ascribed 
by a "trustworthy" witness such as Candrakirti, Bhavaviveka, 
Santaraksita and the like. Secondly a work must have a place 
in a grand scheme which Lindtner wants to propose was really 
in Nagirjuna's mind. In other words a comprehensive treatment
of the doctrine and the path of the Buddhists of the Mahayana
-  -  (7)
persuasion along the lines of Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha
And thirdly throughout the corpus of texts there should be a 
general agreement in style, scope and doctrine. As a result 
of his deliberations Lindtner passes twelve works (in addition
-  k -
to the k arikas) as being authentic. These are the Sunyatasaptati, 
Vigrahavyavartani, Vaidalyaprakarana, Yuktisastika, Catuhstava,
Ratnavali, Pratityasamutpadahrdayakarika, Sutrasamuccaya, Bodhicitta- 
vivarana, Suhrllekha and the Bodhisambhara.
With the karikas themselves the first five of the above works
are held by the Tibetan tradition to belong to the theoretical/
scholastic works of Nagarjuna otherwise known as the logical
(8)(yukti; tib:- rigs tshogs) corpus. P. Williams has subjected
Lindtner's method to scrutiny and points out various defects.
To start with the first of Lindtner's trustworthy witnesses, Bhavaviveka,
  (9)lived approximately 350 years after Nagarjuna , and the others 
lived a considerable time after that. With regard to the consistency 
in style, scope and doctrine Williams ^  ^  points out that to be 
convincing when working from Tibetan and Chinese translations from 
the original Sanskrt is in itself a highly dubious enterprise.
Williams' most severe criticism is very much in conformity however 
with the views expressed by older scholars mentioned above. He 
believes that if we hold the authenticity of the karikas as axiomatic 
then a putative work of Nagarjuna concerning a topic not dealt 
with in the karikas is difficult to ascribe since we have left 
the safety of comparison and have given first priority to witnesses 
etc. in our criteria of judgement. Williams therefore ends up 
in the position adopted by D. S. Ruegg who feels that because of 
the: -
"... opacity and confusion in the records as well 
as the uncertainty concerning the authoriship of 
several works ascribed to Nagarjuna, it will be 
convenient for the historians of the Madhyamaka to
- 5 -
take as his point of departure the treatise universally 
considered as the Madhyamakasastra par excellence - namely 
the MMK (Mula-Madhyamakakarik'5) - together with any other 
texts ascribable to the same author that are doctrinally 
related, and to regard this textual corpus as a standard 
of reference when describing Nagarjuna's philosophy." (11)
As I have demonstrated that there are no good grounds for holding
such a position it is my intention to adopt a modified version
of Lindtner's list of authentic works bearing in mind the criticisms
of Williams, who admits "... my caution is not damning. It
(12)
is simply caution". As both the Tibetan and Chinese tradition
are unanimous and Lindtner's analysis confirms tradition I intend
to work on the basis that the texts of the logical (yukti) corpus 
are original works of Nagarjuna.
Before turning therefore to an examination of the doctrines 
of the Karikas, which must nevertheless still be considered 
the most important of the texts from the point of view of the 
development of the latter Madhyamaka tradition, let us look 
briefly at the other works mentioned to find any evidence which 
can confirm the often expressed opinion that the Madhyamaka 
and the Vijnanavada are doctrinally irreconcilable systems of 
thought.
Ontological Speculation in Naga~rjuna's subsidiary works
In the first place it must be quite clearly stated that nowhere 
in the corpus of works which we accept are authentically those
of Nigarjuna, is there to be found an explicit condemnation
- 6 -
of the notion that prajna represents a state of awareness in 
which things are seen as they are (yathibhutam). This is a 
very surprising fact given Nigarjuna's insistence that all 
phenomena (dharma) are empty (sunya) since they lack own-being 
(svabhava) because they occur only in mutual dependence (pratlt- 
yasamutpanna).
"That which has arisen on this and that, that
has not arisen substantially (svabhavatah). That which 
has not arisen substantially, how can it literally (nama) 
be called arisen?" (13)
The nearest we find Nagarjuna coming to a specific criticism
iA —
of consciousness is his demonstration that vijnana, as a member 
of the group of skandhas,is dependent and hence empty which may 
be found in chapter 4 of the Madhyamakakarikis. However vijnana 
in this treatment is always considered as a thing dependent on 
internal and external sensefields (ayatana) and can therefore 
not be equated with the notion of an abiding consciousness such 
as the bhavapga put forward in the Nikiyas and subsequently 
elaborated by the Yogacara. These particular doctrines will 
be examined in detail in Chapter 8 of this thesis. However it 
should be noted that Nagarjuna's understanding of vijnanaskandha 
is totally in accord with that of the earliest Buddhist writings. 
Of equal importance is the fact that the Vijninavadins too adopt 
such a position. For them the six evolved consciousnesses 
(pravrttivijnana), since they arise in dependence, must from 
ultimate point of view be considered to be empty (^unya). This 
seems to be all that Nagarjuna means when he says:-
- 7 -
"Consciousness (vijnana) occurs dependent upon the 
internal and external sensefields (ayatana). There 
consciousness is empty (sunya), like mirages and 
illusions (maricimayavat). Since consciousness 
(vijnana) arises dependent on a discernible object 
(vijfleya), the discernible does not exist (in 
itself)" (14)
Both consciousness and the external object then are dependent, 
and hence devoid of ownbeing (svabhiva).
It is a curious fact that the Bodhicittavivarana is the only
work attributed by tradition to Nagarjuna which features an obvious
critique of a position similar to that adopted by the Vijnanavadjns.
However this work is never mentioned by CandrakTrti, the only
trustworthy witness for its authenticity being Bhavaviveka in
his Ratnapradipa (15). This does not encourage one to incorporate
the text in the Nagarjuna corpus^quite apart from the fact that
the standard of argument is not what one would expect from the
Acarya himself. Not only is the refutation sophistical it is
(16)
also contradictory. Two examples of sophistry will suffice
to prove the low degree of argumentation. Firstly with reference
to the three nature our author says:-
".. the imagined (parikalpi ta), the dependent (paratantra)
and the absolute (parinigpanna) have only one nature of
their own : emptiness. They are the imaginations (kalpana) 
of mind (citta)" (17)
He does not attempt to follow this statement up. It is a condemn­
ation without support. Similarly we are blandly told that:-
- 8 -
"Mind (citta) is but a name (namamatra). It is nothing 
apart from (its) name. Consciousness must be regarded as 
but a name. The name has no own-being (Svabhava)". (18)
This second statement is clearly an untenable position if it
raises the objection outlined at the beginning of the Vigrahavyavartani,
0 A
an objective we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 2. The 
opponent in this text asks how it is possible for Nagarjuna to 
maintain the truth if he also allows that all things are empty.
Since emptiness applies to words themselves, how can they be 
used for the purpose of demonstrating such truth? Applying ourselves 
to the statement that since mind (citta) is merely a name and 
hence has no ownbeing, we are in fact met by incoherence. In 
the first place the logic of the claim is confused and in the 
second, even if we were to accept that names have no svabhava, 
we must not make the assumption that the object denoted by the 
name, ie. mind (citta) is also devoid of its svabhava.
Actually reading through the Bodhicittavivarana carefully, one 
is struck by many inconsistencies. The author at one point reverses 
his critique of the Vijninavada by affirming a central doctrine 
of the school.
Thus: "The (Buddha's) instruction about the aggregates, elements
etc (merely) aims at dispelling the belief in a self 
(itmagraha). By establishing (themselves) in consciousness 
only (citta-mitra) the greatly blessed (bodhisatt vas) also 
abandon that (instruction)". (19)
Returning co our theme let us ask ourselves a question. If
- 9 -
Nagarjuna is totally opposed to the existence of a mind, would 
he not also be concerned to refute the notion of terms which rely 
for their existence and efficaciousness on such a mental substratum? 
I am in particular thinking of terms which are derived from the 
verbal root jna. We can answer this question to the contrary.
Nagarjuna uses many terms of this type that indicate the fact that
-—
knowledge (jnana) seems to exist from the ultimate point of view. 
Thus we are told in the Yuktisa$tika-karika:-
"Just as the Buddhas have spoken of "my" and "I" for 
pragmatic reasons, thus they have also spoken of the 
aggregates skandha, the sense-fields (ayatana) and 
the elements (dhatu) for pragmatic reasons. The great 
elements etc. (mahabhutadi) are absorbed in consciousnessl/\ — -------------------------------------------------
(vijnana). They are dissolved by understanding them.
Certainly they are falsely imagined (mithya vikalpitam)". (20)
Here then two separate domains of knowledge are being explicated.
The first, with referents such as the notion of "I" and mine, has 
a pragmatic truth value which on a higher levelis seen as charact­
erised by false imagination. A higher form of knowledge appears 
to be born when the notions of the pragmatic level are dissolved 
in understanding (tajjnane vigamam). (21) It does seem difficult 
to believe how Nagarjuna would refute the notion of mind while 
at the same time adhering to this distinction between forms of 
knowledge. Knowledge seems to presuppose some mental apparatus 
by which the former gains efficacy.
In the above quotation from the Yuktisastika-karika we have the 
classical distinction between a mundane form of consciousness usually
- 10 -
associated with the term vijnana, and a higher level form of consc­
iousness which, as we shall see below, Nigarjuna gives the name 
j nana or prajna. These two forms of consciousness reflect the 
two level of truth doctrine held by all the Madhyamakas and,as 
we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6 ;by all the Buddhist schools, would 
appear to represent the mechanisms by which the world view of an 
ordinary person (prthagjana) and a saint (arya) differ. However 
this point of view is not peculiar to the Madhyamakas. The dist­
inction is made in Abhidharmakosa:-
"En effect la connaissance speculative (prajna) par lequelle 
on penetre et comprend, a le m£me domaine (visaya) que la 
connaissance vulgaire (vijnana) , (22)
and de la Vallee Poussin goes on to say:-
X  —  iA —
"D'apres les Vibhajyavadins, le jnana est bon en soi; le 
vijnana est bon quand il est associi- a jnana (Kosa iv 8b, 
p33 n.3): ce qui peut s'entendre que le jnana est le "savoir
supramondain", et que le vijnana savoir mondain, est bon
lorsqu^1il est consecutif au savoir supramondain". (23)
The precise definition of these various psychological terms, all 
of which are derived from the root jna is a matter of some debate 
among scholars and will be left to a more suitable occasion for 
detailed discussion, but at least one point is already clear.
This is the distinction between the mundane form of knowledge des­
ignated by the team vijnana and the knowledge or knowledges of
VS —  A —
a higher order termed jnana or prajna. It seems in fact that 
prajna and jnana are more or less interchangeable terms. J. May
- 11 -
tells us that:-
"... il existe entre citta et prajna la meme opposition 
qu'entre vijnana et jnana, connaissance empirique discursive 
et connaissance metaphysique intuitive". (24)
In Nigarjuna's system one of the fundamental features is the 
emphasis on the development of higher order forms of knowledge.
This is stated again and again. Thus:-
"When one sees that which arises conditioned by ignorance 
(avidyapratyaya) with a correct knowledge (samyagjnana), 
no origination (utpada) or destruction (nirodha) whatsoever 
is perceived (upalabhyate)". (25)
When someone has developed this correct knowledge (samyagjnana) 
then reality (tattya) is seen clearly and ignorance (avidya) is 
destroyed. It follows that since avidya is the first link in 
the twelve fold chain of mutual dependence (dvadasangika-pratTtya- 
samutpida), it is the cause of vijnana (the third member in the 
series) and hence when avidya is destroyed by jnana then so to 
is vijnina. We will examine this in detail in Chapter 7. However 
this is the meaning of MMK, xxvi, 11. One who has arrived at
such a realisation possesses a mind (citta) without a standpoint
(26) ^ (2 *7)
(sthina) , has produced an eye of knowledge (jnanacaksuh)
and in consequence the errors of defilement (klesadosa) that torment
due to false knowledge (mithyajRana) do not arise.
Now most scholars recognise that the task of Nagarjuna was partly 
to bring about an integration of the thought contained in that
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corpus of literature generally called Prajnaparamita. Murti 
typifies this notion:-
"The Madhyamika philosophy is a systematisation of the 
Prajnaparamita treatises". (29)
A typical text of the P.P. corpus is the Astasihas rika. In 
this work the perfection (paramita) of prajna is mentioned 
in a number of places as the chief of the other five perfect­
ions (dana - charity, sila - morality, ksanti - forbearance, 
dhyana - meditation and virya - heroic energy) in the sense 
that it is a guiding and regulating factor by which the other 
five may operate effectively. To quote Murti again:-
"A mind swayed by passions and attached to the world
cannot know the truth; the distracted mind (samahita citta)
is incapable of perceiving the truth for lack of steadiness
in attention. All the other paramitas are meant to
purify the mind and make it fit to receive the intuition
of the absolute (prajna). It is prajnaparamita again
that can complete them, make each of them a paramita ..." (30)
Given these facts we will have difficulty in disagreeing 
with Lindtner*s contention that in all the works of Nagarjuna
that we are considering to be authentic, the notion and explic-
^ (31)
ation of one single paramita (ie prajna) is central.
lA_
This is because it is as the result of prajna that a person 
embarked on a spiritual path is able to transcent the common- 
sense (vyavahara) world view which sees things (dharmas) 
with respect to their characteristics (lakgana) and own-being 
(svabhava) and enters a field of cognition where ultimately 
these things do not exist in the way they were formerly imputed
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but rather, are empty (sunya) of such defining marks as laksana 
and svabhava. If we did wish to make a clear distinction between 
prajna and jnana we could do no better than to endorse Lindtner's 
view that:-
"The culmination of prajna ... is jnana, or intuitive 
insight into reality (tatt ya) beyond the duality of (is) 
asti and_(is not) nasti. This jnana is also the suspension 
of avidya which, as we have seen, in the final analysis 
is based on the wrong assumption of existence and non­
existence etc". (32)
In the texts we are dealing with, Nagarjuna does not define
either of these two terms but we may safely assume that while 
u. -
prajna is a continually evolving faculty dependent on the path
A —
and involving analysis, jnana is the end result of such a 
development, and in consequence, is entirely empty (sunya) 
of the miscellaneous defilements.
One of the major features shared by both the Madhyamaka and 
the Vijnanavada is the notion that ignorance (avidya) has as 
its root characteristic, the dichotomosing tendencies of the 
common sense worldview. The Vijnanavadins place pride of place 
on the false distinction between a subject and an object 
(grahyagrahakakalpana). For Vasubandhu therefore, when the 
mind is at work in an ordinary person a transformation takes 
place such that the distinction between being conscious of 
something (vijnana) and something of which one is conscious 
(vijneya) arises. This dichotomy is calledrepresentation 
(vijnapti). Of course this does not mean that the vijnapti
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lA.
is caused by vijnana. On the contrary, from the vijnapti proceeds 
the vijnana/vijfteya combination which itself produces the idea 
of subjects and objects (grahya-grahaka). This is the sense 
of the Vijnanavadin doctrine that everything is representation 
only (vijnaptimatra). This of course does not imply the idealistic 
connotation that many authors have seen fit to put on it. For 
Vasubandhu reality is observed by the subject/object dichotomy:-
"This transformation of vijnana is a (falsely constructed) 
dichotomy (of subject and object). That which is falsely 
reconstructed is not real. Therefore this everthing is 
nothing but representation (vijnaptimatra)" (33)
A doctrine of a quite similar style is also maintained by Nagarjuna. 
The Sunyatasaptatikarika for instance seeks to demonstrate that 
the reality of things lies between the two extremes of permanence 
(sasvata) and annihilation (uccheda):
"If there is being (sat) there is permanence; if there 
is non-being (asat) there is necessarily annihilation ...
To experience the two as mutually excluding (parasparavip- 
aryaya) is a mistake (viparyaya) ...Therefore it is not 
logical that Nirvana is being and non-being". (34)
Another way these dichotomously opposed principles lead to errors 
regarding the way the true state of things is presented, is 
described in the Yuktisastika-karika where we are told that:-
"Those whose intelligence (buddhi) has transcended being 
and non-being (astinasti) and is unsupported have discovered 
the profound and inobjective meaning of condition (pratyaya).
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Being and non-being are only one pair of opposites which are 
inappropriate for use when talking of reality. The mind addicted 
to discursive thought (vikalpa) automatically generates such 
sets in its doomed attempt to describe reality. However:-
"When (someone) cognizes (something) as born or unborn, 
present or gone, bound or liberated (then) he maintains 
duality (d vaya) (and consequently) does not know the truth 
(tattva)." (36)
< V \ —  ^
That the Vijnanavada prefer one pair of opposites over any other
to demonstrate that the nature of things cannot be adequately
shown by their application may be simply a matter of convenience.
Any pair would do. The point is that knowledge devoid of thought
construction (nirvikalpajnana) is knowledge devoid of dichotomies
(advayajnana) . Some authors, such as Kunst,^^ believe that
by positing such a nondual knowledge, both of the schools of
Buddhist philosophy we are examining are guilty of contradicting
(38)the law of the excluded middle. Ruegg disagrees here.
For him:-
"... to say that something is neither A nor non A (A) does 
not represent an attempt on the part of the Madhyamika 
to define some entity (bhava, ie a thing possessing svabhava) 
that is neither A nor A (indeterminate), but rather a way 
of stating the Buddhist theory of conditionship in terms 
of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness of own being 
(svabhavasunyata) and non-substantiality of all factors 
(dharmanairatmya).
This means that while complementary and extreme positions based 
on the dichotomizing activities of ordinary people are xcluded
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from the Madhyamika conception of the Middle Way, Ruegg does not 
feel that the law of excluded middle or non-contradiction are 
being rejected since no entity is being posited. I do not accept 
Ruegg's reasoning here. Through the rejection of false dichotomies 
an entity or a state is being posited, though from an ontological 
point of view its status must be considered indeterminate. The 
Buddhist position is not fully defined by either Kunst or Ruegg.
In a way one may agree that the law of excluded middle is being 
broken, but not in the Western sense since the middle term has 
a quite different ontological status from the two alternatives.
The law of excluded middle is not really applicable here. Ruegg 
is equally guilty of adhering to Western forms of reasoning by 
maintaining that the law is being obeyed. Ruegg rejects Western 
conceptions when this suits him however:
"... ultimate reality ... is the domain of what Candrakirti 
terms tattvalaksana proper, as accessible to the gnosis 
(jnana) of the perfected saints (arya)". (39)
This seems to be an acceptance of non-logical thought. As a matter 
of fact, when pressed by an opponent in his commentary on MMK XV 2 
Candrakirti gives a number of metaphorical designations (upadiya 
prajnapti) for this ontologically indeterminate reality. He calls 
it the essential nature (prakrti), thusness (tathati) synonyms
\A— _
which are the common property of both Madhyamaka and Vijnana-vada. 
This refusal to see the ultimate from any position conditioned 
by dichotomous thought is taken up by virtually all Madhyamakas, 
Atisa being a representative case. Thus:-
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"... (absolute truth) cannot be the object of any kind of conceptual 
thinking (kalpana) for reality (tattva) is not susceptible to various 
distinctions such as marks of being, non-being, own-being, other-being, 
truth, untruth, permanence, destruction, eternal, non-eternal, 
pleasure, pain, pure, impure, self, non-self, empty, non-empty, 
and unity, difference, origination, cessation etc., for they possess 
a relative nature." (41)
Among Nagarjuna's works such statements are echoed in the Acintyastava 
of the Catuhstava and the mangalasloka of the Mulamadhyamakakarikas.
If we now ask ourselves the reason why reality is conceived in an 
erroneous fashion by those who have not achieved arhatship , then the 
answer is because of vikalpa and prapanca. In the Yuktisastika we 
are given to assume that discrimination (vikalpa) and a fickle (cala) 
mind (manah) mutually condition one another. In other words incorrect 
apprehension of reality is the indispensible concommitant of a part­
icular state of mind. Now the term prapanca actually means something
(45)
like "expansion". The Anguttara Nikaya indicates that the fourteen
unexplicated points (avyakrtavastu) such as "Does the Tatha^ata exist 
after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and 
not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after 
death? etc are imagined (prapancitam) , and the Saipyutta gives
as such examples of prapanca such statements as: "I am, "I shall
be", "I shall not be", "I shall not be formed", "I shall be formless", 
etc. Prapanca then is that activity of consciousness that leads us 
to the belief that we are isolated beings at large in an extended 
world of plurality. At its root prapanca is a dichotomizing tendency 
which endlessly generates principles reliant on the relationship between 
identity (ekatva) and difference (anyatva). In other words because 
of prapanca categories such as self, other, being, non-being Nirva na,
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Samsara, subject, object, etc. arise. J. May says:-
"Prapanca, litteralement "expansion", tib. spros pa, me parait 
designer non pas taut la fonction de pensee discursive, correspondant, 
sons divers aspects a vikalpa, vitarka, vicara, que 1'operation 
de cette function, et le resultat de cette operation, c'est-a- 
dire le monde constitue en objects et concepts dis.tincts" . ( 47 )
The mode by which prapanca informs the world picture of the unenlight­
ened is through discursive thought (vikalpa), reasoning (vicara), 
and conjecture (vitarka). Vikalpa further differentiates the basically 
dichotomized world produced by prapanca until definite views or dogmas 
(drsti) are formed. From vikalpas concerning being (bhava) and non- 
being (abhava) the twin heresies of eternalism (sasvatadarsana) and 
nihilism (ucchedadarsana) are formed and such an attitude to the world, 
in turn, gives rise to suffering (duhkha).
"Profane people (prthagjana) with their positivistic attitude 
(bhavatmaka) are ... deceived by their own mind (svacitta).
Those who understand see that things have ... totally arisen
as a result of ignorance (avidyahetutah) without beginning, middle
or end." (48)
It is jnana therefore that destroys the ignorance (avidya) that arises 
in connection with prapanca. Prapanca is seen to be lacking in any
'fo­
re al foundation. The activities of vikalpa which on-tol-ogrze concepts
j  _
of being (asti) and non-being (nasti) are seen, through jnana, as 
inappropriate to the ultimate understanding of reality (tattva).
From the ultimate viewpoint everything has been imagined (kalpanamitra):
"Therefore you have declared that all phenomena are merely imagined. 
Yes, even the imagination through which emptiness is conceived 
is said to be untrue." (49)
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This sounds remarkably like a statement by Vasubaudhu or Asanga.
The idea of dependent origination (prat'ftyasamutpada ) i s central 
to the thought of Nagarjuna. The centrality of this doctrine in the 
Buddhist tradition will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, in its 
general extended sense the twelve fold chain of dependent origination 
(dvadasarigapratityasamutpada) is mentioned in Chapter XXVI of the 
Mulamidhyamakakarikas. It may be the case that the term pratTtya- 
samutpada itself is a metaphorical designation for reality (tattva).
It would be difficult simply to treat pratTtyasamutpada in its 12-fold 
form as a theory of causality or conditionally since Nagarjuna does 
a thorough refutation of any possible conditions (pratyaya) in Ch1 
of MMK. The two verses of the mangalasloka seem to confirm this since 
they speak of a pratTbysamutpada taught by the Buddha which is the 
equivalent of the shutting off of prapanca and is in consequence without 
destination, production, neither annihilated nor eternal, neither 
differentiated nor undifferentiated and without coming or going:
anirodhamanutpadamanucchedamasasvatam anekarthamananarthaman- 
agamamanirgam yah pratTtyasamutp~adam prapancopa^amainn givam ~  
de^ayamasa sambuddhastam vande vadatam varam
This sounds very much like the earlier discussed idea of reality (tattva)
which is realised through jnana to be free of all dichotomously
constructed distinctions. The real must be indeterminate. Hence 
/_
the Sunyatasaptati
"Without one (eka) there are not many (aneka). Without many 
one is not possible. Therefore things that rise dependently 
(pratTtyasamutpanna) are indeterminable (animitta)." (50)
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Having come to a realisation of pratltyasamutpada all conventional 
view points (drgti) concerning the nature of things are extinguished; 
ignorance (avidya) ceases and one comes to understand reality (tatt- 
vajnana):
"Those who have^come to understand that dependent origination 
(pratTtyasamutpada) is devoid of origination (utpada) and destruction 
(viria^a) have crossed the ocean of existence consisting of dogmas 
(drstibhutabhavarnava)". (51)
When we turn to this doctrine as expounded in the MMK we shall be 
in a better position to judge its exact status in Nagarjuna’s system. 
However from what we have seen so far we can at least maintain that 
the tattva/prat'Ttyasamutpada group of concepts differ in many senses 
from most other ideas examined by Nagarjuna. They are never, like 
other concepts, demonstrated to be totally devoid of own-nature 
(svabhava) and hence empty (sunya) in the sense of non-existent.
How could they be since we are told frequently that they cannot be 
apprehended in terms of existence nor non-existence? On the contrary 
they have an ontological status which cannot be determined since all 
determination depends on the workings of an unenlightened mind ie. 
one acted upon by prapanca. Like the 20th century European existentialist, 
Nagarjuna holds that knowledge must always be conditioned by the strangle­
hold of the verb "to be" on the language we employ, and in consequence 
all speculation on the nature of things must resort to essentialist 
terminology. On this basis I cannot agree with Lindtner who says:-
"Instead of taking things in terms of asti and nasti one should 
become aware that all entities are pratTtyasamutpanna, without, 
however, committing the fallacy of conceiving pratTtyasamutp^da
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as a fact and by itself." (52)
It seems that by applying non-existence to pratityasamutpada Lindtner 
himself is guilty of the error of annihilationism (ucchedadar^apa).
The fact is that prat'ityasamutpida is ontologically indeterminate.
In other words it cannot be determined with respect to exclusive 
categories.
To sum up then it is clear that the term pratityasamutpada is being 
used in two entirely distinct manners in the writings of this school 
of Buddhist philosophy. The first may almost be termed an exoteric 
teaching while the second will be esoteric. In the exoteric we are 
dealing with the traditional twelve nidinas. Using such a heuristical 
device Nagarjuna is able to show that on the conventional level the 
basic teachings of the Buddha have a practical validity, and hence 
the danger of the higher truth doctrine (that by intellectually realising 
the truth of ^ p M ^ a l  Csunyatasatya) someone may decide that there 
is no point making an effort on the spiritual path since from an ultimate 
point of view there is no such thing as morality. Buddhahoo.d Nirvana 
etc.) applied independently of the iower, is defused. The exoteric 
pratityasamutpada therefore is applied to demonstrate the mechanisms 
of the Four Noble Truths doctrine. Whether it is entirely successful 
in this will be left to a later discussion, particularly in Chapter 
7 above, but we may safely say that the second and third truths are 
dealt with in this teaching. Thus the Arising of Suffering 
(duhkhasamudaya) is shown to be a movement towards samsara caused 
by ignorance (avidya) whereas the Cessation of Suffering (duhkhanirodha) 
is a movement backwards through the chain resulting in the extinction
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of ignorance (avidya) by the application of prajna Reading to the 
direct understanding of reality (tattvajnana) which is Nirvana. This 
seems to be the sense of the Sunyatasaptati:-
"By understanding the truth (tattva), ignorance (avidya), which 
arises from the four perverted ideas (viparyasa), does not exist. 
When this is no more, the karma-formations (samskara) do not 
arise. The remaining (ten members) likewise"-! (53)
"To imagine (kip- ) that things (bhava) born by causes and conditions 
(hetupratyaya) are real (samyak) is called ignorance (avidya) 
by the Teacher (sastr).From that the twelve members (dvada^'Sriga) 
arise. But when one, by seeing correctly, has understood that 
things (bhava) are empty (^ unya) one is not infatuated (mudha).
That is the cessation of ignorance (avidya-nirodha). Thereupon 
the twelve members stop". (54)
It is interesting that this exoteric teaching is incapable of explaining 
the first Origin of suffering and the final end; in other words the 
first and fourth Noble Truths. When we turn to an examination of 
the esoteric teaching however this problem is cleared up. We are 
now dealing with a conception of pratTtyasamutpada which works as 
a metaphorical designation for reality uncontaminated by the working 
of prapanca . Now from our previous discussion we know that conceptions 
such as Origin and End are merely the result of discriminative thought 
(vikalpa) working on the fundamental distinction between identity 
(ekatva) and difference (anyatva) which is the feature of prapanca.
From the ultimate point of view however tattva, and therefore prat- 
Ttyasamutpada, are free from prapanca (prapancopasamam) and therefore 
it is inappropriate at this level to speak of the beginning or the 
end of reality. This is traditional Buddhist doctrine which is ref­
lected in the unexplicated points (avyakrtavastu) such as "Is the 
world eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, or neither
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(55)
eternal nor not eternal?" It seems then that if we equate the
exoteric teaching with the conventional level of truth (samvrtisatya) 
and the esoteric teaching with the ultimate level of truth (para- 
marthasatya) the use of limiting terms such as Beginning and End are 
inappropriate for both. This is rather a conundrum and one begins 
to wonder whether Nlgarjuna's theory of the two truths can really 
effectively deal with traditional Buddhist teachings since we have 
already identified an area in which a fundamental set of ideas ie - 
the First and Fourth Noble Truths, appear problematic.
To resolve such a problem the Madhyamaka acaryas posit the idea of 
different types of disciples. On the initial stages of the path a 
practioner is treated to positivistic teachings:-
"To begin with (a teacher) should say that everything exists 
to his truth-seeking (pupil). Later_when he has understood the 
meaning he gains isolation (viviktata) without being attached". (56)
Candrakirti distinguishes three separate types of disciple; the lower
type (hlna-vineya), the middling type (madhya-vineya) and the Superior
(57)type (utkrsta-vineya). The lower type is given positive descriptions
of reality in which terms such as self (atman) apply and serve to 
turn such a disciple away from unwholesome actions. The middling 
type is taught in a negative manner. In this way notions such as 
non-self (anatman) free the practioner from the speculative view 
that there is such a thing as a real substantial self (satkayadpsti).
The superior type of disciple is said to be able to penetrate the 
very kernel of the most profound teachings and in consequence, having 
attained to the stage of zealous attachment (adhimukti) with respect
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to nirvana, is taught in terms of neither ... nor type statements 
eg. there is neither a self nor a non-self. In other words the Buddhist 
spiritual path appears from the writings of Nagarjuna and CandrakTrti 
to be a graded one, the development of prajna leading to the understanding 
of reality (tattvajnana) being a slow process.
Before turning to an examination of these same doctrines as presented
in MMK it may be worthwile to ponder a curious fact. Most scholars
agree that the distinctive feature of the Madhyamaka teaching is the
Two levels of Truth doctrine. It is the case however that in these
subsidiary works of Nagarjuna a distinction between the conventional
(samvrti) and the ultimate (paramartha) is hardly ever explicitly
stated, though of course a generalised appeal to such notions is very
often implicit in many statements. It is interesting therefore that
in one of the few verses I have been able to identify in which the
two truths are both mentioned, ie. in the Acintyastava of the Catuhstava,
—  —
the formulation of the doctrine bears distinctly Vijnanavada-like 
connotations. Thus:
"Convention (samYrti) arises from causes and conditions and is 
relative (paratantra). Thus the relative has been spoken of (by 
You). The ultimate meaning, however is absolute (akrtrima)". (58)
The relative (paratantra) is the middle term in the three nature 
(trisvabhava) doctrine of the Vijnanavada and is very often identified 
with pratityasamutpada. For instance the Mahayanasamgraha gives nine 
essential meanings of paratantrasvabhava (the relative nature). These 
are: (i) The base for the appearance of entities (sarvadharma-
pratibhasasraya)
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(ii) Dependent origination (pratityasamutpada)
(iii) Representation only (vijnaptimatratl)
(iv) Neither different nor non-different (from the other 
two svabhavas) (na bhinno riapy abhinnah)
(v) Like magical illusion etc. (maycidivat)
(vi) Pertaining to suffering and cleansing (samklesamsiko 
vyavada n amsikas ca)
(vii) The object apprendended by the knowledge realised in 
succession (to the wisdom) aVajnbanatp ppsthalabdhajnanasya)
(viii) Nirvana without any fixed abode (apratisthitanirvana)
(ix) The Buddha’s body constituting entities (dharmakiya) (59)
As a provisional measure, then, we may say that the two truths should 
not be considered as ontological entities, but rather as epistemological 
orientations towards some undefined being, given a number of epithets 
such as pratityasamutpada, which nevertheless cannot be said to exist 
or not exist in the same way that it is possible to say cars or unicorns 
exist^or not^as the case may be. We must assume therefore that both 
truths can only be efficacious within some, as yet, indeterminate mental 
framework, though at this stage it may be possible to suggest that 
the perception of the conventional truth (samvrtisatya) is in some 
sense tied up with the workings of vijnana while the ultimate truth 
(paramarthasatya) involves jnana.
Nagarjuna's use of the term relative (paratantra) for pratltyasamutpida 
•naturally allows us to speculate that there may be a great deal more 
connection between his 2 fold truth formulation and the three nature
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notions of the Vijnanavadins than is generally recognised. This theme 
will be picked up and developed at a later stage in our argument.
However we must stay with Nagarjuna himself a little longer to establish 
his position in the most prominent of his works.
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It will be our purpose in the following chapter to investigate 
the doctrines contained in Nagarjuna's major works. We will examine 
the interpretation of some important scholars and attempt to show 
their various drawbacks. This wild, point the way to our own position 
with regard to his work, a position in which a specific solution 
with respect to pratTtyasamutpida becomes the key concept in the 
understanding of reality. PratTtyasamutpida will be shown to be 
as positive a description of reality as is possible, given Nagarjuna's, 
and the general Buddhist tradition's stance on the role of language.
It will provide the rational for the appearance of the englightened 
and the unenlightened states. However before this exegesis is 
possible let us examine the contemporary views on those texts which 
are indisputably claimed, by all, to be authentically written by 
Nagarjuna himself.
It has been customary among scholars of the past to read Nagarjuna
with the aid of a commentary, usually in Sanskrt. Indeed since
the MMK itself was abstracted in the first place and in totality,
_  . (1 )
from the commentary (Prasannapada) of Candrakirti , it is hardly 
surprising that the views expressed in that commentary are strongly 
associated with the doctrines of the MMK. We are left then with 
a tradition of scholarship initiated by Stcherbatsky and in the 
present day represented by Murti that attempts an exposition of 
Nagarjuna's doctrines based on commentar ..al literature written
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approximately four centuries after the event and one would suppose,
though here information is very sketchy, after significant developments
in the use of logic, religio-philosophical debate and general
intercourse of ideas leading to a somewhat modified world picture
and philosophical inclination. Nevertheless scholars like Murti
retain their position. They claim that the Midhyamika;-
"... uses only one weapon. By drawing out the implications 
of any view he shows its self contradictory character. The 
dialectic is a series of REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM arguments 
(prasangapadanam). Every thesis is turned against itself.
The Madhyamika is a prasangika or vaitandika, a dialectician 
or free-lance debater. The Madhyamika DISPROVES the opponent's 
thesis, and does not prove any thesis of his own." (2)
In fact, as we shall see in due course, not even Candrakirti himself
can realistically claim to simply turn an opponent's thesis upon
itself and therefore reduce it to absurd conclusions without either
introducing positions that the opponent does not hold himself,
or more importantly disprove the opponent's thesis without proving
any thesis of his own. When we turn to the case of Nagirjuna
we shall see that such a description of his method is impossible
(3)to uphold. In the first place Robinson has attempted to demonstrate 
that in some instances Nigarjuna seems to be explicitly using
at least two of the three traditional Western "Laws of Thought"
as axiomatic to his system, though there is little evidence that
this position is agreed upon by his opponent. Thus we have a
number of explicit statements of the principle of contradiction
in the karikas:-
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"In truth, the cessation of a real existing entity is not 
possible. For indeed, it is not possible to have the nature 
of both existence and non-existence at the same time." (A)
or "A completed-incompleted doer cannot create a completed- 
incompleted deed. For how could the mutually conflicting 
completed and incompleted states co-exist as one?" (5)
These statements would seem to mirror the purport of the third 
position of the catuskoti or tetralemma employed by the Buddhists, 
that a thing cannot be both existent and non-existent, and in 
this general, sense the third koti appears to conform to the principle 
of contradiction. Now, although the law of identity is nowhere 
found in any of the works we have ascribed to Nagarjuna, Robinson 
certainly believes that the law of the excluded middle is held.
In support of his contention he cites:-
"Indeed, a passing entity does not come to pass, and neither 
does a non-passing entity. Apart from these, how could there 
be a third (type of) entity coming to pass?" (6)
and "One who admits existence will necessarily perceive permanence
and destruction. For, it necessarily flows that such an existence 
must either be permanent or impermanent." (7)
We may simply comment at this stage that such statements as the 
ones above do seem to support the view that a. law of the excluded 
middle is invoked on occasions by Nagirjuna. Robinson*s conclusions, 
with regard to i\lag"ar juna* s putative adherence to such laws^are 
suitably vague. This is obviously advisable, particularly since 
at no point in his writings does Nat Ir juna c*e.c--tly state the
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laws of thought as such. It has been suggested more than once that 
Indian thought forms need not precisely mirror those adopted in 
the West; such a contention being tantamount to cultural imperial—
ism* Robinson seems to be bearing this in mind as he does
not appear to press Nagarjuna's adherence to the laws very far, 
contending in his summing up merely that:-
"Since Nigirjuna's argumentation relies on numerous dichotomies, 
the principle of contradiction is necessary to most of his 
inferences." (8)
(9)In another article Robinson has again questioned how far the 
contention that Nagarjuna adopted the prasanga method with his 
opponents can be upheld. He concludes that in fact it is possible 
to tease out a number of positions that are Naglrjuna's alone and 
do not belong to any identifiable opponent. Using such a method 
Robinson is able to show that six positive positions are axiomatically 
held solely by Nagarjuna in his MMK. These are as follows.
(i) Whatever has extension is divisible, hence is composite and 
is therefore neither permanent nor real. In consequence an indivisible, 
infinitesimal thing cannot possess extension. Now all the schools 
of Buddhism together with the Mahiyinasutras do in fact expound 
a category of non-composite, non-conditioned things.(asamskrtadharmas). 
Space (ikisa) is a dharma of this category which is considered 
to have infinite extension, while at the same time being incapable 
of division. The Acintyastava of the Catufrstava agrees with such 
a definition since we are told:
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"That which arises not, disappears not, is not to be annihilated 
n°k permanent, that is (tattva) which is like space 
(akasa) (^and) not within the range of words (or) knowledge 
(aksarajnina)!f. (11)
It seems strange then that in MMK ch. 5. Nagarjuna should concentrate 
his attack on the notion of space (akasa) by picking the re]ation 
between akasa and its characteristics (laksanas) as a weak link, 
when it is clear that his opponents by regarding akasa as asamskrta 
are saying that it is in fact devoid of attributes or characteristics 
(laksana) . If Nagarjuna accepts his opponents'* position space would 
be "not within the range of words or knowledge (aksarajnana)", 
and consequently would not be a legitimate target for his argument.
(ii) To exist means to be arisen and consequently existence is 
synonymous with manifestation and there can be no unmanifested 
existence. This axiom seems to contradict the doctrines of other 
Buddhists who hold that the real is that which has never arisen, 
has no beginning and no end and is permanent. This seems to be 
the meaning of the Udana when we are told:-
"There is that sphere wherein is neither earth nor water nor 
fire nor air, wherein is neither the sphere of infinite space 
nor of infinite consciousness, nor of nothingness, nor of 
either ideation nor non-ideation; where there is neither this 
world nor a world beyond nor both together nor moon and sun; 
this I say is free from coming and going, from duration and 
decay; there is no beginning and no establishment, no result 
and no cause; this indeed is the end of suffering". (12)
In other places Nagirjuna holds to such as position, hence
"Where the functional realm of the mind ceases, the realm
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words also ceases. For^indeed, the essence of existence 
(dharmata) is like nirvana, without origination and destruction." (13)
and such a view is echoed in the mangalasloka of MMK. We may therefore 
conclude with Robinson that
"Nagarjuna is not alone among the thinkers of classical India 
in promiscuously ahering now to one and now to another of 
these (two) axioms." (14)
(iii) A real thing would have to be an utterly simple individual 
which contains no diversity. If it had diversity, it would have 
extension and so would not be indivisible and real. This is a 
corollary of axiom (i).
(iv) The perception of arising and ceasing is illusory. Nigarjuna 
makes such a point in the karikas:-
"You may think that both occurrence and dissolution can be 
perceived but such a perception only comes about from a deluded 
mind." (15)
Very often the perception of origination and duration are compared 
with a dream, an illusion or a city of the Gandharvas
"Like an illusion, a dream or an illusory city in the sky.
In such a way has origination, duration and cessation been 
described." (16)
On the basic of this axiom Robinson shows that Nagarjuna's attempt 
to demonstrate all phenomena as illusory (maya) is not arrived
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at by a prasanga treatment of an opponent’s position and neither 
is it arrived at by resort to an empirical examination of perception 
which shows that the senses always generate distorted information.
On the contrary all that Nagarjuna is doing here is dogmatically 
asserting that perception is always distorted by false thought 
constructions (vikalpa, prapanca etc.).
(v) Only transitive actions and relations are allowed. In other 
words, Robinson claims that in the case of MMK.VIL7-8:-
" (opponents contention) As light illuminates both itself and 
other entities, so does origination give rise both to itself 
and others."
"(Nagarjuna's reply) There is no darkness in light or in 
its abode. What then does light illumine when, indeed, it 
destroys darkness?" (17)
What Nagarjuna is doing when he denies that a lamp can illuminate 
itself, is merely disallowing the making of reflexive statements.
Thus in the case of the statement "Light illuminates itself" Nigarjuna 
will claim incoherence even though that same statement may be 
reformulated as "Light is inherently bright" which is perfectly 
coherent from a commonsense point of view. It seems then that 
axiom five becomes a special case of axiom three in which a real 
thing is defined as being utterly simple and hence without attributes. 
As we have already shown that axiom three is a corollary of axiom 
one and that no one except Nagarjuna takes this axiom seriously 
one left feeling that Nagarjuna's method is on occasions specious 
to say the least.
- 38 -
(vi) It is claimed that the Buddhas teach:-
” ... that the dharma is based on two truths; namely the relative 
(samvrti) truth and the ultimate (paramirtha) truth." (18)
However in this chapter (24) of the karikas Nagarjuna’s putative 
opponent is a Hinayanist who argues that Nagarjuna is denying the 
Buddha's teaching as contained in the Tripitaka. Nigarjuna is 
not therefore in a position to invoke the Buddha's teaching on 
the two truths as contained in the Mahayana sutras since his antag­
onistic will not accept such texts as authority.
We are now in a position to briefly summarise Nagarjuna's method 
in the karikas. As Robinson puts it:
"It consists (a) of reading into the opponent's views a few 
terms which one defines for him in a contradictory way, and 
(b) insisting on a small set of axioms which are at variance 
with common sense and not accepted in their entirety by any 
known philosophy." (19)
This is most definitely not the prasangi method as defined by Murti. 
Other authors have noted the inconsistencies between the reductio 
ad absurdum method extolled by Candrakirti and Nagarjuna's own 
particular orientation. Lamotte is a major scholar who, in his 
introduction to a translation of the VimalakTrtinirdesastitra, is 
prepared to put down a further six positions or theses which he 
considers are held in a positive sense by the early Madhymaka at 
least from the point of view of the conventional truth (samvrti-satya). 
These gre ( j ) /\]] dharmas are without own-being (nihsvabh'ava) ,
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empty of self being (svabhavasunya). (ii) All dharmas are non­
produced (anutpanna) and non-destroyed (aniruddha). (iii) All 
dharmas are originally quiet (adisanta) and by nature in complete 
nirvapa (prakrtiparinirvrta). (iv) The dharmas are without a character 
(alaksana) and are consequently unutterable (anirvacanTya, anabhilapya) 
and inconceivable (acintya). (v) all dharmas are equal (sama)
and non-dual. (advaya). (vi) Emptiness (sunyata) is not an entity 
(bhava, dharma, padirtha). Although we may object to statement
(vi), preferring to say that from the ultimate point of view ^unyati 
neither exists (asti) nor does not exist (nasti) nevertheless here 
again we have a respectable authority on Mahayana Buddhism admitting 
the fact that Nagarjuna, far from following the prasanga method, 
is quite ready to make a number of statements which appear axiomatic 
for his own system and not held by any known opponent.
The pivotal point of the whole Madhyamaka system seems to be the 
term sunyata. Nagarjuna's statement in MMK.XXIV, 11, that a wrongly 
grasped sunyata is like a badly siezed snake appears to imply that 
an ontological existence value cannot easily be predicated of it.
That it cannot be either an existent or a non-existent seems clear 
since the Madhyamika would be guilty of the charge of eternalism 
(sasvatavada) if he endorsed the former position, and by condoning 
the second would be accused of nihilism (ucchedavada). Since all 
Buddhist schools, and the Madhymaka is no exception here, stress 
an avoidance of adopting any extreme position, and in consequence 
tread a Middle Path (madhyama pratipad) between them, there is 
a difficulty in accepting the idea of sunyata which itself avoids 
these two extremes. P. J. Baju (20) has a point in his assocation
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of the term sunya with the mathematical zero of Indian scientific 
thought. Zero is defined as a mathematically indeterminate number, 
being neither positive nor negative. This seems a reasonable 
interpretation and the only objection to Raju’s position here is 
that of Ruegg whose argument seems more a quibble than anything 
else, since as we shall see, he is wholeheartedly opposed to any 
attempt to place a value on the notion of sunyata. He says:-
"... there is no evidence in the basic texts of the Madhyamaka 
school that a mathematical model (and place-value) had any 
immediate bearing on their theory of sunyata. In the Madhyamaka 
the term sunya refers to the fact that any dharma is empty 
of own being (svabhavasunya) in which notion there is no 
mathematical connotation." (21)
It seems to me that Raju has not been attempting to explicate the 
whole of the Madhyamaka philosophy using a mathematical model as 
Ruegg seems to suggest, but is simply saying that the concept of 
zero as an idea referring to an entity or entities which cannot be 
determined with regard to being or non-being, and which consequently 
ha we a problematic ontological value, may quite feasibly have 
been borrowed from mathematics.
Now MMK.xxiv .13 holds that emptiness (sunyata) may not be an 
object of refutation. This stands to reason. Something may only 
be refuted or affirmed if it is capable of being understood in terms 
of being or non—being. Sunyata is clearly not capable of being 
understood in such a way, which is why it is reported to be like 
a snake wrongly grasped (fIMK .xxiv.11) . One can easily fall into 
the trap of assigning a definite value to it. This is what Lamotte 
is saying n his thesis (vi), ie. that sunyata is not an entity.
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It does not follow from this that sunyata does not exist. It is
not in a null class, along with mirages, etc., as Nakamura would
, ,. (22) 
have us believe v
Nagarjuna's statement that;-
"Whatever is in correspondence with emptiness (sunyati) all 
is in correspondence (ie,possible). Again whatever is not 
in correspondence with emptiness (sunyata), all is not in 
correspondence." (23)
shows how sunyata- is to be properly interpreted. iiJhen things are 
not understood as being empty, substantiality or own-being 
(svabh'ava) is imputed to them. Nagarjuna shows in MPjK.xv. that the 
concept of svabhava„when associated with things, renders them 
incapable of cooperating in dependent origination (pratTtyasam- 
utpada) . An ignorant world-view then destroys the essentially 
causal characteristic of things. Emptiness {sunyata) simply 
signifies the abandonment of such a world-view. One comes to 
see how things actually cooperate.
Robinson confirms our supposition, while at the same time repud­
iating the position of Nakamurat-
"(All [sarvam] ) means all mundane and transmundane dharmas 
(in MMK.XXIV.1 A), that is all true predicables in the Buddhist 
domain of discourse. It manifestly does not mean predications 
about rabbit horns and tortoise hairs ... Dependent co-arising 
is emptiness and therefore it is cogent._ Emptiness is by 
definition 'absence of own being' (svabhava). The entire point 
of Nagarjuna's argument is that the class of entiti es that 
possess own-being is null. Thus the class of empty phenomena 
(pratTtya-samutpida) is the complement of the own-being or 
null class ... Thus the emptiness class is not null, but is 
co-extensive with the universal class." (2*t)
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Things are not totally non-existence but simply falsely imputed to 
have own-being (svabhava). In fact these dharmas are svabhavasunya 
and cannot be confused with any null class from a logical point
of view. Actually, this second non-null or universal class has 
cogency simply because it is linked to pratTtyasamutpida .
In another part of the karikas we find that:-
"Dependent Origination (pratTtyasamutpada) we call emptiness 
(sunyata). This is a provisional name and indeed it is the 
middle path". (25)
In other words "sunyata is a provisional name or metaphorical design­
ation ( upada.ya prajnapti) for dependent origination (pratTtya­
samutpida). It has already oeen noted (supra p.15f.) that the 
concept of pratTtyasamutpada occupied an inportant place in 
Nagarjuna's system. Now we can see why. PratTtyasamutpada and 
'sunyata are synonymous. ulhatever is in correspondence with these 
is ultimately true.
Nagair juna' s method then is to show that any of the alternatives
supplied by discursive thought to characterise things, may be
conventionally valid, but from the ultimate point of view do not
apply. In presenting the conventional options he clearly, as Ruegg
suggests, uses a logical method based on Aristotelean "two-valued
logic founded on the dichotomously structured binary nature of
(pjo )
ciscursive thinking in terms of alternatives."
Or again:—
"... the exclusion of the middle, as an onto-Iogical principle ... 
is ... one of the very foundations of Madhyamaka thought.
And if the logical principle of excluded middle ... is not 
accfpted in the Madhyamika's procedure based on the use of 
the prasanga, this is because he considers that the subject 
of such sentences is in fact null". (21 )
- 43 -
However, since he rejects all alternatives from the ultimate 
point of view, one will be wary in applying Uestern logical concepts 
to interpret his system in to to, Ruegg again sums this up by 
stating:-
"That the principle involved in the TERTIUM NON DATUR is indeed 
fundamental in Madhyamika thought follows from the consideration 
that, if a third position or value really existed, the mind 
would cling to it as some kind of thing, albeit one beyond 
the two values of "classical" logic. But if this were to 
happen there^could be no "stillness" or "tranquility" on the 
level of paramartha, ie-no absence of vikalpa and prapanca.
And this would be radically opposed to Madhyamaka theory". (2&)
Ue can give a qualified support for such a view, the qualification 
being that at the level of param'artha, ie. that state devoid of 
thought construction (nirvikalpajnana), "stillness" does not 
imply the complete obliteration of mental processses. As we have 
seen vijnana is transformed into jnana, and the jnana ofA has an 
object. This object paradoxically has no objectivity since at 
such a level of spiritual attainment objectivity and subjectivity 
have been transcended.
Of importance in connection with a discussion on Nagarjuna's 
method is the question of where in his writings the two—valued 
logic,which he generally employs, breaks down. It seems, from what 
has already been observed, that it would most probably do so when 
a discussion turns away from the conventional and towards the 
ultimate nature of things* Now we know that a prasangikg is 
supposed to avoid the characterisation of things from the ultimate 
point of view, but is this actually the case in the writings of 
NiTgarjuna? Ruegg certainly believes that it is:-
- 44 -
"... there appears to be no doubt that Nagarjuna, and his 
successors in the Madhyamaka school, founded many of their 
analyses of concepts and entities and their arguments based 
on reasoning by undesired consequences (prasanga) on the twin 
principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, before 
going on to show that in fact none of the members of a conceptual 
pair or tetralemmacan in fact apply in reality." (‘29)
Staal  ^  ^ disagrees. In his examination of
the logical structure of the catuskoti he allows an interpretation 
of the fourth koti in which adherence to the law of the excluded 
middle is rejected:-
"When the Madhyamika philosopher negates a proposition, it 
does not follow that he himself accepts the negation of that 
proposition. Accordingly, there are other alternatives than 
A and not-A, and the principle of the excluded middle does 
not hold." (31)
The point at issue nere seems to be the aspect of Magarjuna's 
doctrine which most disturbs his opponents, we will agree with 
Fenner’s characterisation of Naglarjuna’s overall approach to the 
conventional world such that;—
"The assumptions that undergird the Madhyamika analysis are 
these (1) that conceptually depends on the consistent ascription 
of predicates to an entity, (2) that predicates arise in the 
context of their logical opposites, which in its strong inter­
pretation, as is required by the Madhyamikas, means that the 
presence of a predicate implies its absence (and vice versa).
This principle assumes a status equal to the aristote]ean principles 
and its significance is that analysis is effective to the extent 
that this principle is structurally formative (in its strong 
interpretation) for conceptuality. (3) the logical validity 
and formative influence and role of the three aristotelean principles 
of thought in structuring the development of conceptuality". (32.)
However by totally negating the predicates which arise in the 
context of their logical opposites, is not Nagarjuna opening 
himself to the charge of nihilism by appearing to suggest that such 
predicates in fact refer to nothing at all.
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Now all Buddhists including Nagarjuna;are quick to 
reject the charge of nihilism. In fact the VigrahavyavartanT" 
was written specifically with such a purpose in mind. Ruegg himself 
conducts such a defense when he comments
M ... a thing may be said, following Mahayanist theory to be
like & magical projection (maya) (not in a nihilistic sense
but in the sense that it is imagined to be otherwise than it
is in its true nature of dependent origination and emptiness)". (33)
Nagarjuna must surely wish to negate the predicates without at 
the same time negating the ground to which they hav/e been incor­
rectly applied. This may be the purport of Staal’s aforementioned 
statement.
Let us now turn to an associated problem.
Of central importance in our study of Nigarjuna's thought 
is the specific form of negation he employs. The Buddhist tradition 
accepts two alternative forms of the negation and we are now in the 
position to examine which of the two is most appropriate to Niglrjuna's 
work, acknowledging beforehand that nowhere in those texts ascribed 
to him does he explicitly make the distinction himself. The two 
forms of negation of interest are the total negation (prasajya-
pratisedha)and the limited or partial negation (paryudasapratisedha).
Put briefly the prasajyapratisedha is a total negation because it 
negates a thesis without at the same time affirming any contrapositive 
thesis. In other words the total negation signifies the total avoidance 
of any thesis formulation whatsoever. The paryudasapratisedha or 
partial negation however is one in which^although an original thesis 
may be refuted, nevertheless this does not imply that the contra­
positive thesis is also negated.
Reference to a typical neither ... nor (ie. fourth koti) statement 
from the kirikas will establish what is meant. In MMK.XXV 10 we have:
"The teacher (Buddha) has taught the abandonment of the concepts 
of being and non-being. Therefore nirvana is properly neither 
(in the realm) of existence nor non-existence". (£**•)
Now if we take this statement to be a prasajya type of negation 
then we are led to conclude that the twin ideas of being and non-being 
totally exhaust the ontological status of the concept■which in this 
case is nirvana.
In the prasajya negation of nirvana no further position can arise 
once the negation is concluded which would lead to any proposition 
being tendered concerning the notion of nirvana. The paryudasa 
or limited negation on the other hand works in a different way.
The initial negation here does not exhaust all that may be held 
concerning the concept to be negated. In our example of nirvana 
therefore,even though on the surface one would accept the negation 
that it is neither being nor non-being^one would not, because of 
such acceptance, wish to state that these two concepts exhaust the 
modes in which nirvana may be said to occur. On the contrary nirvana 
as we have already noted, is empty (sunya) rather than totally 
devoid of existence as Fenner makes clear:—
"... an entity is shown to be empty rather than non-existent 
through the exclusion of al1 possible predicates as being 
inapplicable to an entity. The entity A is neither a P nor 
a -P where P and not P exhaust the universal set of modalities. 
The nihilistic conclusion for the non-existence of something 
presupposes the applicability of predicates to an entity which 
are in actuality absent ... If A goes uncharacterized because 
all predicates are inapplicable to it, its existence or non­
existence is unascertainable as the entity itself would be 
unidentifiable." (3S)
If we make A= ni£vana, the total negation will indicate that P 
-P completely exhaust all the modes in which A can be said to 
occur. This would not however be the case for Nagarjuna since we 
have established the likelihood that in his writings he implicitly 
holds the view that, while A "goes uncharacterised because all 
predicates are inapplicable to it", nevertheless there is some 
indeterminate sense in which A may be said to exist. We may 
suggest that a useful way of indicating such indeterminacy will 
oe to say that A exists ultimately in its emptiness (sunyata) mode. 
This will be the equivalent of saying that it is ultimately 
uncontaminated by all attempts to define it existentially. This 
is what I mean when I talk about the ontologically indeterminate 
existence of an entity.
Most scholars who have treated this subject are again heavily in
debt to Candrakirti. Because he insists on the prasajya type of
negation as the characteristic negation of the Prisangika-Madhyamika
it has been taken for granted that Nagirjuna himself, even though
he makes no specific reference to either, avoided the use of the
limited paryudasa type. There is in fact a diversity of thought
(3k) 4- m
amongst scholars on this particular issue. Fenner tells us
that Candrakirti distinguishes his school from the Svatantrika school 
of Bhavaviveka on the basis that while Bhavaviveka and his followers 
adopt the paryudasa, the Prasangikas plump for the prasajya. However, 
he fails to tell us precisely where Candrikirti says this. Ruegg 
is similarly vague and does not quote sources. Nevertheless he 
opts for a different interpretation. For him both the Prasangikas 
and the Svatantrik? ’ use only the prasajya negation. He claims that
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in'this form of negation (ie.prasajya) as used by the Madhyamika 
denial of a position does not necessarily involve commitment 
to any other position ... The Madhyamika is certainly not working 
towards some ontological or logical third value between contrad­
ictories any more than he is seeking a dialectical synthesis. 
Indeed, if there really existed such a dialectical synthesis 
or third value, there would be something on which conceptual 
thinking could base itself and cling, and the whole purpose 
of the Madhyamaka method could then no longer be achieved."
Although such a statement may be said, with some reservations, to 
outline the position of an author such as CandrakTrti there does 
not seem to be any good justification to extend it to include Nagarjuna 
and his earlier followers. Let us take as an example the eight 
(negated) epithets of pratTtyasamutpada in the mangalasloka of MMK
— f — s
anirodham anutpadam anucchedam asasvatam 
anekartham ananartham anagamam anirgamam
Ruegg asks the question; do such epithets commit the Midhyamika 
to a positive statement concerning pratTtyasamutpida equivalent 
to the contra dictory of what is here negated? He answers "no".
However from what has already been said concerning the status 
of pratTtyasamutpacIa in Nagarjuna's non-RMK works, and his 
general method which only follows logical principles up to the 
limit of the conventional, we must be more careful than to give 
such an unqualified "no"* In fact Ruegg is being completely 
consistent here. He applies tha total (prasajya) negation in the 
manner that he expects Nagarjuna would have done. Ultimately 
of course pratTtyasamutp~ada cannot be characterised and Ruegg is 
in this sense correct to say "no". However this is only half of
- 43 -
the truth for we have already seen that an entity may also exist 
in its emptiness mode even though an attempt at characterisation 
has failed. In other words it may exist in a state of ontological 
indeterminacy. PratTtyasamutpada is exactly the type of thing we 
should expect to possess such indeterminacy. Being ontologically 
indeterminate pra111yasamutpada will survive the partial (paryudasa) 
negation, and this is the point that Ruegg*s "no" does not take 
account of • Pratityasamutpada is not therefore non-existent. From 
point of view of ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) it may not 
be presented as an object to consciousness. It is not the object of 
vi jnana though it may be conceived in a transcendent emptiness 
mode as self and other intimately united in jnana.
In other words there is such a 
thing as pratTtya-samutpada, though it may not be characterised 
in terms of the eight epithets mentioned and it is therefore ontolog­
ically indeterminate.
At another point in i'lNK we hear that the Buddha may not be deter­
mined with regard to existence or non-existence after both having 
attained nirvana and died. This of course corresponds with the 
general unwillingness of the Buddha to ascribe an existence value 
to such a state in the unanswered questions of the Tripitaka. 
Nagarjuna simply expands on what the Buddha has already said:—
"That image of nirvana (in which) the Buddha either 
"is" or "is not"- by him who (so imagines nirvana) the 
notion is crudsly grasped. Concerning that which is 
empty by its own-nature (svabhava), the thoughts do not 
arise that: the Buddha "exists" or "does not exist" 
after death." (3^)
He does however make it perfectly clear that the Buddha, in his 
ultimate condition, does have an ontological value for:-
"Those who describe the Buddha in detail, who is 
unchanging and beyond all detailed description—
Those, completely defeated by description, do not 
perceive the Tatha"gata. The self-existence of the 
Tathagata is the self-existence of the world. The 
Tathagata is devoid of self-existence and the world 
is likewise." (39)
It would be much easier for Nagarjuna, should he have so desired,
to assert that neither the Buddha, nor the world exist, but this
he pointedly refuses to do. We must assume therefore that this
is not the position he wishes to adopt. Such a position would^
as far as our researches lead us to believe, be the consequence
of a total negation (prasajyapratisedha) of the predicates. The
position here taken with regard to the Buddha, since it assigns
some indeterminate ontological value to his ultimate existence^
corresponds closely with the consequences of a partial negation
(paryudasapratisedha).
Now before turning to a textual analysis of MMK let us briefly look 
at some of the logical aspects of the VigrahavyivartanT (VV). Our 
point here will be to decide whether in this text Nagarjuna applies
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the prasanga approach prescribed by CandrakTrti. In other words, 
does he once again both make propositions not held by his opponents, 
and utilise a logic at odds in many places from that adopted by 
the so called prasanga method. In the first place the precise nature 
of his opponent in this text is an object of controversy. Bhattacharya 
is of the opinion that Nagarjuna’s opponent is a Naiyayika realist 
and in this he has his supporters, such as Tucci.^9  ^ Lindtner 
feels that this is incorrect. He gives five reasons to support 
his contention that the opponent is actually a Buddhist Abhidhlrmika. 
Unfortunately at the present state of Buddhist studies the problem 
seems likely to be unsolved for some time, although if we do accept 
the opponent of MMK to be an Abhidhoj^i ka. t and that MMK and VV comprise 
a corpus with one specific end in view then one has some reason 
to come down in favour of holding the opponent in VV to be from 
an Abhidharmic school.
Now commenting on the function of the VV in the Madhyamaka scheme 
of things Ruegg tells us that in this text
"... a Madhyamika restricts himself to a kind of philosophical 
destruction - and therapeutic dehabituation - with respect 
to dichotomizing conceptualization while refraining from propounding 
any propositional thesis (pratijnl) of his own, but any argument 
adduced to combat and refute the theory of sunyati is devoid 
of cogency, and falls into line with and reinforces the Madhyamaka 
theory, since all things can be shown to be equally non-substantial." (51)
This is simply not true for Nagirjuna really never successfully answers 
his opponents first objection. However even it if is admitted that 
there is some substance to his replies it can hardly be held, as Ruegg 
would have us believe, that he is using the prasanga method.
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Let us examine the argument in detail. The opponent has spotted a 
weakness in Nagarjuna's thought since if all is empty, then on what 
conceivable grounds can Nagarjuna propound in a meaningful way the 
emptiness of all views. Thus the VV opens:-
"If own being (svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing 
thing, your statement (itself) being without own being is not 
capable of refuting own-being. But if that statement has (its 
own) own-being, then your initial proposition is refuted. There 
is a (logical) inconsistency here and you should explain the 
grounds of the difference." (52)
To what seems a justifiable complaint, Nigarjuna replies that either 
his opponent accepts that negation must always have something real 
as its negandum in which case he must accept emptiness (sunyata), 
or else he must give up his thesis. This is confusing but, as far 
as Nigarjuna's position is concerned there is no negating anything, 
otherwise he would be forced to accept the neganda. As that is the
case all he claims to be attempting to do is to suggest or indicate
w (53)
(jnapayate) the absence of his own being. In his reply then,
Nigirjuna makes the distinction between indicating an absence of his
own being and negating the existence of own being and that these two
activities are completely different. He claims to be doing the former
and not the latter. In the accompanying auto-commentary (svopajnavftti)
verse 65 is glossed.
"In the same manner, the sentence, "there is no svabhava of the 
bhavas, does not make the svabhava without essence, but conveys 
the absence of svabhava in the bhavas". (54)
Mehta uses an analogy to eluci< ate this point in his interpretation
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of the argument. He says that when one makes a statement such as 
"Devadatta is not in the house", the statement itself merely informs 
us of Devadatta's absence in the house and therefore does not possess 
the power to bring about the existence or non-existence of Devadatta 
as such. However the statement about Devadatta is really in no 
way analogous to the argument in VV since, while the statement concerning 
Devadatta is easily verifiable by sense perception and may therefore
be proved or disproved by a state or states of affairs beyond the
structure of the sentence, there is no way in which an opponent 
can challenge Nagarjuna's contention that the statement "All things 
are without own-being" simply serves to make such a fact know£ without 
having the further power of leaving other statements incoherent.
It seems that it is Nagarjuna who misses the point here. Since 
no contemporary thinker held a view that statements themselves have 
the power to bring about states of affairs, eg. emptiness (sunyati)
Nagirjuna is again abandoning any claim for him to be Prisangika.
It seems that he is putting forward this view himself. The opponent 
is therefore not objecting to this particular thesis but simply 
to the logical form of Nagarjuna's central theme. In other words 
"If all things are empty, how can you demonstrate, given the fact 
that your own words are empty, emptiness?" The logical structure 
of a sentence such as "Devadatta is not in the house" is simply 
an inadequate analogy to the Madhymaka contention that:
"... sunyati does not have the function of making dharmasjsmpty 
since this is what they are; a sentence concerning sunyata 
therefore serves to make this fact known." (56)
j
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All sentences must presumably serve to make something known, otherwise
one would be left with an absurd theory of language. Here again
therefore we have evidence of Nagarjuna's technique at work. He
does not attempt to answer the objection, but rather sidesteps it,
proposes a theory that his opponent does not hold, which has the
effect of introducing confusion, and finally introduces a conclusion
which because of the foregoing argument seems acceptable when viewed
not too critically. It is not the case that by a remorseless application
of logic based on reductio ad absurdum of the opponent's thesis
Nagarjuna achieves a crushing victory, and it is certainly not the 
(57)case, as Ruegg would have us believe that the Madhyamika theory
is immune from refutation. One cannot help but agree with Streng
here when he says that Nagarjuna's work occasionally is "an analysis
(58)
which appears to be rather arid and often simply a play on words".
With reference to this particular argument in VV Betty has recently 
observed:-
"It is as if the objector had said to Nagarjuna, "You're wrong", 
and Nagarjuna had answered "Of course I'm wrong, that's precisely 
what makes me right". As alluring, as stunning, as Taoistically 
fascinating as such an answer is, it is not really an answer; 
it is not cogent in an argument where the rules of logic apply, 
as they do here. Nagarjuna has evaded the issue; he has seen 
the problem, but he has not treated it seriously : he has not 
"accepted" it." (59)
Another apparent inconsistency arises in connection with VV.29 which 
says:
"If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would 
have a logical error; but do not make a proposition; therefore 
I am not in error." (60)
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The autocommentary goes on to say:-
"... when all entities are empty, altogether still and devoid 
of a nature how could there be a proposition (presenting them 
as being something or other)?" (61)
The objection must be raised, however, that here again Nagarjuna 
is up to something fishy. Is it not true that the statement "...I 
do not make a proposition", is not itself a proposition (pratijna), 
and since it is, how is such a fact compatible with the autocommentary 
in which we are told that there are no such things as propositions.
r
The^e obviously are. The problem from a logical point of view here 
is quite analogous to our examination of statements concerning 
sunyata above. However, in this case Nagirjuna does not attempt 
to follow up the problems. Ruegg attempts to dispense with them 
by saying
"... this interpretation assimilates two distinct uses of 
the term "proposition", and it would hold good only if pratijna 
meant here any sentence or statement ... But this^sentence^
(ie nasti ca mama pratijna VV._29) is not a pratijna in Nagirjuna's 
sense; for in his way pratijna denotes an assertion and more 
specifically a thesis which seeks to establish something." (62)
So according to Ruegg the term (ie,pratijna) may have one of two 
meanings. Firstly it may mean any sentence, and secondly it means 
a thesis which seeks to establish something. If we accept Ruegg's 
belief (unsupported by reference to sources) that all that Nagarjuna 
is saying in VV.29 is that he does not make propositions which seek 
to establish something, we are still back to square one and Ruegg 
has done nothing to extricate himself and Nigirjuna from the problem,
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since the objection still exists, "Is not your statement, that you 
do not make propositions seeking to establish theses, itself a prop­
osition?"
VV is actually full of such inconsistencies and in the light of what 
we have said regarding both it and MMK, we must be forced into a 
different interpretation of these two works than that provided by 
Ruegg and others. There can be little doubt that Nigirjuna does 
not abide by the prasanga method in argumentation. If he was a 
Prasangika we could accept that he has no thesis of his own to put 
forward, but this is simply not the case. Once we are able to abandon 
this false connection with prasanga logic there is consequently no 
obstacle in our way for accepting Naglrjuna's adherence to partial 
(paryuqasa) as opposed to total (pras<xjj^ ) negation (patisedha).
This interpretation is certainly consistent with the texts themselves.
Using these conclusions as our foundations we shall be able to promote 
the thesis that the Madhyamaka is not so dissimilar to the Yogicara 
as generally thought. Since we now understand that Nigarjuna, partic­
ularly in his apparent use of a three valued logic, may be implicitly 
able to hold "positive" positions concerning the nature of things, 
the idea that only the Yogacara adopted such an outlook seems onesided. 
More similarities between the two "schools" will now be able to be 
revealed, particularly when treated against the background of the
early Buddhist tradition..
(63)
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Chapter Three
Nagarjuna and the Continuity of Tradition
(1)
A. K. Warder has attempted to ascertain the exact nature of 
the Mahiyina teachings, if any contained, in MMK. His opinion, 
like my own, is that the approach to Nagarjuna’s work via later 
commentators such as CandrakTrti should be dealt with carefully, 
since it is unlikely that any school of thought would stay still 
for a period of 400 years or so. Turning to the text then, Warder 
notes that throughout the whole of MMK there is no explicit quotation 
from any known Mahiylnasutra. However, and this is surprising given 
the fact that Nagirjuna is generally considered to be the Mahayanist 
par excellence, quotations from the Tripitaka of the early schools 
are fairly frequent. Ruegg vigorously opposes Warder's thesis that 
there is no good reason to refer to the author of MMK as a Mahiyanist 
simply because he attacks certain ideas held by contemporary 
Abhidharmikas. He in fact unearths a verse of MMK which he claims
"clearly to presuppose a section of the Ratnakuta collection, the
- / (2 )
Kasyapaparivarta". This particular verse,
"Emptiness (sunyata) is proclaimed by the victorious ones as 
the refutation of all viewpoints; but those who hold emptiness 
as a viewpoint - (the true perceivers) have called those incurable 
(asadhya)". (3)
however is not found intact in the Ratnakuta; the general idea is 
merely developed in this text. Since one could in all probability 
ascribe similarities in doctrine between other verses of MMK and
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all sorts of disparate literatures, without at the same time being 
able to bring parallel texts forward as evidence, the contention 
that Nagarjuna is a Mahayanist since he quotes Mahayanasutras cannot 
be upheld in this case. However Ruegg is definite that:-
"... in view of his place in the history of Buddhist thought 
and because of his development of the theory of non-substantiality 
and_emptiness of all dharmas, it seems only natural to regard 
Nagarjuna as one of the first and most important systematizers 
of Mahayanist thought." (4)
Ruegg defends his position at another point by noting that while 
the MMK may be problematic in its relationship to the Mahayanasutras 
this is not the case with the RatnivalT which quotes at length from 
a number of Mahayina sources. However as explained in detail earlier 
on, since the Ratnavali does not form part of the logical (yukti) 
corpus of Nlgirjuna's work as acknowledged by Tibetan and Chinese 
tradition, we must regard the authorship of this text as doubtful, 
and have already decided not to include an analysis of its teachings 
in an exposition of Nagarjuna's thought.
Other scholars have actually found parallels between MMK and Mahayina-
(5)sutras, most noteworthy of these being Lindtner. He believes
he has found three allusions to the Lankavatarasutra (LS) in MMK.
These are:
(i) MMK XVIII 7 y
nivrttam abhidhatavyam nivrttas cittagocarah 
anutpannaniruddha hi nirvanam iva dharmata 
LS III 9
astinastTty ubHavantau ya"vac cittasya gocarah 
gocarena nirudhena samyak cittam nirudhyate
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(ii) MMK XXI 11
drsyate sambhavas caiva vibhavas' caiva te bhavet 
drsyate sambhavas caiva mohad vibhava eva ca 
LS X 37
sambhavam vibhavam caiva mohat pasyanti balisab 
na sambhavam navibhavam prajfiayukto vipa^yati
(iii) MMK XVII 33 y
klesah karmani dehas ca kartaras ca phalani ca 
gandharvanagarakara marTcisvapnasamnibhah 
LS X 279 ~
klesah karmapatha dehah kartaras ca phalam ca vai 
marieisvapnasamkasa" gandharvanagaropama'
While it is sufficiently clear that neither of these three pairs 
constitute parallel readings Lindtner feels that not only are the 
ideas presented in them identical, but the verses of MMK are themselves 
references to the Lankivatarasutra. This is clearly an overstatement. 
P. Williams has shown that such a position cannot be upheld.
In the case of example (i), while both verses do refer to the cessation 
of the wandering about of the mind (cittagocara) MMK goes on to 
talk of the cessation of that which can be talked about (nivrttam 
abhidhatavyam) and concludes on a positive note; in other words 
that nirvana coincides with the true nature of things (dharmata).
The LS is quite different from the verse simply saying that when 
ci ttagocara is brought to an end then so too is the mind (citta).
This is certainly not implied in MMK.
Let us look at the second example. Although both verses do refer 
to production and destruction as apprehended in delusion (moha), 
the LS quotation contrasts such a viewpoint with that of one united 
with prajna (praj^ayukta), while the MMK does not. Therefore while 
LS is comparing the vision of the enlightened with the unenlightened,
- 6  *  -
MMK is more likely than not arguing with the commonly held AbHi dharmik<x-
concepts of origination and destruction. Example (iii) shows the
most thoroughgoing overlap. However the comparison of conventional
existents such as bodies (dehah) with a city of the Gandharvas,
a mirage or a dream is a stock image from a certain phase of Buddhist
writing and in this case Nagarjuna may have been referring to any
of a large number of texts. In fact Lindtner believes that Nagarjuna's
use of the Gandharvanagara metaphor is itself sufficient reason
to refute Warder's claim that the author of MMK cannot be demonstrated
to be a Mahayanist by showing that the term Gandarvanagara does
(7)not occur in the ancient agamas. Now although such an argument
may be admitted it does not appear to me that the use of a newly- 
coined metaphor in Nagarjuna's writing provides sufficient proof 
to reject Warder's claim. Before returning to Warder though let 
us merely endorse Williams' statement that although the verses quoted
may "express similar sentiments ... there is no need to assume that
—  —  (8)
the ... connection ... is a reference by Nagarjuna to LS".
The texts that are definitely referred to in MMK are mainly from
the Samyuttanikiya of the early Tripitaka. The only sutri actually
- ------- (9)
named is in MMK.XV, 7. This is the Katyayanavada which shows 
that the Buddha, throughout his teaching, always avoided the extremes 
between being (asti) and non-being (nasti). Other sutras are however 
agreed, by most scholars, to be referred to in MMK. Thus the 
Acelakasyapa which incidentally follows immediately on from
the Katyayanavada in the Samyuktaa»kaya tis referred to in MMK.XII.1.
It appears that this sutra may be the source of Nigarjuna's use
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of the catuskoti since we are told in it that suffering (duhkha) 
does not come about either through self-causation (svayam krtam),
t
causation by anothr (parakrtam), by the two together or by neither.
In fact suffering is said to come about through dependent origination 
(pratityasamutpada) which cannot itself be characterised by any 
of these four positions (catuskoti).
According to Warder other references to early texts are found in
(11)MMK.XIII,1 where the Dhatuvibhangasutra is invoked. The rejection
of extreme opinions (drsti) such as whether things (dharmas) are
eternal or non-eternal contained in MMK.XXVII. also seems to follow
(1 2 )
some version of the Brahmajalasutra. He concludes therefore
that in MMK:
"There are no terms peculiar to the Mahayana. There is no
evidence that Nigarjuna had ever seen any Prajniparamita text ...
for him the most important canonical text is the Nidana Samyukta" . (13)
It appears that Nagirjuna, if we accept Warder's thesis, does not 
stand outside the early Buddhist tradition in order to set up an 
entirely independent school of thought but rather, he represents 
one strand of thought within the tradition itself, which maybe at 
odds with what he considers to be a deviant branch. In the last 
chapter we met with the idea that the purpose of the VigrahavyavartanI 
was not to counter the arguments of all-comers, but rather to check 
the excesses of a certain group of Abhidharmikas, and again this 
may well be the case with MMK. Rather than establishing a new teaching 
therefore, Nagarjuna may be seen as someone engaged in the defense 
of orthodoxy.
- l>(j -
That a so-called proto-Madhyamaka strand of thought is to be found 
in the Tripitakathere can be no doubt. If we look at some of the 
earliest Buddhist writings ie.the Atthakavagga and the Parayanavagga 
of the Suttanipata we are immediately reminded of Nagarjuna's assertion 
that all views (drsti), because they are generated by the dichotomising 
tendencies of the mind (prapanca), which give rise to thought 
construction (vikalpa), are to be rejected. Although, as we shall 
see, Nigarjuna does not reject reality as such, nevertheless all 
theories associated with pinning it down because they are generated 
by prapanca etc. must be rejected. This is also the position of 
the Suttanipata when it says:
"Giving up assumption, unattached, he builds no reliance on 
knowledge itself ... he does not rely on any view whatsoever ... 
he who has no leanings here to either of the two extremes; 
being or non-being, here or beyond, he has no moorings what­
soever, no clutching while distinguishing among dharmas. He 
has not formed even the last apperception in what is here seen, 
heard or thought". (14)
(15 )In Gomez's study of this early material the origin of false
views bears remarkable similarity to the aetiology suggested by 
the writers of the Madhyamaka. Gomez states:
" ... what is the cause of our preferences and attachments?
The misdirected mind, specifically the wrongly applied faculty 
of apperception (sanna). Apperception leads to dualities, 
graspings, conflicts and sorrow because of its two primary 
functions: its power to conceptualise and define (satnkha) and 
its tendency toward division and multiplicity (papanca). The 
capacity of these faculties to generate friction and frustration 
is reinforced by the root apperception of "I" and "mine". (16)
However, and here again the equivalence with Nagarjuna is clear,
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the author of the Suttanipata is not enunciating a position of nihilism 
in the sense that with the rejection of all views based on the dichotomy 
of being and non-being, everything comes to an end. He is simply 
saying that in such a state an enlightened person has transcended 
the erroneous impulse to construct theories about the nature of 
reality through having brought thought construction etc. to a halt.
The appropriate response for a mind which has moved into nirvana 
therefore is to remain at peace and not to be disturbed by the desire 
to talk since, as language itself is infected at its root by false 
dichotomies based on notions such as being and non-being, even an 
enlightened person cannot use language successfully to give an accurate 
picture of reality. At best language must remain a heuristic device 
used for the purpose of hinting at things which cannot in fact be 
successfully articulated. As the Suttanipata puts it:
"Of him who has gone to cessation there is no measure, there 
is nothing in terms of which one could speak of him. When 
all dharmas have been uprooted, all the ways of speech have 
also been uprooted." (17)
"The silent one (muni) does not speak of "equal", "low" or 
"high", serene, having left all attachment to self behind, 
he does not grasp at anything nor does he reject anything". (18)
Nagarjuna adopts such a position.
"The bringing to rest of all apprehending is the bringing to 
an end of the dichotomizing tendencies of the mind and this 
is peace. No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha 
of anything". (19)
For him a recourse to speech and language inevitably leads to error,
-  -
and by such a recourse one can never know the true nature of things, 
for the true nature of things (tattva, dharmata) is only to be 
apprehended in nirvana. Language leads away from nirvana.
"Those who describe the Buddha in detail, who is unchanging 
and hence beyond description, are defeated by such description 
and do not see the Tathagata". (20)
Only when mental discrimination is brought to an end is nirvana 
achieved and at such a point language grinds to a halt.
"When the wandering of the mind (cittagocara) is brought to 
a halt, the realm of words also ceases. This indeed is nirvana 
which is neither originated nor destroyed, the true nature 
of things (dharmata). (21)
Reality as such is not contaminated or implicated with dichotomous
thought (prapanca), thought construction (vikalpa) and is non- 
- - (22 )
differentiated (ananartham) .> Commenting on MMK ch.XVIII
CandrakTrti shows that for him the world of suffering is brought
about by erroneous views concerning tattva. He in fact presents
his own truncated form of the classical 12-linked pratlt-.yasamutpada
to account for the unenlightened state. In this formula the first
link in the chain is appropriation (upalambha) which gives rise
to the other members which in turn are dichotomising thought (prapanca),
thought construction (vikalpa), erroneous attachment to "I" and
"mine" (ahammameti-abhinivesa), defilement (klesa), actions (karma),
- (23)
and old-age and death (jaramarana). The generation of such
a causal series is destroyed when the appropriation (upalambha) 
which causes it is destroyed. When this activity (which is equivalent
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to ignorance (avidya) in the classical formula) is brought to rest 
the factors leading to old-age and death do not arise and there 
is nirvana. Since reality (tattva) is from this point of view always 
beyond the reach of knowledge and speech,this, according to Candrak'frti, 
is the meaning of Nagirjuna's statement that the Buddha has never 
taught anything.
Considering the above close similarity between the early Suttanipata 
and later Madhyamaka doctrine with regard to speech and silence 
there appears to be a case for establishing some sort of influence 
of the former on the latter, or at the very least for proposing 
a tendency with regard to this particular doctrine common to both 
periods of Buddhist thought.
A
The question we must now ask is what happens to the mind once prapanca
etc. have been brought to cessation? Are we correct in assuming
that this will result in a state totally devoid of any mental activity,
a state of total unconsciousness, or will the mind continue to operate
but in an entirely different manner from its unenlightened mode?
In other words is there mind or some state of mind in nirvina?
Let us look at the early Buddhist tradition first. Now the Suttanipata
itself refers to people having attained nirvana. Their minds (cittani)
(24)
are said to be free from the obsessions. In other texts it
is clear that the mind still functions for it is said to be "well
composed and free" , "and of such a nature that it will not
(26)
return to the world of sense desire" after have attained
enlightenment.
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Such a state of mind is consequently of a different order from 
that characterised by the turmoil created by prapanca, vikalpa 
etc. It may be that these two states are referred to respectively 
by citta and vijnana, where citta is somehow at the deeper level 
and therefore unconditioned by activities at the interface between 
mind and matter. Vijnana on the other hand is conditioned, dependent
LA
on prapanca, constantly changing and hence differentiated, only 
being brought to a halt in nirvapa. Since vijnina is one of the 
terms of the classical pratityasamutpada series and hence arises 
dependent on ignorance (avidya) it stands to reason that when avidyi 
is uprooted vijnana will come to an end. However, and this is 
a very important point, it should not be assumed that such an event 
signals the total extinction of mental processes since before 
vijnana arose citta existed and when vijnina ceases citta is still 
there. Johansson confirms such as supposition. He notes that 
in nirvana:
tAAS —
"... although vinnana is "stopped", still an act of differentiated 
understanding can take place, so the "stopped" vinnlna refers 
to a different layer of consciousness than the momentary surface 
processes ... There are simply, according to the early Buddhist 
analysis, two layers of consciousness; what we call the momentary 
surface processes and the background consciousness". (27)
The background state is often spoken of in terms of being "an immovable,
unfluctuating mind" (28), and as being "deep, immeasurable and
(29)
unfathomable as the great ocean". We will come to see, m
an examination of a nexus of doctrines connected with this mental 
background state^which we must put off until the final chapter 
of this thesis, that such conceptions clearly anticipate some of
the so called developments in the psychological system outlined 
in the works of Vasubandhu and Asanga.
One important aspect of citta when in the state of nirvana, partic­
ularly relevant to our discussion of the overlap between early 
Buddhism and Nagarjuna is that, in the Majjhimanikaya, it is said 
to be associated with emptiness. In a state which clearly refers 
to the attainment of nirvana, the mind (citta) is said to be free 
from the obsessions of sensuality (kama), becoming (bhava) and 
ignorance (avijja), and the monk comes to understand that such 
a conscious state represents an emptiness of the obsessions
(asava). This emptiness (sunnata) is therefore associated with
a permanent state of mind (citta), equivalent to nirvina which
^ ( 3 "1 )
derives from the cessation of vinnana. Nirvana is also associati
_ (32)
with emptiness in the TherTgatha. These references to emptiness
in the early Buddhist canon do seem to emphasise the fact that 
emptiness is a state in which subjectivity and objectivity break 
down. uJhen those processes habitually met with in the unenlight­
ened mind (ie. “asravas, prapanca, vikalpa) are eradicated the dist­
inction common to that state between self and other can no longer 
be established. There is an intimate union between the knower and 
the known. Although one may talk provisionally of the knowledge of 
a Buddha it must always be born in mind that such knowledge itself
transcends any distinction between epistemology and ontology.
Crucial in the eradication of all the factors that contribute to
the unenlightened state is prajna (Pali-panna). It is responsible 
for bringing to an end the obsessions (asravas).
"... having seen by means of panna, the obsessions (asava) 
are completely destroyed." (33)
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It is therefore ultimately responsible for bringing ignorance (avidya) 
to an end, and consequent on this the entire pratityasamutpada
series.
"If panna is developed, what result will it lead to? All 
ignorance is abandoned". (34)
In other words when prajna is generated vijnana and all the other 
twelve links are stopped, there is no suffering, and a person enters 
nirvana. Now Dignaga, admittedly a later author, holds prajna to 
have the same efficacy in the Mahayana as it seems to have in the 
early texts. He says:
"Prajnaparamita is non-dual knowledge (advayajnana), and that 
is the Tathagata. The treatise and the spiritual discipline, 
as leading to this end, receive the same application". (35)
In fact as we have already mentioned in Chapter One, many scholars 
do hold the major function of the Prajnaparimita corpus to be to expound 
and help generate prajni.fwhich is felt to be the chief of the perfections 
(paramitas). Many scholars, not least Murti, have held that the 
Prajna-paramita is the major literary influence on Nag'arjuna. However 
since there is no direct reference to prajna in the MMK one must agree 
with Warder that such a thesis has not been proved. What evidence 
do we possess to suggest that a notion of prajna, even though not 
explicitly expressed, is important for an understanding of MMK? Let 
us follow up Dignaga1s hint that prajna is s synonym for non-dual 
knowledge (advayajnana). In the first place Candrakirti^(and here
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we are bearing in mind the fact that as a commentator 400 years removed 
from Nagarjuna we should not place too much trust in his interpretations) 
at the very beginning of his Prasannapada, comments on the centrality 
of non-dual knowledge (advayaj nina) in the Madhyamaka system. (36^
Murti of course takes his interpretation of the Madhyamaka system from 
CandrakTrti. For him
"Non-dual knowledge (jnanam advayam) is the abolition of all 
particular viewpoints which restrict and distort reality". (37)
"The sole concern of the Madhymika advayavada is the purification 
of the faculty of knowing. The primor-dal error consists in 
the intellect being infected by the inveterate tendency to view 
Reality as identity or difference, permanent or momentary, one 
or many etc. ... With the purification of the intellect, intuition 
(prajna) emerges; the Real is known as it is, as Tathata or 
bhutak oti". (38)
Now one problem with Murti*s approach, even though when we have 
examined the doctrines of MMK on this point and found them to generally 
support his view, is that his interpretations are based too heavily 
on the PrajnaparamitI texts. In other words although we may find 
support for the PP notion that the non-appropriation of all things 
(yo1 nupalambhah sarvadharmanam) is the pf)e)fection of prajna  ^ ^  , 
there is no evidence to suggest the fact that Niglrjuna held "non-dual 
knowledge (prajna) is contentless intuition". Nagarjuna's
psychological position in connection with such questions as whether 
prajna, or for that matter any form of consciousness, has content 
or is contentless, is not sufficiently well developed and one cannot 
fall either on one side or on the other in this matter. The issue 
remains undeveloped until a much later date in the history of juddhist
thought when it became the subject of a heated debate; the Sakaravadin s 
like J rianasmmitra and Ratnakirti holding there to be a content 
to consciousness while the Nirakaravadins such as Ratnakafasanti 
holding consciousness to be void of an object. * Murti is therefore 
jumping to conclusions which cannot be justified. What then can 
we know concerning the existence or non-existence of consciousness 
in the enlightened state?
In the first place nowhere in the MMK does Nagirjuna reject the 
existence of consciousness as such. In fact his position appears 
to be very much the same as that presented in the Suttanipata.
How is this so? Well, to start with, Nagarjuna seems to attach 
a greater degree of conditionality to vijnana than to any other 
mental state. This is not surprising since in the early tradition 
vijnana is seen to be conditioned by the pratTtyasamutpada process 
and can therefore be brought to a halt. In his critique of the five 
faculties (caksuridlndriya) Nigirjuna brings his thesis to light:-
,!As a son is said to have come about_through the mother-father 
relationship, so therefore does vijnana come about through the 
relationship between the eye and material form". (42)
and similarly in the analysis of the twelve links (dvadasanga) of
pratTtyasamutpada Nagarjuna holds that vijnana is conditioned by
mental predispositions (samskara) while at the same time being itself
- - (43)
the cause of name and form (namarupa). This is entirely consonant
with the classical formulation of the twelve links which is found
{ h U  ) , .ai/v-
in the Tripitaka . Now we have already seen how vinnana is
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said to be stopped once nirvana is reached, in the early literature. 
Nagirjuna holds exactly the same position since for him:-
"By the cessation of every (link of pratTtyasamutpada) none 
function. Thus that single mass of suffering is completely 
destroyed". (45)
In other words, once the momentum of the chain of becoming is 
broken, none of its individual links can be maintained and they 
consequently cease to function. This is the suppression of suffering 
(duhkha) and is equivalent to nirvapa. Since vijnana is one of 
the links concerned we must assume that for Nagarjuna nirvina 
may be characterised as^among other things^the cessation of vijnina. 
Are we to assume by this that nirvana must be a state devoid of 
consciousness? Nagarjuna is in fact quick to point out that this 
is not the case. He makes a distinction between the enlightened 
and the unenlightened person. The distinction between the two 
is that while the latter, under the influence of ignorance (avidya) 
creates mental predispositions (samskara)etc., the former has 
cut ignorance at its root through the application of jfiana. When 
jnana is operative ignorance does not arise and all the factors 
conditioned by ignorance have no efficacy. The enlightened one 
therefore, through the agency of jnana sees reality (tattva) as it is.
"Thus the ignorant create the mental predispositions which 
are the root of samsara. One who creates (such predispositions) 
is ignorant. The wise person is not (one who creates) because 
he sees reality (tattva). When ignorance ceases mental pre­
dispositions do not come into existence. The cessation of 
ignorance comes about through the cultivation of j nana . (46)
-  l io  -
Now we have already noted that the term prajna is not used on any 
occasion in MMK. This must not in itself be conclusive evidence 
that Nagarjuna does not entertain the notion of such a faculty.
As we have already noted the terms prajni and jnana form a nexus 
in which it is very difficult to distinguish the precise significance 
of each term. The most we have been able to suggest is that jnana 
may designate the end process in the development of prajna. Be 
that as it may, it is clear that there is a well defined distinction 
between the mental state or states designated by vijnana and that 
designated by prajt\a/jnana. We have already also seen that in the 
earliest strata of Buddhist literature while vijnana refers to a 
conditioned surface state of consciousness only available to the 
unenlightened, prajna/jnana refers to the unconditioned vision of 
reality. If such is the case, let us not be overinfluenced by subtle 
semantic points but rather cast our attention to the structure of 
MMK to ascertain whether Nagarjuna admits the possibility of prajni, 
though under another name.
Now we have seen that the characteristic of the unenlightened mind 
is its habitual tendency to distort reality. This is brought about 
by a number of factors including prapanca and vikalpa which in turn 
are conditioned by ignorance (avidya). Nirvana then is the cessation 
of these factors. As Nigirjuna has it:-
"On account fe^the destruction of karmic defilements (karmaklesa) 
there is liberation (moksa). The karmic defilements are mentally 
constructed (vikalpatah). They arise because of dichotomous 
thought (prapanca). Dichotomous thought is brought to cessation 
through emptiness (sunyata)11. (47)
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Emptiness (_sunyata) then is a state of consciousness in which 
dichotomous thought (prapanca) no longer holds sway* It is a state 
of mind dehabituated from its ignorant tendency to distort. As such 
the attainment of emptiness ('sunyat*a) must, by definition, be in­
communicable and unknowable since it is the transcendence of all 
dichotomies, including subjectiv/ity and objectivity. The attain­
ment of emptiness may be understood as the dawning of gnosis ? 
remembering our previously stated view that all such talk must 
remain provisional. Ultimately there can be no differentiation 
between knower and known in such an elevated state and the distinc­
tion between epistemology and ontology collapses.
Now we have noted that in the Majjhima Nikaya emptiness represents 
that state of mind which is free from the defilements of the obsessions 
(asrava). We are consequently in a better position to interpret 
the curious MMK. XVIII. 7.
nivrttamabhidhatavyam nivrtte cittagocare 
anutpannaniruddha hi nirvanamiva dharmata
in which nirvana is equated with the cessation of cittagocara.
Now cittagocara has variously been translated as the realm of thought, 
the domain of thought, the mind’s functional realm et< ., but it 
is clear that these are unsatisfactory renderings sin ,e they imply
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that the mind is brought to a halt in nirvana. Although the term 
gocara does imply the range of something, such a meaning is secondary 
since in many cases it implies ranging in the sense of wandering 
about. In such circumstances the term cittagocara would be better 
translated as the wandering about of the mind. As the cow (go, 
gaus) is an undisciplined animal wandering wherever its fancy takes 
it, so also is the mind of an unenlightened being. Nirvana therefore 
is the supression of an unruly mind, made to wander here and there 
by the action of prapanca etc. This interpretation of nirvana is 
quite congruent with our understanding derived from early Buddhist 
literature, in many senses rescues Nagarjuna from one aspect of 
the charge of nihilism (since if nirvana was total unconsciousness 
why should anyone be motivated to strive for it, or rather could 
it not be attained through suicide?), and fits in well with the 
general tenor of the text of MMK. Nowhere are we told that nirvana 
is in fact a non-conscious state. Rather it is always defined as 
a state free from those mental factors which are associated with
v\—
vijnana. Hence:
"Not related to anything in a conditional way, at peace, not 
elaborated by dichotomous thought, free of thought construction, 
undifferentiated. Such are the characteristics of reality 
(tattva)". (48)
In the last verse of this chapter Nagarjuna goes on to say, quite 
explicitly, that enlightenment is a state of mind.
"If fully accomplished Buddhas do not arise, and the ^ravakas 
disappear, then independently the jnana of the Pratyekabuddhas 
is produced". (49)
We are now in a good position to tie together most of the centra] 
Concepts of Nagarjuna's system and subject them to our own inter­
pretation. In the first place sunyata is not a metaphysical ontological 
concept. Nagarjuna is therefore not an absolutist. Stcherbatsky 
is quite wrong to find in the term sunyata a concept similar to 
the Absolute Idea of Hegel. There is no evidence in the MMK that 
sunyata has an ontological dimension, that it develops in a dialectical 
process, or that it may be rendered in English as "relativity".
In fact sunyata is something quite the opposite of a thing; it 
is a state in which the imputation of "thingness" (svabhiva) is 
no longer operative. All of this is quite clearly borne out by 
the important Chapter XXIV of MMK (Aryasatya pariksa). By contrasting 
the conventional (sam vrti) with the ultimate (paramirtha) truths, 
Nagarjuna here distinguishes between worldly understanding and 
the understanding of the wise. He goes on to demonstrate that 
while the latter has its basis in the former, nevertheless the 
ultimate vision of things is free from the substantializing tendency 
of the conventional. Since this substantializing tendency is 
intimately connected with the imputation of self nature, the ultimate 
(paramartha) must be in a condition empty of such self natures. The 
ultimate then is emptiness (sunyata). We may be tempted to infer 
that this state is equivalent to jnana. When the mind is empty 
of the defilements which lead to a distorted picture of reality 
(tattva) ie. the defilements leading to the imposition of concepts 
such as being and non-being, the mind is no longer held in the 
turmoil of ignorance (avidya) and consequently becomes enlightened. 
Sunyata therefore describes the state of enlightenment or nirvana.
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Nirvana seems to correspond to the mind empty of the defilements.
In Samsara, on the other hand, a general condition of mind operates 
in which factors, determined by ignorance (avidya), predominate.
This being so a distorted vision of reality, dependent on the ind­
ividual’s personal desires and cravings is established.
"The status of the birth-death cycle is due to grasping (upfoayi) 
and dependence (pratlya). That which is neither grasping nor 
dependent is taught to be nirvana". (52)
Nirvana is therefore an exalted state of mind, and the achievement
of accomplishing such a state, empty of the defilements, will not
entail a fundamental change in the structure of reality. It is
rather a radically different way of looking at reality. This is
why Nagarjuna says that nirvana can be neither described in terms
(53)
of existence nor non-existence. It is essential to bear in mind
the previously stated view that nirvana transcends any distinction
(54)
of subjectivity or objectivity and in this senseit would be
wrong to assign any ultimate epistemological or ontological value 
to it. Nirvana signifies that state in which there is an intimate 
union of seer and seen. It is a state in which those thought con­
structive processes which generate dichotomies of all kinds are no 
longer operative.
Samsara may more readily be understood as an epistemic state in
which prapanca operates. Nagarjuna's statement that:—
"There is no difference oetween samsara and nirvana;
There is no difference between nirvana and samsara»" (55)
correctly interpreted^is true therefore in the provisional sense
that, sincejsams'ara and nirvana seem to be orientations towards one
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ontological category which Nagarjuna calls reality (tattva), there 
can be no essentia]- difference between them. They are both states 
of mind. They do not both refer to radically different reality 
structures. Reality (tattva) therefore is the ontological base 
for the appearance of both the enlightened and the unenlightened 
world views. The difference between them is purely conventional 
since while the samsaric epistemological orientation generates an 
imaginary world picture complete with internal contradications which 
lead to suffering, the nirvanic orientation, a state of mind character­
ised by emptiness from the defilements, views things as they are
(yatha.bhutam) involves no contradictions and is at peace (^inta).
This reveals the true nature of things (dharmata).
If we look at MMK.XXIV.14 again (cf this thesis, Chapter 2 n 25)
sarvam ca yujyate tasya sunyat.i yasya yujyate
sarvam na yujyate tasya 6unyam yasya na yujyate
it is clear what is meant. When it is said that whatever is in 
correspondence with emptiness (sunyata) is in correspondence, we 
may interpret that Nagarjuna is conveying the notion that when the 
mind is empty of defilement everything is seen correctly. Conversely 
when the mind is not empty ‘things are not seen correctly.
Having ascertained that in speaking of nirvapa or Samsara Nagarjuna 
is dealing with epistemological orientations towards reality (tattva) 
we may now decide the exact status of tattva in Nagarjuna s system. 
Actually there has been a great deal of scholarly debate as to the
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correct interpretation of MMK XXIV 18.
yah pratTtyasamutpadah sunyatim tarn pracaksmahe 
sa prajfiaptirupadaya pratipatsaiva madhyama
It is clear however that in the overall context of its appearance 
in a chapter devoted to examining the doctrine of the four noble 
truths;which in the process counters an opponent's claim that 
sunyatavada leads to an abandoning of those truths and hence to 
a position in which morality appears absurd, Nigirjuna is ;in this 
versettrying to give his own version of the Middle Way (madhyama 
pratipad) which avoids the extremes of nihilism or eternalism.
We have already discussed at some length the fact that these extremes 
depend on notions of existence and non-existence which in their 
turn are the result of the actions of prapanca, vikalpa etc. on 
the unenlightened mind. This is why it is said that nirvana cannot 
be characterised in terms of either of these concepts. It is concept- 
free. Emptiness (sunyata) represents the sense of emptiness of 
such concepts in the enlightened mind, and as such is the equivalent 
of nirvana. In the light of this how will we interpret MMK.XXIV.18?
The first hemistitch reads "We declare that dependent origination 
is emptiness (junyata).11 On the relationship between pratTtyaz 
samutpacla and sunyata- Stcherbatsky states thats-
"In Mahayana it (ie•pratTtyasamutpada) is synonymous with 
the "central-"conception of the Madhyamikas and means their 
idea of Relativity or Negativity (ma_dhyanra pratipa_d = sunyata -
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pratityasamutpada). cp. XXVV 18." (56)
We may wish to disagree with Stcherbatsky's translation of technical 
terms, but will accept that emptiness and dependent origination are 
ultimately synonymous.
Now from a provisional point of view emptiness refers to that state 
of mind devoid of defilement and hence appears to be used epistemic— 
ally in MMK. Again dependent origination (pratTtyasamutpada). part­
icularly as treated in the mapgalasloka, is provisionally the 
ontologically indeterminate existence realm; indeterminate in that 
it cannot be spoken of in terms of mutually exclusive categories 
such as existent and non-existent. It is free from dichotomous 
thought and at peace. The synonymous nature of sunyat'a and pratTtya- 
samutplada will however be revealed from the ultimate point of view
since while conventionally they refer respectively to mental and 
extra-mental entities or processes, ultimately there is union 
between the two. The knowledge of the Buddha transcends the dist­
inction between self and other.
Turning to the second hemistitch we notice first of all that sunyata 
of the first hemistitch is now termed a metaphorical designation 
(praj'naptir upadaya). The meaning of this shoul d be quite clear. 
Sunyata should not be hypostatizedf as stcherbatskywants.
Also it is a metaphorical desigi ation not meant to convey the fact
that pratityasamutpada is essentially empty, in the sense of non­
existent, but rather that in reality pratTtyasamutpada may not 
be characterised in terms of dichotomously opposed concepts. This 
therefore is the true meaning of the Middle Way. Put simply MMK 
XXIV 18 conveys the fact that Nagarjuna adheres to the Middle Way 
laid down by the Buddha and expounded by the early traditions.
Although reality (tattva = pratTtyasamutpada) is essentially incapable 
of description in terms of existence or non existence (it is ontol- 
ogically indeterminate - the true sense of the Middle Way which 
avoids the two extremes), the unenlightened mind confers such 
definitions upon it. Only when the mind is emptied of the defile­
ments which lead to such superimpositions will it appreciate tattva 
as it is. While sunyata" may provisionally bs taken as the nirvemic 
state of mind, ultimately it refers to a condition which transcends 
epistemology and ontology. The final verse of Nagarjuna's analysis of 
the four noble truths puts his entire system into perspective.
"He who perceives pratTtyasamutpada also sees suffering,
the arising of suffering, its destruction and the path." (57)
In fact then, pratTtyasamutpada is the base not only for the arising 
of duhkhabut also for its extinction. Through ignorance (avidya) 
the other eleven factors arise which contribute to the distorted 
vision of the basis, while through knowledge which has been purged 
of those same factors the basis is seen as it is. It is clear 
then that in the final analysis Nagarjuna does hold to a concept 
°f prajna even though it is not specifically referred to in MMK. 
Implicit in his system is a'concept of mind purged from all. the
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factors which lead it to a distorted vision of reality and this 
purified mind is structurally related to the idea of prajna found 
in both the early Buddhist writings and the Prajnaparamita literature. 
Finally to follow up one loose strand we may further add that there 
is justification in saying that for Nagarjuna this state of mind 
may be referred to as non-dual knowledge (advayajnana) since we 
have already seen that this state transcends those in which things 
are described in dichotomously related terms.
Returning to Warders initial thesis, it does appear that much that 
has been said above tends to confirm his position. With the possible 
exception of a couple of novel terms such as the reference to the 
city of the Gandharvas (gandharvanagara) it has been shown that 
the central core of MMK does expound a doctrine which differs very
little from that contained in much of the early Buddhist writings.
— w
That Nagarjuna does have an opponent to which is arguments are
addressed is however certain. It seems an overestimation to say 
that his target is Early Buddhism in general for two good reasons. 
Firstly, he does seem to quote some early texts with approval,
but secondly and perhaps more importantly because there is a strong
congruence between his position and the position of early texts.
The idea that Nagirjuna has somehow abandoned the whole of the 
early teaching and set up a new school called the Mahayana must 
therefore be seen as an inadequate understanding of his role in 
the history of Buddhist thought.
It is far more likely that lagarjuna stands in the position of
someone who is attempting the defence of orthodoxy against new
and possibly heretical teachings. The heterodox teachings which
are most likely to have been his target will be those which concentrated
strongly on the dharma theory of existence. Such schools, such
as the Sarvastivada, held that only dharmas are ultimately real
(paramirtha) while other things which were believed to be built
out of combinations of these primary building blocks, in other
words the things of the everyday world, were merely conceptual.
(58)
As Warder has pointed out one of Nagarjuna's principle targets
in MMK is the idea of the existence of dharmas. The heart of this 
critique is that the existence of dharmas is incompatible with 
the concept of dependent originality (pratTtyasamutpada). Both 
the Abhidharmikas and Nagarjuna accept pratTtyasamutpada, but he 
shows that the assumption that dharmas exist implies "exist always" 
which is the extreme position of eternalism. He goes on to prove 
that a process of dependent origination is made absurd if one holds 
that dharmas always exist, or in other words have an immutable 
nature ; an own-nature (svabhava). This being the case, and given 
the fact that pratTtyasamutpida is the central teaching of the 
Buddha, and hence inviolate, if such things as dharmas are operative 
in pratTtyasamutpada they cannot be immutable and must therefore 
be devoid of own-nature (nifosvabhava).
The own-nature (svabhava) doctrine was probably formulated in the
(59)
Sthaviravada commentaries before 100AD and is not explicitly
mentioned in the tradition of the Sarvastivada. However given 
the time Nagarjuna was probably writing and particularly some of
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of the contents of MMK (cf.Ch XV - Examination of svabhava it seems 
highly feasible that MMK serves a two fold purpose. Firstly as 
a polemic against the increasing widespread influence of the 
Abhidharmika dharma theory and its latter developments including 
the theory of own-nature (svabhiva), and secondly as an attempt 
to reinforce and give a new but essentially unchanged treatment 
of the central doctrines of liberation according to the early teaching. 
As Warder puts it:-
"From all this it seems clear that Nigirjuna accepts the 
Tripitaka, in an ancient form recognised probably by all schools 
of Buddhists as the teaching of the Buddha, but attacks what 
he sees as misinterpretations of it by the scholastic traditions 
of the schools. He professes to be simply restoring the original 
meaning of the old sutras, showing that the innovations of 
the schools lead to contradictions and in particular conflict 
with what he takes to be the essential teaching, namely conditioed 
origination. This is hardly going over to the new Mahayana 
movement ... " (60)
We conclude this chapter with many more questions left to answer, 
but have at least laid to rest the myth that Nagarjuna overthrew 
the whole of the Buddhist tradition to establish a new school.
We can now see him not as an innovator, but rather as an expositor 
following in a long tradition. Our next task is to establish the 
correct position of the Vijninavadin authors Asanga and Vasubandhu 
in the Buddhist tradition and once this is done to compare what 
they have to say, particularly concerning the nature of reality 
and the enlightened and unenlightened mind, with Nagarjuna's own 
statements. It is only through such a process that one can attempt 
a reliable comparison between the so-called Yogacara and Madhyamaka 
schools of Buc Ihism.
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Chapter Four
The Problem of Mahayana "Schools1
The second great moment in the history of Mahayana Buddhism is 
generally considered to coincide with the establishment of the 
Yogacara/Vijnanavada school of Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu.
The dating of this entire period of Indian history is beset with 
a multitude of problems connected with both the paucity of sources 
and the ambiguous identifications of authors and writings prevail­
ing at this time.
* • . ( 1 }Nagarjuna himself is paradigmatic. Warder asserts the existence
of more than one author of this name, but since his Nag"arjuna I
is attributed with all the works that concern us, this theory
need not detain us unduely. Accepting Bu-ston's statement that
Nagarjuna is a pupil of Rahulabhadra (c.12Q AD), Warder assigns
(2)
the former to the second century of the Christian era and in
this he is supported by Lamotte , Winternitz , and Murti^^ *
Either side of this date we find Shackleton Bailey ^^going for
  (7) .
the end of the first century, and Walleser placing Nagarjuna in
(81the third. Ruegg ' is altogether more cautious, being content to 
say thatj-
Nagarjuna is generally believed to have been born 
and to have worked in South-Central India (South Kosala 
or Vidarbha?) early in the first millenium p.C."
Opinions on the date and identities of the authors of the Yogacara
are equally distributed. Those accepting the historicity of
(9)
Maitreya tend to place him at the turn of the fourth century AD , 
with Asanga, on whom the latter's dates are computated, generally
2£>
coming out as being active sometime within the mid-fourth century.
Both Warder  ^ \  and Yamada agree here though the actual
dates do not correspond exactly.
Vasubandhu complicates matters yet again. In an influential article
Frauwallner has argued, on the basis of discrepancies in the trad— -
itional accounts (particularly in Paramartha’s Life of Vasubandhu P 2^),
for the existence of two authors with the name Vasubandhu. However
again this need not worry us over much since the writer of the
Mahayanist texts which are of interest to us is claimed by Frau—
(13)
wallner to be the younger brother, and therefore contemporary,
of Asanga. 3aini nicely sums up the research on this question of 
dating:-
"Takakusu favoured A.N. 1100 and proposed A.D. 420-500 as 
the period of Vasubandhu. In 1911 P.N.Peri, after a 
thorough investigation of all available materials on the 
subject, proposed A.D. 350. Over a period several scholars, 
notably Professor Kimura, G.Ono, U.Woghihara, H.Ui, and 
many others, contributed their views on this topic, which 
were summed up in 1929 by D.Takakusu, who again tried to 
establish his previously proposed date of the fifth cen­
tury A.D." (14)
(15)Clearly Takakusu's date is too late to allow us to maintain a
close relationship between him and Asanga and we will therefore be
better off sticking to the date Frauwallner gives to Vasubandhu I, in
(16}which he agrees with Ui and others, of sometime in the fourth
century •
We have, or will have cause to refer to a number of other important 
writers in this thesis. Regarding later Yogacarins the consensus
(17)
puts Vasubandhu1s commentator Sthiramati in the mid sixth century
(18) •
making him a contemporary of Bhlvaviveka * We tend to find
Nagarjuna’s important, though late, commentator Candrakirti unanim­
ously agreed to have lived in the mid-seventh century  ^ , though 
c, la Vallee Poussin puts him a little earlier, "vers la fin du VI8
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ou 1 b comm encement du V I I s s i e c l e . "
T a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  we may 
be r e t i c e n t  t o  a s c r i b e  e x a c t  d a t e s  t o  any o f  t h e  a u t h o r s  m e n t i o n e d .
Ue may h o w e v e r b e  f a i r l y  c o n f i d e n t  i n  p u t t i n g  f o r w a r d  a g e n e r a l  c h r o n ­
o l o g i c a l  schema w h ic h  w i l l  a l l o w  us t h e  l u x u r y  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  who 
p r e c e d e s  whoy an d  so o n .  The c h a r t  b e lo w  w i l l  be a p p r o p r i a t e ; —
NAGAR3UNA 1st-2nd century AD
(HAITREYA ?), VASUBANDHU and ASANGA 4th century AD
STHIRAMATI 6th century AD
BHAVAVIVEKA 6th century AD
CANDRAKIRTI 7th century AD
Now the Madhyamaka
has received a great deal of attention from Western scholars and 
consequently possess a burgeoning secondary literature, the Yogicara/ 
Vijnanavada has been relatively neglected. This neglect has contributed 
to a long standing misunderstanding of the principle doctrines expounded 
by the authors of this "so-called" school. A number of influential 
writers therefore have attempted to put forward the idea that the 
establishment of the Yogacira/Vijnanavida heralded an entirely new 
epoch in the development of Buddhist thought; this epoch being charact­
erised by an abandoning of the principal positions of the old Buddhist 
tradition and the erection of a new intellectual edifice which has 
as its fundamental feature an interpretation of Buddhist doctrine 
from an idealistic point of view.
This mistaken approach to the subject has a number of sources. We 
have already discussed in connection with the interpretation of the 
Madhyamaka how the use of commentarial texts, particularly writtei 
some time after the root text itself, can give rise to misleading
results. Now one of the earliest studies on the subject is a work
^ . (*0) lA
by S. Levi who attempted an outline of the Vijnaptimatra system
as contained in Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika and Trimsika. To do this
he relied entirely on Chinese and Japanese sources. Now since 
the Chinese mind was already strongly influenced by Mencian idealism
before the arrival of Buddhism in that country, it is hardly surprising
that Chinese translations of Sanskrt texts which deal predominantly
with psychology, epistemology and ontology would convey a strongly
idealistic flavour. It is consequently not surprising that L€vi
should reach the conclusion that Vasubandhu, having criticised
the realistic systems of both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, would
set about the task of erecting a system, based upon an idealistic
Absolute. Thus, talking about the Vimsatika Levi says:-
uVasubandhu, avant d'exposer en detail sa propre doctrine 
de 1'idealisme absolu s'attache a refuter les objections de 
principe qu’on pent lui opposer a l'interieur de l'eglise 
bouddhique elle-meme; puis il s’attaque a la th^orie atomique 
des Vaisesikas, 1 1 interpretation physique de l'univers la 
plus puissante que le genie hindou ait elaboree, et qui s'etait 
insinu^e dans le bouddhisme, jusque chez les Vaibhasikas du 
Cachemire que Vasubandhu avait longtemps suivis avec sympathie". (Zl)
Levi gives the impression that this work represents a radical dis­
junction from what has gone before, both among Buddhists and their 
opponents. A fellow countryman, J. May, substantially repeats 
Levi's position, though in an attenuatted form, that we are confronted 
with a new school of Buddhist thought, propounding a new philosophical 
idealism.
"Du Ille au Vile siecle de notre ere, selon la chronologie ^ 
la plus souvent admise, la pensee bouddhique en Inde a trouve 
une expression particulierement brillante dans l'ecole dite 
du Vijnanavada ... Les categories qui gouvernent^la pensee 
philosophique en Occident s'appliquent mal, en general, a 
la pensee indienne. Pourtant^on peut admettre, ^ sans trop 
forcer les choses, que le Vijnanavada est un idealisme . (22)
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The other major source of misleading interpretation is Stcherbatsky 
who has also influenced a generation of scholars. Stcherbatsky did 
not depend on Chinese sources, for the most part concentrating his 
efforts on Sanskrtoriginals and Tibetan translations when necessary. 
Although the general problem of translation still arises when Tibetan 
materials are used we are nevertheless in a slightly simpler situation, 
since while the Chinese had already a long history of philosophical
speculation and literature which was bound to influence the reception
of Buddhist ideas, the positionn in Tibet was different. While 
it would be over simplistic to claim that the Tibetan mind was a 
tabula rasa before the arrival of Buddhism, nevertheless in comparison 
to China the level of philosophical speculation would be expected 
to be relatively low and in consequence the influence of earlier 
traditions probably had a low impact on the reception of Buddhist 
philosophical ideas. Of course this would not necessarily have 
been the case with regard to things like ritual, cosmology, demonology 
etc. Although Stcherbatsky did not have the problems to deal with 
which beset the predominantly French Sinologists, his handicap was 
just as serious; a great desire to demonstrate the fact that Buddhist 
thought, in its many aspects, mirrored the central position of the
German idealist philosophies. He was particularly keen to show
the correspondence between Mahayana Buddhism and Hegel or Kant, 
although on many occasions other luminaries of the Western philosophical 
firmament are invoked to demonstrate the essential similarity between 
Eastern and Western philosophical speculation. Therefore, while 
Stcherbatsky’s overall work has been immensely influential in the 
growth of Buddhist studies, it would be true to refer o him as 
one of the first Buddhist apologists in the West. His conclusions
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on _ ..?acara reflect this stance. For him authors, like Vabubandhu 
are expounding a species of Absolute Monism. Yogacara philosophy
"... the denial of Pluralism and the vindication of Monism, 
with the implication that this Monism has a superstructure 
of phenomenal Relativity or that the phenomenal Relativity 
has a subjacent foundation of Absolute, non-relative Reality ... 
This Absolute represents the unique substance of the Universe 
(ekamdravyam). There is no other substance. It embraces 
the totality of everything relatively real, but is itself 
the non-relative Absolute". Ui)
This attitude has spilt over into more recent work in much the 
same way as Levi's has. Thus Murti, who seems to follow the line 
taken by Stcherbatsky, who is in fact heavily influenced by him, 
takes the position that:-
"The Idealism of the Yogacara (Vijnanavadi) school, has to 
be understood as a significant modification of the Madhyamika 
sunyati on a constructive basis". (ty)
It does appear that Indian authors who have taken a particular 
interest in the Yogacara have, without exception, been under the 
influence of the two prevailing tendencies. For them the Yogacara 
is both idealistic and absolute monism. A. K. Chatterjee is a 
good example of this synthetic approach. Concluding his book "The 
Yogacara Idealism" he says:-
"Idealism is one of the greatest philosophies of the world, 
and the Yogacara system, it has been the contention of this 
essay, represents idealism in its pure epistemological form.
It cannot be stigmatised as merely subjectivism, since absol­
utism is its inevitable logical goal. In spite of being 
absolutism however it does not give up its idealistic bias". (2S)
Finally a recently published book on the work of Vasubandhu reiterates 
all that has been said before. For K. N. Chatterjee ^  the Yogicara 
school set itself the task of avoiding the nihilistic tendencies 
of the Madhyamaka by proposing the idea that everything that exists 
is mind-only (cittamatra). ^
In the last few pages I have attempted an outline of what has come
to be the established orthodoxy among Buddhist scholars in relation 
to the position of Yogicara school both historically and philosoph­
ically. However there have been a number of people who have disagreed 
with this point of view. For them the small discrepancies between 
Nagarjuna and the Yogacara authors are far outweighted by the over­
whelming concord of their writings. According to these authors 
neither Nagarjuna nor Asanga nor Vasubandhu are system-builders 
in the generally accepted sense of the term. Rather they have, 
in common, the task of rendering traditional Buddhist doctrine in 
such a way that it can be used to tackle particular problems. Therefoi 
it is pointless categorising them as nihilists or idealists or 
anything else. Rather they should be seen as expositors, adapting 
traditional doctrine to meet the needs of particular tasks while 
at the same time leaving the body of that doctrine fundamentally 
unchanged and unquestioned.
D. T. Suzuki seems to have been the first person to take up this 
matter and argue for a de—emphasis between the Madhyamaka and Yogacara
"Most Buddhist scholars are often too ready Djmake a sharp 
distinction between the Madhyamika and the logacara school,
taking the one as exclusively advocating the theory of emptiness 
(sunyata) while the other is bent single-mindedly on an idealistic 
interpretation of the universe. They thus further assume that 
ohe idea of emptiness is not at all traceable in the Yogacara 
and that idealism is absent in the Madhyaroika". f*>jil
What Suzuki appears to be getting at here is that one should be
cautious of identifying a Buddhist school merely on the basis of
its treatment of a single issue. In some senses it is a misnomer
/_ __
to refer to the Madhyamaka as Sunyatavada because this indicates
that the doctrine of sunyatl is the central doctrine of such a school.
As we have already seen this would be a simplistic interpretation.
w- _
Similarly the use of the term Vijnanavada as descriptive of the writings 
of Asanga and Vasubandhu tends to overemphasise the position played
*A —
by vijnana In their works.
L. de la Vallee Poussin is an exception amongs scholars working 
In French. He is less inclined to make a hard and fast distinction 
between Mahayanists. It seems that in his statement:
"Peut-on douter qu'il y alt Mldhyamikas et Mldhyamikas,Yogiciras 
et Yogacaras?"
he is suggesting that while some authors have associated themselves 
as adherents of one school or the other, there are other Mahayana 
authors who have not done so. It appears to me that the Idea of 
belonging to a school of thought was a fairly late development
in the history of Buddhism in India and in all probability neither 
Nagarjuna, nor Asanga, nor Vasubandhu considered uhem^elves in 
such a manner.
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In more recent times W. Rahula has outlined in more detail the 
above position. To him the idea that the authors of the early 
Mahiyina were involved in the expounding systems of philosophy 
in contradiction with each other is clearly absurd. On the contrary
"Their contribution to Buddhism lay not in giving it a new 
philosophy, but providing, in fascinatingly different ways, 
brilliant new interpretations of the old philosophy. But 
they all solidly based themselves on the ancient Canonical 
texts and their commentarial traditions". (29)
Rahula believes that in many senses the work of writers like Nagarjuna 
and Vasubandhu may be seen as analogous to the Pali commentarial 
literature sometimes ascribed, though he believes incorrectly, 
to Buddhaghosa. Nagarjuna therefore, while he places emphasis 
on the doctrine of sunyata, is not introducing anything new into 
Buddhist thought, since as we have already seen the concept of 
emptiness is found in a number of places in the Tripitaka. Similarly 
the Yogacara concern with consciousness (vijnana, citta) is not 
in the slightest bit innovative. The interaction between the external 
world and the mental processes and the consequent world views generated 
is a constant theme at all periods in the history of Buddhist thought. 
Rahula however very firmly points out the error in interpretations 
that attempt to show that the Yogacara teaching of vijnaptimatrata 
is one which introduces a notion of Absolute Reality composed of 
mind into Buddhist doctrine. This appears to me to be exactly 
the tone of Stcherbatsky, and his followers’, interpretations.
Rahula feels that such a position would be totally opposed to
the fundamental axioms of Buddhist thought aid hence quite unacceptable.
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In conclusion he says:-
The sunyata philosophy elaborated by Nagarjuna and the cittamatra 
philosophy developed by Asanga and Vasubandhu are not contrad­
ictory, but complementary to each other. These two systems 
known as Madhyamika and Yogacara or Vijnanavada, explain and 
expound, in different ways with different arguments, the very 
same doctrines of nairatmya, ^unyata, tathata, pratityasamutpada, 
but are not a philosophy of their own which can properly be 
called Nagarjuna’s or Asahga's or Vasubandhu's explanations, 
arguments and theories, postulated to prove and establish 
the Canonical teaching of sunyata, cittamatra or nairatmya.
If any differences of opinion exist between them, these are 
only with regard to their own arguments and theories, advanced 
to establish the old fundamental Canonical teaching, but not 
with regard to the teaching itself." (Jo)
Actually it is clear that the controversy we have been looking 
at is nothing new. Many early Buddhist commentators have left 
a similarly confusing message. It seems to me that the root of 
the problem may be traced to a passage in the Sandhinirmocanasutra 
which mentions the threefold turning of the wheel of Pharma 
(dharmacakrapravartapa). Unfortunately the Sanskrt text is not
extant but E. Lamotte translates the passage that concerns us, 
from Tibetan, thus:-
"At first in the deer park in Varanasi, the Lord set the wheel
of Dharma in motion for adherents of the Disciples’ Vehicle
(isravakayana) in the form of teaching about the four Noble
Truths . . However this setting in motion was surpassed, gave
rise to criticism, contained an implicit meaning (neyartha)
and became the subject of controversy .. As a result the Lord
set about teaching that all phenomena are without essential
nature, not produced, not destroyed, originally quiescent
and by nature in a state of Nirvana. This second wheel of
dharma he set in motion for adherents of the Mahayana in the
form of teachings about emptiness ... Finally the Lord taught
that all phenomena are without essential nature ... This third
wheel of Dharma which is perfectly expounded he set in motion
for adherents of all vehicles. (This setting in motion is
unsurpassed, does not give rise to criticism, contains an
explicit meaning (nitartha) and is not a subject of controversy". (31)
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Now although it seems fairly clear what the first turning of the
wheel of dharma refers to, since it appears to be the Buddha's
first sermon after gaining enlightenment in which he laid down
the Four Noble Truths, it is less obvious precisely what the second
and third turnings might be. In fact the subject is a controversial
one, but nevertheless I have been unable to find any Indian Buddhist
author who specifically associates individual Mahiyana schools
with particular groups of Mahayina canonical literature. There
is no harmony of opinion here however. According to Tibetan sources ^
Bbavaviveka held the second turning to reflect the teaching of
the Sandhinirmocanasutra and the third was in conformity with.,
the Prajnaparamita corpus. On the other hand Dharmapala inverted
—  —  —  —
the sequence identifying the Prajnaparamitasutras with the second 
and the Sandhinirmocanasutra with the third turning. The author 
of this source, Wonchuk, gives us his opinion on the subject.
He feels that the second turning was initiated by Nagirjuna's 
authorship of several sastras including MMK and the third by the 
composition of “sastras by Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu. This
(33)
is substantially the same position as that held by Tson-kha-pa.
It seems likely therefore that the ascription of different turnings 
of the wheel of dharma to different "schools" of the Mahayana was 
a fairly late development in Buddhist history. It is interesting 
to note at this point that fofonch'uk states that even at the time 
of Dharmapala (since Prabhimitra was Dharmapala's disciple), there 
was thought to be no fundamental conflict between the work of 
Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu. Thus:-
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At that time (ie.the time of Vasubandhu) there was no controversy 
over sunyata and bhava (existence). This is the reason why 
Bandhuprabha or Prabhamitra said, "A thousand years ago, the 
taste of the BuddhsMs teaching was one. Thereafter, the smrti 
(dran pa) and prajna have gradually deteriorated, which caused 
the rise of controversy over existence and non-existence". ("SH*)
Another piece of evidence to suggest that the notion of Mahayana 
schools was a fairly late development, possibly contemporaneous 
with the transmission of Buddhism to Tibet^is provided by AfTsa 
(c• 980-1056AD) . In his Bodhimargadipapanjika, the autocommentary 
on his famous Bodhipathapradipa, we are given the distinct impression 
that the matter of "schools" and their relative merits have still 
not finally settled, since he speaks of his own gurus as if they 
had not really plumped for one side or the other in the dispute.
He says:-
"In India learned men have claimed that Arya -Asanga advocated 
a modification of the Teaching (de^anaparyaya) for he took 
the meaning of prajnaparamita to be representation-only 
(vijnaptimatra) and at present this is also the opinion of my 
guru Suvarnadvipa and guru Santipa. Acarya-Nagarjuna however 
preached the essence of the Teaching (desanasara) for he under­
stood the meaning of prajnaparamita in the deep sense of the 
Middle Way (mahamadhya-makartha) transcending being and non-being 
and this was also advocated in the tradition of other learned 
men. At present this is also the opinion of my guru Bodhibhadra 
and bhattaraka Kusulupa." (i5)
From what we can gather from this quotation AtTsa acknowledges 
his debt to a number of gurus, some of whom accept Asanga to be 
the source of a correct tradition for the interpretation of the 
Dharma, others accepting Nagirjuna. In a later verse Atisa comes 
down on the side of the latter, but it seems to me that since he 
regards all of his teachers with respect, and claims Asanga and
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Nagarjuna to be Arya- and Acarya respectively we are not at this 
point in Buddhist history looking at someone who for sectarian 
reasons considers one teaching to be inferior to the other.
Sectarian rivalry certainly seems to be even less evident several
hundred years before Atisa. Arya Vimuktisena probably lived about
a hundred years before Candraklrti, which means, according to 
(3t»)
Ruegg , around the first half of the sixth century. Vimuktisena 
is considered by the Tibetan pseudo-historians to be the founder 
of the "so called" Yogacara-Madhyamaka synthesis. It is thought 
that such a synthesis came about partially through Vimuktisena's 
studies in the school of Dignaga and partially through his studies 
of the Prajnaparamita literature. Now we know that the Buddhist 
traditions hold Nagarjuna's main scriptural influence to have been 
the Prajnaparamita corpus, and Dignaga on the other hand to have 
been a member of a lineage of exegesis which stems from Asanga 
and Vasubandhu. It seems strange that someone could bring together 
two radically opposed systems of thought and end up with a workable 
system, as Vimuktisena is alleged to have done, and therefore we 
must conclude that, here again, we have someone who to all intents 
and purposes seems quite happy to study in two separate traditions 
of exegesis. Such a conclusion must strengthen the case that these 
two traditions were not hostile to one another.
An interesting point in connection with Arya-Vimuktisena concerns 
his commentarial works, and in particular his commentary, on Mai^reya s 
Abhisamayalamkara. Now the Abhisamayalamkara is itself a s. mmary 
and commentary on all the important doctrines of the Prajnaparamita
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corpus and was written according to Bu-ston from the point
of view of the Yogicara-Madhyamika-Svatantrika (Rnal-byor-spyod- 
Pa ^ -dbu-ma-ran-rgyud-pa), which is curious since Maitreya is 
generally considered to be the mythical instructor of Asanga, and 
therefore for those who see Mihiyana Buddhism in terms of schools, 
to be the founder of the Yogacara-Vijnanavada. One wonders why 
someone seeking to establish a rival school to Nagarjuna should 
wish to write a treatise on the Prajnaparamita if, as many authors 
believe, it is ammenable only to an interpretation from the standpoint 
of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka. Now according to Obermiller 
the Tibetan tradition assigns all the great authorities on the 
Prajnaparamita in the Madhyamaka to the branch which we have 
referred to as the Yogacara-Madhyamaka-Svatantrika. He goes on 
to say, on the basis of Tibetan tradition again;that the great 
exponents of this commentarial work include Arya-Vimuktisena, Bhadanta- 
Vimuktisena and Haribhadra, and that Tibetan writers of Tson-kha-pa's 
school also follow the same method of interpretation. This again 
is a strange fact since Tsoh-kha-pa considers himself to be a 
Prasangika-Madhyamaka following the line laid down by Candrakirti 
in his Prasannapada and Madhyamakalamkara. Taking all this into 
account it does look very much as though we are receiving confirmation 
for our view that the development of Indian Mahayana Buddhism should 
not be seen as a series of diverging schools. Rather fundamental 
doctrines are illuminated in different ways by different seminal 
writers for purposes entirely unconnected with the establishment 
of novel interpretations. Actually each of these important authors 
seems to be applying an exposition of the doctrine to the solving
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of particular problems, such as attacks by opponents, protection 
from heresy and cultivation of spiritual discipline. It is not 
surprising that, if this were the case, the works and ideas of 
these people should converge in the writings of those 1 ater system— 
atisers such as Arya-Vimuktisena or Tsoh-kha-pa where such convergence 
would naturally be seen to illuminate fundamental knowledge.
In fact Ruegg, who is generally resistant to such an interpretation, 
preferring his own ideas which involve the evolution of schools, 
acknowledges my own position, although quite possibly unconsciously.
He mentions the fact that "several Yogacirin/Vijnanavadin masters
-  -  -  (33)wrote commentaries on works by Nagarjuna and Aryadeva". This
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is borne out by the fact that Atisa mentions one of the eight
standard commentaries on MMK used in his day to be that written 
by Acarya-Sthiramati, who, as we shall see, is mainly relevant 
in modern Buddhist studies as a major commentator on Vasubandhu 
and, therefore to most scholars, a Yogicirin. Ruegg goes on to 
suggest that the authors that followed Nagarjuna and Aryadeva paid 
particular attention to those details of the Buddhist tradition 
which are given scant attention in the writings of the Yogacara.
In his discussion of the work of Santaraksita Ruegg says:
"... the Yogacara—Madhyamaka synthesised the pure Madhyamaka— 
which it regarded as perfectly valid and adequate with respect 
to the paramartha - with a form of_philosophical analysis  ^
derived from the Yogacara/Vij nanavada, a school which by the 
eighth century had attained a high de“gree of development and 
whose achievements could not, it was evidently thought, be 
ignored by the Madhyamaka". )
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This statement gives the impression that the fusion of the two 
"schools" was made for negative reasons, since it was perceived 
by the Madhyamaka that it would be better to have the Yogacara 
as an ally than as an enemy. It seems much more likely that the 
synthesis has no origin in a particular point of time, but rather 
that the two ways of treating fundamental doctrines ran parallel 
to one another, and at the same time mutually conditioned one 
another for some considerable time before the advent of the Yogicira- 
Madhyamaka fwhich anyway seems to be an invention of the Tibetan 
pseudo-historians.
There is a section in Santaraksita's Madhyamakalamkira in which,
i ' V -  _
according to Ruegg, he compares the Viinanavada'with the Madhyamaka. 
This section is supposed to demonstrate the fact that the outlook 
of the former may be considered to be a philosophical propaedentic 
which ultimately leads to the outlook of the latter. However if 
one examines the text such a statement cannot be upheld. It says:-
"On the basis of cittamitra one is to know the non-existence 
of external things and on the basis of this system one is 
to know complete non-substantiality, riding the chariot of 
the two systems and holding the reins of reasoning (yukti),
(the philosopher) therefore attains the sense as it is, the 
Mahayanist one itself." (tyl.)
Ruegg interprets this to mean that the cittamatra viewpoint, once 
it is won, is itself superceded by the system that establishes 
complete non-substantiality (nihsvabhavata or sunyata). However 
this is an over simplistic rendition. In the first place we have 
already suggested in our treatment of Nagarjuna's work, particularly
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in Chapter 3 above, that while he holds to a doctrine of nonsubstant­
iality or emptiness, this is in a very specific sense. For Nagarjuna 
unenlightened cognition infected with thought constructive tendencies 
(vika. ]pa, prapanca etc.) distorts reality leading to the imputation 
that entities (dharmas) possess substance or own—being (svabhava) 
However in reality the existence of such entities cannot be estab­
lished since they exist only due to the distortion caused by ignorance 
(avidya) . In other words mentally constructed phenomena overlay 
true reality (tattva) and prevent its gnosis by the unenlightened.
These mentally constructed phenomena do not therefore exist in 
reality. In a sense then it is clear that, even in the works of 
Nagarjuna, we have two stages in the development of the enlightened 
mind outlined. In the first there is the realisation that all 
things perceived by the ignorant are actually the construction 
of an unenlightened mind, and in the second such mental contents 
are realised to be devoid of substantiality. This being so, Nlgirjuna 
himself can be said to progressively combine the doctrine of cittamatra 
with that of complete non-substantiality. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, exactly the same can be maintained by a careful 
analysis of the work of Asanga and Vasubandhu. For them the realis­
ation that the unenlightened world view is characterised by the 
fact that it is mentally constructed (cittamatra; vijnaptimatra)
leads to a rejection of the basis for such a view, and a subsequent
__ (
transformation to a state of gnosis (jnana) in which things are
understood without the thought constructive tendencies of the
unenlightened state intervening. This results in knowledge devoid
.lA- >
of thought construction (nirvikalpajnana J .
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Returning to the quotation from Santaraksita's Madhyamaka]amkara 
then, it does seem that Ruegg's interpretation is inadequate.
Nowhere does Santaraksita refer to the terms Madhyamaka or Vijnanavada. 
On the contrary he simply refers to the Mahiyanist as someone who 
has moved from a realisation of cittamatra to the realisation of 
complete non-substantiality / and as we have said such a position 
could be said to be held by both Nigarjuna and Vasubandhu. It 
seems clear that in this case there is no evidence to suggest that 
Santaraksita holds the Yogacara/Vijnanavada to be a preparatory 
stage in the path to the Madhyamaka outlook. It would be nearer 
the spirit of the quotation to say that he held both outlooks to 
be the core of the Mahayana, although it may be said that in some 
senses they complement one another.
It must be noted that at the present stage of historical scholarship 
into the development of the Mahayana it is impossible to say exactly 
when the differentiation into schools of thought actually happened 
but from what we have noted above, a reasonable assumption may be 
that it took place sometime during the transmission of the tradition 
to Tibet. If one imagines what may have happened at the time such 
a hypothesis makes a lot of sense. It is exceedingly probable that 
the nature of the transmission was such that Buddhism was introduced 
by Indian teachers brought up in particular lineages. This was 
certainly the case with Santaraksita, Atisa etc. Each lineage could 
be expected to have its own peculiar method of interpretation and 
therefore in the early days those unfamiliar with the tradition 
as such could easily confuse methods of interpretation, based on 
the emphasis of one or two doctrines over the others, with sectarian
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differences. Such an attitude would naturally be passed on and 
finally formalised by the systematizers and pseudo-historians such 
as Bu—ston. Their work, which has been utilised by students of 
Indian Buddhism, has consequently coloured attitudes with the result 
that nowadays most authors accept the proposition that Indian Mahayana 
Buddhism comprised a number of exclusive and doctrinally incompatible 
schools of thought, even though there is no evidence from primary
sources to support such a conclusion.
Now the traditional Buddhist view about the path to Buddhahood is
that it is gradual and progressive. It was such a view that defeated
the Chan-like notion of sudden enlightenment put forward by the 
Chinese protagonist Hoshang at the Council of Samye sometime in 
the 8th century; a view which can be traced back to the Tripitaka:-
"Just as the great ocean dips gradually, ebbs gradually, slopes 
gradually and not suddenly like a precipice, so in my doctrine 
and my discipline, the access to perfect knowledge (annapativedha) 
is achieved by gradual practice (anupubbasikkha), a gradual 
action (anupubbakiriya), a gradual way (anupubbapatipada) and 
not directly (na ayatakena)". (43)
Such a view is observed by many Mahayanist authors who developed 
a teaching which emphasised this sense of gradual progress. The 
form which such a teaching takes is very often one in which a particular 
stage in the path is linked with the realisation of a particular 
attainment or the realisation characteristic of a certain stage 
of mental development. The stages (bhumi) in the progress of the 
Bodhisattva is one example in pointy but one more relevant to our 
present discussion is to be found in be th the writings of the early
-  I l l  -
Yogacira and of Candrakirti. In these writings we find the progress 
of someone seeking Buddhahood described in four stages characterised 
by progressively higher comprehension of reality. The Yogicirabhumi 
which was probably written by Asanga gives the following stages:-
(i) The stage of reality established by the world (loka-prasiddha- 
tattvartha)
(ii) The stage of reality established by reasoning (yukti-prasiddha- 
tattvartha)
(iii) The stage of reality in which the mind is purified of the 
obstacles of the defilements (klesavarana-visuddhi-jnana-gocara- 
tattvartha)
(iv) The stage of reality in which the mind is purified of the obstacles 
of the knowable (jneyavarana-visuddhi-jnana-gocara-tattvartha)
The first two stages refer respectively to common sense, and the 
workd-view formulated through philosophical thought. Stage three 
is supposed to come about upon the realisation of non-existence 
of self (pudgala-nairatmya) while stage four follows from the realis­
ation of the non-substantiality of things (dharma-nairatmya). Stage 
four is in fact the equivalent of the purest knowledge of ultimate 
reality (yathabhuta, tathata dharmata, sunyata), according to 
the text. In other words it is nirvina.
A very similar doctrine is presented in Candrakirti1s Prasannapada. 
Commenting on MMK.XVII. 8^which mentions the graded teaching of the 
Buddhas (buddhanulasanam)^ he also reveal s that there are four levels 
of understanding corresponding to that of an ordinary person, that
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of someone who has not eradicated the obstacles (ivarana), that of
someone who has partially eradicated the obstacles, and finally that 
— (45)
of an Arya. This corresponds very well with the previous schema
outlined by Asanga. Interestingly enough it also ties in with the 
account of the three turnings of the wheel of dharma (dharmacakra— 
pravartana) given in the Sandhinirmocanasutra. There we are told 
of three teachings; the first being introductory, the second and 
third being implicit, and explicit (and hence unsurpassed) respectively.
It appears that the first level of understanding given by Asanga 
and CandrakTrti refers to a non-Buddhist understanding and is therefore 
not mentioned in the Sandhinirmocanasutra. However once someone 
enters the path they enter the second stage or the first turning 
of the wheel of dharma. Consequently the second turning corresponds 
to the third stage and so on. By indicating such a correspondence 
it is clear that what has been thought to be a reference to schools 
and their respective merits in the Sandhinirmocanasutra, may in fact 
be reference to distinct levels of attainment in spiritual practice. 
Neither Asanga nor CandrakTrti do in fact associate these levels
of attainment with any particular school of thought and we must conclude
that here again we have found no evidence to support the assertion 
that Indian Mahayana acaryas thought the Madhyamaka was more advanced 
a path than the Yogacara^or vice versa.
One point does however need to be cleared up before we turn to an
examination of the thought of Asanga and Vasubandhu as such. There
is in CandrakTrti' s Madhyamakavata'a. a celebrated critique of
the Vijnanavada. There have been a number of articles (<0) in recent
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years which have used this critique to point out the radical differ­
ences between the Prasangika-Madhyamaka and the Vijnanavida but 
P. G. Fenner makes clear:-
There is some contoversy among contemporary scholars as to 
whether the Vijnanavada is a genuine idealism. Independent 
of the outcome of that controversy it is clear that CandrakTrti
interprets the Vijnanavada as "idealism". (<t£)
It is certainly true that during the course of his critique CandrakTrti 
does use the term Vijnanavldin, although it must be said that it 
only crops up in the autocommentary. The problem is that the doctrines 
ascribed to the Vijnanavada do not correspond with those expounded 
by Vasubandhu or Asanga. It will be shown in the next chapter that 
neither author puts forward an idealistic interpretation of reality. 
However it is clear that CandrakTrti directs his criticism at notions 
adopted by the Yogacara such as the store-house consciousness 
(ilayavijnlna) and the doctrines of the three natures (trisvabhiva), 
but again these are represented in a way not intended by the latter.
Let us take the notion offered by CandrakTrti that for the Vijnanavada 
reality may be said, from the ultimate point of view (paramarthasatya) 
to be nothing other than mind (cittamatra) , bearing in mind that
a further treatment of this subject will be undertaken in the next
chapter.
Now many canonical texts state that mental processes have a profound 
effect on the way reality is understood and one of the most influential 
sources in this connection is^the Dasabhumikasutra which states 
that:-
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"This triple world is nothing but mind (cittamatra); the twelve 
members of existence (bhavariga), which have been distinguished 
and proclaimed by the Tathagata, they all depend on mind." (H^ )
Now since this is a canonical source CandrakTrti cannot reject it 
so he attempts to interpret it in a novel way. For him the
sutra has a provisional meaning in the sense that it is made from 
the point of view of the conventional truth (samvrtisatya). It 
therefore has been spoken by the Buddha to destroy the adherence, 
among the ignorant, to the notion of a permanent and personal agent 
(kartr) which results in the ideaof actions (karman). In other 
words, it is mind alone (cittamatra) which is the cause of the erroneous 
conceptions although from the ultimate point of view such conceptions 
do not exist. Therefore the doctrine of mind-only (cittamatra) 
is true only from the conventional point of view. For CandrakTrti 
the mistake made by the Vijnanavadins is that they hold this doctrine 
to be true from the ultimate point of view. Such a position leads 
to a rejection of the Buddhist teaching and the establishment of 
full-blown idealism; the absolute existence of mind. The Vijnanavadins 
have therefore misinterpreted the Dasabhumikasutra. Candrakirti 
re-emphasises his argument by quoting from the Lankavatarasutra; -
"The person, continuity, aggregates, causal conditions, atcms. 
primal matter, Isvara, a maker - I say they are all mind only . (SI )
By making this quotation CandrakTrti proves that he has scriptural 
authority for stating that all categories put forward as synonymous 
ultimate principles have no validity from the ultimate point 
of view; they are all mentall constructed. It would therefore
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be just as much of a mistake to say that from the ultimate point 
of view there is nothing but mind. It is interesting in this connection 
to note that there is also a text ascribed to Nigarjuna by AtTsa 
in his BodhimargadTpapanj iki which performs exactly the same inter­
pretation on the Dasabhumika quotation as CandrakTrti is doing above. 
This text is the Mahayanavimsiki which is generally not included
in the list of authentic Nigarjuna works since it deals with topics 
usually of more interest to the Yogicira. However since it follows 
the line adopted by CandrakTrti its authorship by Nagirjuna may 
be worth reconsidering.
Having noted CandrakTrti's interpretation of mind-only (cittamitra) 
and his subsequent condemnation of the Vijnanavada doctrine on this 
matter let us now examine the works of a representative of this 
viewpoint in order to assess CandrakTrti’s contention. In fact 
nothing that he says would be contradicted by Vasubandhu, for instance. 
He opens his autocommentary on the Twenty Stanzas (Vimsatika) with 
the assertion that:—
n... in the Mahayana it has been established that those belonging 
to the three worlds are only representations of consciousness 
(vijnaptimatram)". (53)
This is a clear reference to the Dasabhumika with the exception 
that the term mind-only (cittamatra) in the former has been replaced 
by representation-only (vijnaptimatra) in the latter. However as 
T. Kochumuttam has pointed out the term traidhatukam in the
above quotation has the adjectival meaning belonging to the three 
worlds". As a matter of fact this is the case for the Dasabhumika
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excerpt also. He argues that the term traldhatuka, being adjectival, 
should qualify a noun and, from an examination of Vasubandhu*s 
other works, comes to the conclusion that the noun or rather nouns, 
in question are the mind and mental states (cittacaitta). Kochumuttam’s 
strongest piece of evidence comes from the Trimsika of Vasubandhu.
In this text we are told that all that is considered as representation 
only (vijnaptimatra) is confined to consciousness and its evolutes 
(vijnanaparmama) .
"This (threefold) transformation of consciousness is (just) 
the distinction (between subject and object). What is thus 
distinguished, does not exist as (subject and object). Therefore 
all this is representation-only (vijnaptimatra)." (5$)
In other words due to the transformations of consciousness, in three 
stages according to Vasubandhu, distinctions of thought constructions 
(vikalpa) arise which take a dichotomous form, usually treated in 
these texts as the division into a false subject/object paring.
These vikalpas and their concomitants are what is referred to as 
representations (vijnapti), since the word vijnapti is a causative 
form of vijnina and therefore means "caused by consciousness".
Vikalpas are therefore brought about by vijnana.
If we look at the term vijnanaparinama more closely we find that 
vijnana has three modes, the most fundamental (out of which the 
other two develop) is the storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijnana).
Of the alayavijnana we are told that:-
it 21^0 0 to rent of water which ceases with the attainment
of arhatship". (*><•)
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In other words the basis of vijnanaparinama (ie.alayavijnana) comes 
to an end somewhere towards the end of the Buddhist path. Now if 
the Yogacara was idealistic it would want to hold that even at the 
attainment of Buddhahood, an enlightened being would maintain that 
nothing existed apart from mental phenomena. However it is clear 
from a reading of Vasubandhu that this is not the position that 
he holds. For him the unenlightened mind is one in which represent­
ations (vijnapti) are delusively held to be real, while on the other 
hand once the mind has freed itself from this state of ignorance, 
it realises the mistakes of its previous state, attains the condition 
of gnosis devoid of thought construction (nirvikalpajnana), and 
sees things as they are (yathabhutam); this is Sthiramati's inter­
pretation of the penultimate stanza of the Trimsika:-
"That indeed is the supramundane knowledge, no-mind (acitta), 
without a support. It is the revolution at the basis~Tlsraya 
paravrtti) through the removal of the two-fold wickedness." (51)
Vijnana is brought to a halt by a revolution at the basis (asraya) 
which results in the removal of the two wickednesses which are the 
obstacles of the defilements (klesavarana) and the obstacles of 
the knowable (jneyavarana). The basis is the store-house consciousness 
(alayavijnana). When this is brought to an end supramundane knowledge 
(lokottarajnana) dawns.
If we now go back to our original point which was, "how does 
Vasubandhu interpret the Dasabhumika passage?", we are in a better 
position to answer. The statement that the triple world is mind-only
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(cittamatra) simply means that for the unenlightened person what 
he or she takes to be reality is in fact nothing but mind and its 
concomitants (citta caitta). The enlightened being on the other 
hand sees things as they are (yathabhutam) . Sthiramati takes this 
line of reasoning:-
"The above mentioned threefold transformation of consciousness 
is just thought construction (vikalpa). This is nothing but 
the citta and caittas belonging to the triple world which have 
for their object mentally constructed forms. Hence it is said; 
the citta and caitta of the triple world are a non-existent 
imagination". (5$)
Kochumuttam is therefore vindicated in his assertion that the nouns 
qualified by "belonging to the three worlds (traidhitukarp)" are 
citta and citta.
We actually have a situation in which Vasubandhu and CandrakTrti 
are in agreement over the interpretation of the Dasabhumika passage. 
For the latter it has a provisional meaning in the sense that while 
it may be correct to say that for an unenlightened being the world 
is purely mental, nevertheless, upon the attainment of Buddhahood 
this could not be said to be so. The mind of the Buddha has been 
transformed in the sense that it is no longer contaminated by the 
vikalpas, prapancas etc., which are caused by ignorance. CandrakTrti 
does not go on to say that such an enlightened mind is conscious 
of nothing, or he would be open to the charge of nihilism; he rather, 
and this is entirely consistent with his overall stance, refused 
to speculate on the nature of reality. Vasubandhu is quite similar 
here. He al 30 distinguishes between an unenlightened state in which
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it may be justified in saying that mind only or representation-only 
operates, and an enlightened state which is equivalent to a radical 
transformation of the mind which has now been freed to see reality 
as it is. There is no hint of idealism here. For Vasubandhu enlight­
enment is the realisation that in the unenlightened state one has 
been deluded into taking the representations of consciousness to 
be real. This is the true interpretation of the term Vijnaptimatratl.
Both authors therefore give an entirely consistent treatment of the 
notion of mind only (cittamatra) which is outlined in.the Dasabhumi- 
kasutra ,and we must conclude from this that when CandrakTrti refers 
to the Vijninavida he is either misinterpreting what the Yogacarins 
have said, or what is more likely given what we have said about the 
early mutual development of the Mahayana, is taking issue with a 
point of view which was never held by exponents of classical inter­
pretation and therefore represents a definite deviation from Buddhist 
principles. While many authors have chosen to interpret Candrakirti 
as being radically opposed to the Vijnanavada, using our method of 
exegesis it seems, on the contrary, that both were in close harmony.
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Chapter Five
The Conception of Truth in the Hinayana
Much of the commonly held presuppositions concerning the distinction 
between Madhyamaka and Yogacara revolve around their conceptions 
of truth. In order to determine the veracity of such presuppositions 
we must now turn our attention to the earliest Buddhist notions 
of truth (sacca; satya), before tackling the central issue in the 
next chapter.
On the surface this is an enormously complex subject since many 
apparently conflicting formulations are found throughout the development 
of Buddhist thought. In the earliest strata of the tradition we 
meet with the notion that truth is unitary.
"There is one truth without a second. People, being confused 
on this point, claim there to be many truths". (1)
Now, are we to assume that in this reference the concept of truth 
(satya) being one should be understood in the sense given it by 
a system such as the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara? Is this satya 
an ontologically unitary absolute of the monistic variety? It
(2 )
seems unlikely. Jayatilleke has an alternative theory. He argues 
that in the context of the discussion taking place in the Sutta 
Nipata it is more likely that when the Buddha talks about truth 
being unitary he in fact means that statements should not contradict 
one another. In other words, if someone makes a series of statements 
on a particular matter it is important that they should all point
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in the same general direction, or rather that they should cohere.
Someone whose statements do not meet this condition may be dismissed 
as someone who is not expounding a unitary truth, therefore. There 
is nothing uncommon in this procedure in the history of Buddhist 
thought. It is one of the primary methods employed by Nigarjuna 
in his attempt in MMK to discredit potential opponents and is the 
basis of the prasanga method of reasoning extolled by CandrakTrti.
If an opponent's position can be shown to be internally inconsistent 
the force can rapidly be taken out of his attack. This does not 
mean however that the Prasangika challenger is forced to accept 
the fact of a unitary (in the sense of absolute) truth. Rather 
he merely insists that any series of statements must conform to 
a coherence theory of truth in order to be taken seriously. This 
particular aspect of the Buddhist truth formulation is therefore 
entirely independent of any ontological speculation since it rests 
solely on the non-contradictoryness of statements.
Other concepts of truth however are also met within the early literature. 
We are told that it is possible to entertain both true and false 
notions with regard to facts and that such notions may be proved 
or disproved by recourse to pseudo-empirical methods. Thus:-
"When in fact there is a next world, the belief occurs to 
me that there is no next world, that would be a false belief ... 
When in fact there is a next world, the belief occurs to 
me that there is a next world, that would be a true belief. (3)
It is clear that what we have here is a primitive correspondence 
theory of truth since statements which do not accord with the fc ly
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things re ally are must be false while statements which are true 
conform to the facts. This is in the sense of the Sanskrit term 
yathabhutam - as it is. If something is said to be yathabhutam 
it must be true since it corresponds with reality (bhuta). Again 
there is no question that simply because something is true by this 
criterion we must conclude that reality is some sort of unitary 
absolute. Furthermore there is no particular conflict between this 
correspondence theory and the statement already quoted from the 
Sutta Nipata, since the former may still be seen to yield a unitary 
truth in the sense that all true statements may now be said to cohere 
with the true state of things.
Another important distinction which is made in the Pali canon, which 
we shall soon see has a direct bearing on the conception of truth 
in later Buddhism, is that between two different types of Sottas; 
those with a direct meaning (nftattha) and those with an indirect 
meaning (neyyattha). Thus:-
"There are these two who misrepresent the Tathagata. Which 
two? He who represents a sutta of indirect meaning as a 
sutta of direct meaning and he who represents a sutta of 
direct meaning as a sutta of indirect meaning". (A)
Now the Pali canon itself gives no information on how to identify 
a passage of either direct or indirect intention, and further there 
exists no positive evidence which would lead to the placing of 
one sutta in a more 'exalted position than the other. It seems 
that the nitattha/neyyattha distinction is basically one with a 
pedagogical purpose; the one kind of sutta being suitable for a
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person of a particular disposition, or at a certain stage in the 
path, the other for someone else. The strictures contained in 
the above quotation would therefore be aimed merely against mixing 
up teaching materials and support the use of appropriate teachings 
for the appropriate kind of disciple.
It is actually the Pali commentarial literature which seems to 
make the distinction between riitattha and neyyatha suttas one of 
degree. Since these commentaries were written some time after 
the rise of the Mahayana one may suspect a certain amount of cross­
fertilization . Be that as it may, it appears that in these writings 
the suttas of indirect meaning (neyyattha) are placed in a subordinate 
position to those of direct meaning (nTtattha). This is because 
while the later are deemed to be true from the ultimate point of 
view (paramattha) the former are only conventionally so (sammuti).
Now the Pali canon itself contains no passage in which statements 
of ultimate and conventional meaning are contrasted and we may 
therefore suspect that this distinction is a commentarial development. 
However there is no doubt that such an idea exists implicitly in 
the Abhidharma literature, even though there may be no explicit 
formulation. The Abhidharma recognises the fact that while convent­
ionally language about persons (puggala) etc. may be understood
c
and acted upon by the ordinary person, the pscyino-physical continuum 
is in reality nothing but a mirage caused by the constant interplay 
of countless impermanent/insubstantial/and unsatisfactory elements 
(dharma). It is clear that sometimes the Pali commentarial literature 
draws on the Abhidharmika tradition in its attempt to make the 
distinction between sayings of indirect meaning and those of direct
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meaning , for we are told:-
"A sutta of the form "there is one individual, 0 monks", 
etc., is a sutta of indirect meaning... Here although the 
perfectly Enlightened One speaks of "there is one person,
0 monks", etc., its sense has to be inferred since there 
is no individual from the ultimate point of view ... One 
should speak of a sutta of direct meaning (as of the form), 
"this is impermanent, unsatisfactory and devoid of a soul". (5)
There does seem to be a case to be made for the assertion that 
the concept of two levels of Buddhist truth is therefore a fairly 
late development in the evolution of doctrine. As we have already 
said, the early texts tend to speak of only one truth, or rather 
one interconnected series of statements which together may be taken 
as expounding the truth. This interlocking formulation results 
in a coherent vision of reality as such and corresponds to the 
Buddha's teaching (dharma). While it could be maintained, that 
on the basis of this statement it may be possible to hold to a 
two-level truth doctrine in the sense that everything conforming 
to dharma must be true while everything contrary to it must be 
false, this is not what is generally meant by two levels of truth 
in the Pali commentarial work and in the writings of the Mahay ana. 
Rather both of the two truths are held under certain circumstances 
to possess veracity, though it is clear that the parameters which 
limit one do not necessarily apply to the other.
If we return to the nTtattha/neyyattha distinction of the early 
literature we notice again that no explicit value judgement has 
been placed on the two forms of teaching. The distinction merely
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refers to the appropriateness of their use in the pedagogical process. 
How then did the position arise in which the Pali commentators 
felt the need to introduce a novel formulation in which for the 
first time the teaching of direct meaning becomes linked with ultimacy, 
while the indirect teaching is relegated to a position of inferiority? 
It is more than probable that in the period marked by the rise 
of the Mahayana and the development of the schools of the Abhidharmikas 
a need was recognised to systematise, to a degree that had not 
been done before, some of the many seemingly conflicting references 
to truth in an already burgeoning ocean of doctrine. This would 
probably have been due to the fact that a coherent dharma needed 
to be presented to conform with both the influential Sutta Nip"ata 
statement that "truth is one without a secondhand to protect 
Buddhist doctrine from the criticism of opponents. As we have 
already noted the Abhidharmikas had promoted the idea that while 
persons, treesjetc.,could be held to possess a conventional reality, 
only the dharmas underlying these objects could be said to be true 
from the absolute point of view. It was more or less inevitable 
therefore that a systematizer would come along and graft this idea 
on to the nitattha/neyyatha concept and arrive at a synthesis not 
unlike that presented by the commentator on the Anguttara Nikaya.
It is impossible to say exactly who was responsible for this new
departure but from approximately the fifth century AD onwards it
„ . «-• (6) •becomes an important doctrinal element. CandrakTrti gives
a reference to a canonical, work of unknown date, the Aryaksayamati— 
sutra^in which sutras of indirect meaning (neyartha) are said to 
deal with conventional ideas such as living things (jiva), souls
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(purusa) and persons (pudgala) while sutras of direct meaning (riTtartha)
concern doctrines such as selflessness (anatman). Authors before
Candrakirti however were well aware of the awkwardness of some of
these attempts at synthesis. Asanga, for instance, in his Bodhisatt-
vabhumi classifies truth (satya) in ten ways. At the top of the
list he says that "truth is one in the sense of being non-contradictory"^^,
while seemingly contradicting such an assertion immediately afterwards
by saying that "truth is two-fold as conventional truth and ultimate 
(8 )
truth" . While noting the point that Asanga must surely have 
realized the variance between these two statements, we will wait 
until a more appropriate stage in our argument to see how he resolved 
such obvious difficulties. The conflict between a one truth doctrine 
and a two truth formulation was not the only stumbling block. The 
Buddha had insisted from the very beginning of his teaching that 
the dharma consisted of Four Noble Truths. How could this be consistent 
with the ideas expressed in the Sutta Nipata? The Vibhasa asks 
the same question,
"If there are four truths, why did the Bhagavat say that there
is only one truth?" (9)
It goes on to answer that there is no inconsistency. The way that 
this is done supports the idea that the concept of a unique truth 
should not be taken in any absolute sense, and should on the contrary 
merely refer to coherence within a matrix of doctrinal formulations.
The Vibhasa goes on further to seek support from Parsva's contention 
that the one-truth concept is the only correct interpretation of 
the four-noble truths. It seems that many heterodox teachers had
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taken each of the noble truths to refer to a number of different 
attainments. To take an example, according to the Vibhasa (10) 
many heretical teachers confused the truth of cessation (nirodhasatya) 
with the four formless attainments (arupyasamapatti)
i) The stage of infinite space (akasanantyayatana)
ii) The stage of infinite consciousness (vijnananantyayatana]
iii) The stage of nothingness (akimcanyayatana)
iv) The stage of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness
/ .'A— — A  —
(naivasamjnanasamjnayatana).
However none of these attainments actually represent deliverance 
(vimukti) ; they are rather forms of existence in the non-material 
sphere (arupyabhava). This being the case^when the Buddha taught 
the truth of cessation (nirodhasatya) he was referring only to the 
one true deliverance (vimukti); in other words nirvana. The same 
technique is used by the Vibhasa to demonstrate that the other three 
noble truths can be correctly interpreted in one, unique and coherent 
manner and consequently any attempt to segment any of them is heretical.
Samghabhadra puts the whole problem of the one and the four into 
perspective. In his commentary on the Abhidharmakosa, the Abhi- 
dharmanyayanusarasastra, written from a Vaibhasika standpoint, and 
making particular reference to the one-truth doctrine of SN88A, 
he maintains:-
"The expression 'one—truth' indicates a general manner
proclaiming the truths in the holy teachings (aryadesanasasana) .
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What he means here is that there is no real dispute over the question 
of the four and the one since the expression "one-truth" merely 
refers to the correct and consistent interpretation of the four 
noble truths and all other Buddhist doctrines for that matter.
It is, as he says, a general manner of understanding which is available 
only to those far-advanced on the Buddhist path, and which stands 
in conformity with the true intentions of the Buddha when he formulated 
his doctrine.
Following on from this particular problem, Sam ghabhadra also tries 
to reconcile the doctrine of the unity of truth with that of the 
two truth concept. For him the correct interpretation of the noble 
truths (aryasatya) corresponds with ultimate truth (paramarthasatya).
In other words Samghabhadra implicitly links the "one-truth" of 
SN884 with paramarthasatya. With regard to conventional truth 
(samvrtisatya) we are told that since it is connected with the manner 
of worldly speaking (lokajanapadanirukti), and that such discourse 
is itself based on false and vulgar designations, it is not the 
concern of the enlightened^since they no longer have recourse to 
such conventions. They have no dispute with conventional, truth 
however since the method of discourse implicated in such truth formul­
ations prevents the possibility of pointing out ultimate truth.
Put more simply Sa^ i ghabhadra seems to be saying that samvrtisatya 
is an inherently unsatisfactory, but nevertheless the best possible, 
means of articulating paramarthasatya. For this reason samvrtisatya 
is entirely dependent on paramarthasatya. The duality of this truth 
formulation is entirely apparent and the two-truth doctrine becomes
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quite compatible with SN884, or as our text says:-
"As the conventional truth (samvrtisatya) comprises the ultimate 
(paramartha) there is no contradiction with the unity of truth 
taught by the great sage (mahamuni) (12)
The Vibhasa follows a slightly different tack by trying to find 
agreement between the two-truth and four-truth formulations, but
( 1 8
in the end comes to the same conclusions as Sam ghabhadra. It mentions
four separate theories concerning the connection between these various
doctrines. The first connects the first two noble truths (duhkhasatya
and samudayasatya) with the conventional truth (samvrtisatya) since
these two deal with mundane concepts, while the third and fourth
of the noble truths (nirodhasatya and margasatya) connect with a
supramundane reality (lokottaratattva) and are therefore ultimately
true (paramarthasatya). The second opinion places the first three
noble truths within the samvrtisatya leaving only the margasatya
as ultimately true, since according to this theory only the fourth
truth is uncontaminated by mundane designations. The third opinion
makes all the noble truths merely of conventional application, while
the fourth, said to be associated with P'ing-kia, allows the noble
truths to be both samvrti and paramartha depending on one's point
( 1 A )
of view. L. de la Vallee Poussin has pointed out that other
theories were also current which differed from the four enumerated 
in the Vibhasa. What is clear through all of these attempts at 
synthesis however is a deep seated desire by many Buddhist authors 
to reconcile the apparently contradictory statements of the Buddha 
concerning the nature of truth.
The Vibhasa presents these various attempts in a light which shows 
that they are not entirely satisfactory solutions to the problem.
They may, in a sense, be considered as cul-de-sacs in the development 
of a comprehensive solution to this knotty problem. The Vibhasa 
does however present its own solution, which we have already noted 
corresponds quite clearly with that of Samghabhadra. Responding 
to the objection that, "If there is only one truth, why then establish 
two truths?", the author firstly equates the one truth with paramarth- 
asatya. The author goes on to elaborate a kind of correspondence 
theory. Reality itself is uninfluenced by the construction of truth 
formulations. It is however the basis of two different points of 
view. The first point of view is not entirely accurate since while 
it takes reality as its starting point;it is affected by many subsidiary 
factors which are built into worldly conventions. It accordingly 
departs from the true state of affairs but nevertheless is recognised 
as truth in conventional discourse. This is conventional truth 
(samvrtisatya). The second point of view is uncontaminated by worldly 
convention and therefore conforms with reality as it truly is 
(yathabhutam). This is the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya). Now 
since these two judgements both have their roots in a world independent 
of the processes of thought the Vibhasa reasons, quite justifiably, 
that in a sense it is entirely consistent to maintain one onto-logical 
truth: it is this world independent of thought which itself gives 
rise to the two truth formulations; one of which is in total corresp­
ondence (ie paramarthasatya), the other which is less so (ie samvrtisatya). 
Paramarthasatya then is completely identical with reality (tattva); 
the samvrtisatya, while taking reality as its basis and therefore
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being dependent on paramarthasatya, deviates somewhat.
If we may now summarise a little, it becomes clear that while many 
Buddhist authors became confused in their treatment of the miscellaneous 
truth doctrines of the Buddha, there is a perfectly satisfactory 
way of explaining their overall coherence. In the first place all 
the evidence points to the Buddha’s identification as a realist.
There is a real world external to and independent of the processes 
of mundane thought. This reality is the ontological basis upon 
which two epistemic orientations have their foundation. The first 
epistemic orientation is dependent not only on its prime datum (ie. 
reality) but is also influenced by thought constructions which lead 
to a distorted picture of things. The second is a complete identif­
ication and accurate reflection of reality and is available only 
to those who, having progressed sufficiently along the Buddhist 
path, have eradicated the influence of convention. In other words, 
one ontological truth (ie.reality (tattva) ) is responsible for 
two epistemic truths; the conventional (samvrti) and the ultimate 
(paramartha). The Buddhist teaching (dharma) is itself a body of 
disparate doctrines such as the four noble truths, the theory of 
dharmas, the three marks of existence,etc. which cohere into an 
overall picture with the explicit intention of providing an antidote 
to the conventional way of seeing things, and eventually leads to 
the realisation of ultimate truth. The Dharma then, while it may 
appear contradictory to a superficial examination, has in fact a 
coherent unity since it points towards the true nature of reality.
This leads us back to the nitattha/neyyattha distinction. There
- 1 3 & -
is no doubt that, if what we have said above is correct, these two 
categories of discourse cannot ultimately be at variance with one 
another. If this were so we could not talk of the Buddhist doctrine 
as being internally coherent. It is clear therefore that the Pali 
commentators are adopting a peculiar tactic when they ally nTtattha 
with sammuti and neyyattha with paramattha, particularly since there 
is no basis for such a development in the Canon itself. Further 
analysis of these commentarial writings does in fact reveal that 
in the hands of the authors the terms sammuti and paramattha are 
being used in a sense which differs somewhat from that used by the 
Mahayanaand the Abhidharma. In the Pali commentarial treatment 
of the two kinds of truth there is no implication that one is actually 
superior to the other:-
"The Perfectly Enlightened One, the best of teachers, spoke 
two truths; the conventional and the absolute - one does 
not come across a third; a conventional statement is true 
because of convention and an absolute statement is true as 
(disclosing) the true characteristics of things". (15)
More importantly both "truths" are equally efficient in bringing 
the auditor to an understanding of the true state of affairs since 
they differ not so much in degree, but rather in the way that two 
foreign languages differ. They both express the same meaning though 
in ways designed to suit different individuals.
"Just as if there were a teacher, who explains the meaning 
of the Three Vedas and is versed in the regional languages; 
to those who would understand the meaning if he spoke in 
the Tamil language, he explains it in the Tamil language 
and to another who would understand (if he spoke in) the 
Ardhra language, he speaks in that language. (16)
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and "But whether they use conventional speech or absolute speech, 
they speak what is true, what is factual and not false." (17)
It seems that, according to this view, either form of teaching 
is capable of leading a person to the realisation of the nature 
of things and we must therefore conclude that this particular usage 
of the terms conventional (sammuti) and ultimate (paramattha) is 
quite different from that adopted by the rest of the Buddhist tradition 
In this case they are merely used as synonyms for the two forms 
of teaching recorded in the discourses of the Buddha. One could 
almost say that in this usage the only difference between the two 
is that sayings of direct meaning (riTtattha) are absolute (paramattha) 
since they employ Buddhist technical jargon, while those of indirect 
meaning (neyyattha) are conventional (sammuti) because they employ 
customary language.
What therefore is more commonly held, principally in the Abhidharma,
to be the distinction between paramartha and samvrtisatya? First
there is no doubt that the explicit distinction is entirely absent
from the Theravada tradition. This does not mean however that
there is no trace of such a doctrine in the Hinayana as a whole.
We are told in the Milindapanha that the person Nagasena is merely
a name and consequently only conventionally true (sammuti), for
from the ultimate (paramattha) point of view, again with reference
(18)
to Nagasena, there is no person to be got hold of. Light on
such a theory can be shed by reference to Sa mghabhadra and his 
attempt to expound the doctrines of the Vaibhasikas. His idea is 
that existence may be subsumed under two headings; substantial existence
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(dravyasat) and designated being (prajnaptisat). The former may 
be considered as a primary form of existence, the latter consequently 
being secondary. Sam ghabhadra gives a number of examples of what 
it means to constitute each of these classes of entity. Primary 
existents therefore are considered to be sense-data such as form 
and sensation, while an object like a chair would of necessity be 
a secondary existent since it depends for its being on primary exis- 
tents (dravyasat). As Williams says:-
"Secondary existence is the sort of existence pertaining to 
entities which can be further analysed and which are therefore 
conglomerates composed out of primary existents." (1 9)
Returning to the Milindapanha reference then, it becomes clear that 
"Nagasena" must be regarded as merely a secondary existent (prajnaptisat) 
since it is said to be conventionally true (sarpvrti). This does 
not mean however that it is devoid of an underlying substantial 
existence (dravyasat), a primary nature, that may exist from the 
ultimate point of view (paramartha), since as Williams again notes:-
"A secondary existent is an existent solely because it is 
an intentional and primarily linguistic referent. But primary 
existents too are linguistic referents for the Sarvastivada, 
the point of difference being that the secondary existent 
is dependent and therefore has no self-essence, in its own 
right it is nothing, that is, it lacks a uniquely individuating 
description". (20)
It seems that for the Vaibhasikas the real distinction between a 
dravyasat entity and a prajnaptisat entity is that the ontological 
status of the former is more certain than that of the latter. One 
could say that a prajnaptisat entity such as a "person" refers to
-  -
something with reality merely in the conventional sense; it is
empirically real, while on the other hand since it can be analysed
into more fundamental existents which themselves cannot be broken
down any further, it may not be said to be ultimately real. What
the Vaibhasikas seem to be getting at is the notion that when an
external object is presented to consciousness the primary cognitive
content is rapidly turned into a linguistic form for the purpose
of conventional discourse. The mental activity which causes such
a transformation is identified by another Sarvastivadin, Subhagupta
_ (21)
in his Bahyarthasiddhikarika as a thought constructive consciousness
(A —
(vikalpajnana) which superimposes unity, and hence a convenient 
linguistic label, upon a series of separate primary elements. For 
this school of Buddhists it seems clear that the distinction between
vA
prajnaptisat and dravyasat entities is parallel to that of conventional 
truth (samvrtisatya) and ultimate truth (paramarthasatya).
What is not clear in this theory however, is whether or not dravyasat 
entities can be articulated linguistically, or in other words whether 
it is possible to speak of ultimate truth. In another article William 
tells us:
"There is nothing for the Sarvastivada which has no name, although 
there may be situations such as samadhi which are of a nature 
that precludes utterance. The inability to name does not render 
something ineffable, and this incoherence of ineffability is 
found not only in the Sarvastivada texts but also in those 
of the Theravada and seems to be a notable feature of Abhidharma 
Buddhism. Followers of the older schools seem to have been 
united in holding that all existents can be named. Buddhaghosa 
observed that there is nothing which escapes being named, for 
if we say that a thing is ineffable then that thing is thereby 
named as 'ineffable' ". (22)
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This quotation supports Williams' earlier scheme ? and simply 
stated conveys the idea that experience, even from the ultimate 
point of view, can be successfully articulated. The basic idea 
seems to be that someone far advanced on the path has awareness 
of the contents of the world independent of thought. He "sees" the 
underlying substantial entities (dravyasat), or prime existents. He 
views the dharmas. As such his language will refer to the dravyasat 
level. He will therefore be able to successfully articulate his 
experiences, though one may suppose that such language, conforming 
to the specifications of the Abhidharmic system, will b®, necessar­
ily technical. In other words he is likely to list the prime con­
stituents ofa chair rather that report that "It is a chair".
The corollary to this is that the ignorant person, not trained in 
"seeing" dharmas .will indulge in illegitimate thought construction 
with primary existents as its basis, and use conventional discourse 
to describe the secondary (prajnaptisat) entities which he inevit­
ably experiences.
The Sarvasti-vadin position comes down to the following:- all known
entities whether primary or secondary can be referred to linguistically. 
Such ref erring will be of a more or less technical nature, and will
reveal, particularly to an adept in "bringing dharmas into view",
the level of insight of the speaker. The use of conventional
discourse may reveal a speaker as experiencing a secondary level of
reality, w h i l e  h e  w h o  uses A b h i d h a r m i c  j a r g o n  w i l l  h a v e  penetrated
to the primary.
This schema clearly coheres with the nltartha/neyartha distinction 
already discussed in which talk of dharmic constituents of reality 
constitutes an unambiguous message from the Buddha, while conven
tional discourse is held as merely implicit and hence requiring 
further orthodox interpretation in order to reach full intelligib­
ility. This doctrine will be quite interchangeable with the Sarva- 
stivadin notions. Language of substantial entities (dravyasat) is 
therefore synonymous with talk of an explicit or direct intention 
(nTtartha), while language of designated entities (prajnapfrisat) 
will only have an indirect (neyartha) sense.
The section of the Plilindapanhat previously quoted, clearly 
relegates discourse on "Nagasena" to what is conventionally true 
and we have already stated that this should not lead us to the con­
clusion that "Nagasena" is totally non-existent; ie. that/no 
substantial existent or existents underlie the name. It is not 
clear however in this text whether there is a possibility of 
referring to such dravyasat entities that possibly comprise 
Nagasena, by name.
The fiahayana, on the whole, would be clearer on this point. In the 
authors of the I’lahstyana relevant to this thesis there is a con­
sensus that tha sphere of discourse does not touch the true nature 
of things. Candrakirti will be a case in point. For him names 
(abhidliana) and pra.jnaptisat entities are one and the same thing;
they are ultimately non-existent. This seems a development distinct from
that of the nitartha/neyartha distinction. Words no longer sometimes
refer to a true state of affairs and sometimes refer to a distorted 
reality. In this view words themselves, irrespective of the precise 
ontological status of the thing to which they refer, must all be 
taken on the same level. A word denoting a dharmic consistuent has 
no greater truth value than the word "Nagasena". The net of language 
has become a meta-system thrown over the world, but standing apart 
from it. This net is inherently unsatisfactory in explicating it.
One may say that language becomes a metaphor for reality.
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Such a doctrine seems to be quite at odds with the p raj nap ti sa t/ drav/yasa t
distinction of the Sarv/astiv/ada. It is howev/er at the root 
of Nagarjuna's contention that the Buddha never uttered a word.
"All mental perceptions (upalambha) are (basically) quiescent, 
free from dichotomisation (praparJca) and at peace. No dharma 
has anywhere been taught by the Buddha of anything." (26)
CandrakTrti' s idea that nirvana cannot be commented on by the saVnbs
(arya) follows on from this. However the notion that reality cannot
be properly articulated ndbteaftinvention of the Madhyamaka.
In the unanswered or inexpressible (avyakata) questions of the Pali
(27)
Cula Malunkyasutta we meet with the Buddha's refusal to answer
on the grounds that any answer to fourteen philosophical questions:-
(i) is the world eternal, or not, or both or neither?
(ii) is the world finite, or infinite, or both or neither?
(iii) Does the Tathagata exist after death, or not, or both, or 
neither?
(iv) is the soul identical to the body or not?
would result in misleading consequences. The Abhidharmika interpret­
ation of the Buddha's refusal to answer would seem to be that by 
accepting the premises of these questions the Buddha would be giving 
credence to a view that concepts such as "world", "Tathagata", "soul" 
etc. exist in reality rather than being, as the Abhidharma suggests, 
composite entities made up of more fundamental constituents. Another 
interpretation however is possible. We have already noted that Nagarjuna 
make: implicit reference to the Brahmajalasutta in MMK chapter XXVII.
Now this sutta makes the fundamental point that in all cases the Buddha 
wishes to avoid dogmatic speculation (ditthi-vada) since such activity 
inevitably leads to the participants being caught up in the ’’net" 
of Brahma (Brahmajala). It seems therefore that the Buddha not only 
explicitly refused to answer the fourteen avyakata questions, but 
also implicitly refuses to answer any questions of the type "Is it 
true that since if he were to give a yes or no answer he would
be guilty of the crime of dogmatism (ditthivada) which he repudiates 
in others. The Buddha therefore treads a middle path (madhyama pratipad) 
when it comes to speculation of a metaphysical nature. He avoids 
the extremes of eternalism (sa^va^avada  ^ and nihilism (ucchedavada).
This does not of course imply that the Buddha taught a sort of Golden 
Mean with respect to truth. As Jayatilleke comments:-
"Logically there is no reason why truth should lie in the middle 
rather than in one of the two extremes ... The problem, however, 
is whether it was dogmatically assumed that the truth must lie 
in the middle or on the other hand whether it was considered 
that the truth in the above instances happened to lie between 
two extremes. The second appears to be the more plausible 
alternative in the light of the facts." (28)
There is much to commend what Jayatilleke is saying but one must also 
bear in mind the fact that while such a truth does occupy the mid 
ground between the two extremes, it is also entirely dissimilar to 
them since it is inarticulable. The two extremes are dogmatic theories 
the Buddhist "truth" is not.
"The Tathagata, 0 Vaccha, is free from all theories ... Therefore 
the Tathagata has attained deliverance and is ^ree from attachment, 
inasmuch as all imaginings, or agitations, or false notions 
concerning a self, or anything pertaining to a self,
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have perished, have faded away, have ceased, have been given 
up or relinquished." (29)
While it cannot be denied that the Buddha did speak a great deal 
about all manner of things, the importance of the "silence of the 
Buddha" doctrine is to put a certain provisional significance to 
such statements. The Buddha's teaching is merely a raft which should 
be abandoned once the stream has been crossed and is therefore not 
intended to have any ultimate value. As we are told in the 
Kaccayanavada, the only sutta of the Tripitaka to be explicitly
mentioned by Nagarjuna, it is impossible to formulate statements 
without appeal to the "it is" (atthitam) and "it is not" (natthitam) 
duality. Therefore reliance on language inevitably involves these 
two extremes. As the Buddha's teaching is saidjin this sutta^to 
be the middle position between the two it may be possible to infer 
that in this particular strata of the canon the notion is proposed 
that the Dharma is ultimately inexpressible. This position corres­
ponds well with the linguistic theories previously assigned to 
Nagarjuna and CandrakTrti.
The Hinayaha tradition then leaves us with a certain tension with 
regard to its notion of the meaningful bounds of language. On one 
side we recognise that two levels of discourse are held to be poss­
ible} a lower, worldly usage and a higher, accessible to those who 
"see" the world of ultimate dharmi£ realities. On the other there 
appears to be tacit approval of the fact that when it comes to matters 
of ultimate importance, language, by its very nature, leads the seeker
for truth away from his goal, while recognising the pragmatic value 
of language this second viewpoint suggests that language itself is 
infected with dichotomies which always implicate it in a constructed 
world picture.
In the light of such a tension it is hardly surprising that the idea 
of a reality entirel^free from the dichotomies inherent in language 
would eventually arise in Buddhist thought. It is similarly un­
surprising that an author like Nagarjuna, who repudiates the doctrine 
of dharmasvabhava, and therefore would have no need for a level of 
discourse which articulates dharmic realities, would adopt a position 
vis a vis language,which he does. Although the precise historical 
route by which the tension was overcome is not so far established, 
and one would therefore be foolish to be too specific, there are 
important indications that a provisional solution was being 
considered by two Buddhist groups- the pra.jnaptivadins and the fol­
lowers of Harivarman.
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We do in fact possess an important indication that such a doctrine 
may have played a major role in the teachings of the Mahasaoghikas.
It has already been noted that designation (prajnapti) was considered 
to be a feature of conventional truth (samvrtisatya) in the Milindapanha.
In his Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Vasumitra maintains that the 
Mahasanghika school very quickly split into nine sub-schools, one 
of which is called the Prajnaptivada. In the subsequent discussion 
of the doctrines of thesesub-sects Vasumitra goes on to say that 
for the Prajnaptivadins all conditioned things (ie.secondary existents 
[prajnaptisat]) are unsatisfactory (duhkha) since they are merely 
designations (prajnapti).
"Les compositions (samskara), qui sont des assemblages (samagri) 
evoluant en interdependence, sont nommees douleur par simple 
designation (prajnapti). II n'ya pas d'homme agent (purusa 
kartr)." (32)
Paramartha (557-569 AD), the Chinese translator and commentator, 
tells us that the main point of controversy which led to the split 
between the Mahasanghikas and the Sthaviras was over the status 
of the Buddha's teaching. For the former the use of various doctrines 
is merely a heuristic device, while for the latter doctrinal concepts 
such as nirvana etc. are denotative.
"L'ecole Mahasanghika soutenait que la transmigration (samsara) 
et le Nirvana sont tous deux les denominations fictives (prajnapti); 
l'ecole Sthivirtya soutenait qu'ils sont tous deux reels (dravya) (33)
Paramartha goes on to say that the sub-sect Bahusrutika Vibhajyavada 
(Prajnaptivada) derives its authority from the teachings of Maha-
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Katyayana. This is interesting since it is precisely the Kaceayanasutta 
the Tripitaka that Nagarjuna quotes with approval. We have 
seen that thia sutta may be interpreted as promoting the view that 
the Buddha's teaching is essentially incommunicable owing to the 
fact that statements about reality inevitably rely on the false 
dichotomy of "it is" (atthitam) and "it is not" (natthitam). Since Kaccayana > 
the Prajnaptivadins, and Nagarjuna, do have important doctrinal 
features in common one cannot help speculating whether or not there 
was a direct line of transmission from one to another. Be that 
as it may, Paramartha holds that for the Prajnaptivada the Buddha's 
teaching is of provisional importance since it has to rely on prajnapti:
"... Ceci a ete enonce par le Buddha entant que denomination 
fictive (prajnapti), ceci est 1'enseignement reel du Buddha; 
ceci est verity absolue (paramarthasatya), ceci est verite 
contingente (samvrtisatya)." (34)
We seem to be moving towards the fully developed position of the 
Mahayana concerning the doctrine of two truths. However before we 
do so, let us briefly examine one further lead.
Demieville tells us that the schismatic processes which led to the
establishment of the various schools associated with the Mahasanghikas
r - - (35)
resulted in what he calls "un syncretisme de Hinayana et de Mahayana."
What is particularly of note is the fact that one of the texts to
/_
come out of this tradition is the Satyasiddhisastra of Harivarman.
This is an abhidharmic document, the only surviving version being
(36) —
Kumarajiva's Chinese translation of 412AD. According to Paramartha,
Harivarman was a follower of the Bahusrutikas (Prajnaptivada?) and
consequently must have accepted some disctinction between the two
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truths. Now the Satyasiddhi occupies an interesting position in
the history of Buddhist philosophy, belonging to a time of Hinayana/
Mahayana synthesis and therefore containing many ideas which are
found in elaborated form in the writings of either the Madhyamaka 
- - (37)
or the Yogacara. For instance it makes great use of the emptiness
(sunyata) concept and goes on to create a teaching based on three 
truths.
However what is important to us at the moment is Harivarman*s doctrine 
of three kinds of awareness:
(i) Awareness of concepts (prajnapti)
(ii) Awareness of phenomena (dharma)
(iii) Awareness of emptiness (sunyata). (38)
The examination of these three groups comprises Harivarman*s chapter
on emptiness. The first awareness, ie„ that of prajnapti, however 
is of most interest for us, since here we are told that:-
"... concepts are names conventionally attached to associations 
of phenomena (dharmas); the concept of a wagon is thus dependent 
on the association of wheels, axles and so forth, and the concept 
of a man is dependent on the association of the Five Groups 
(skandhas). These concepts are unreal, for there are no entities 
to which they correspond; but they are useful to us in the 
ordinary course of living.** (39)
Harivarman goes on to use the terms conventional (samvfti) and ultimate
(paramartha) truth and maintains that, while the former is a truth
in terms of concepts (prajnapti), the latter corresponds to reality 
as such. (40) He also assets that prajnaptls are devoid of
own-charactenstics (svalaksana) and can therefore not be the source
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of true knowledge. We are left to Infer that true know] edge can 
only come through paramarthasatya. The Satyasiddhi contains a long 
discussion on the possible relations between concepts and real 
phenomena. Using the example of a pot Harivarman argues that it 
would be incorrect that there is a total non-existence of such an 
object. If this were the case , the same may be applied to guilt, 
merit, bondage, release, etc. In other words a nihilistic attitude 
would easily spill over into the moral field and render Buddhist 
soteriology meaningless. Such an arguement is analogous to that 
employed by Nagarjuna in MMX .15. The imaginary opponents of Hari­
varman and Nagarjuna both take the view that the consequence of 
maintaining the emptiness of concept (prajnapti), or in Nagarjuna's 
case own—being (svabhava), renders that which is denoted non­
existent. Both 3uddhist authors vigourously reject such a conclu­
sion. For them the correct understanding of the relationship between 
concepts and real phenomena is the key to the Buddhist path. Both 
reject nihilism. In the case of Herivarman the rejection of the 
ultimate value of concepts does not negate the underlying reality.
Pots, and so forth, do 
exist from the conventional (samvrti) point of view, and the Buddha 
chooses to use convention as a vehicle to lead the ignorant towards 
awakening, even though ultimately (paramartha) language makes no 
true contact with reality.
Harivarman seems to take the classical Abhidharmic theory that 
conventional things are in reality associations of primary existents 
and added the implicit notion that concepts only apply to the former 
conventional constructs. In the final analysis these constructs are
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devoid of reality. Although Harivarman's position is not as explicit 
as that found in the Mahayana, there are some grounds for suggesting 
that his theory, along with that of the Prajnaptivada. represents 
a halfway house between the truth formulations of the Hinayana 
proper and the Mahayana.
In conclusion let us survey the doctrines relevant to truth in the 
texts of the Hmayana. In the earliest phase of the canon we have 
found the idea that tha Buddha's teaching comprises a coherent whole 
and in that sense truth may be claimed to be one. Although it is 
impossible at this stage to pinpoint a chronology in the develop­
ment of early Buddhist thought we may note, again at this period, 
the existence of an idea concerning two levels of discourse; implicit 
(neyartha) and explicit (nTtartha). The first reflects worldly usage 
while the second is technical and indicates the users^Buddhist insight 
and particularly his knowledge of dharmas. Some texts, notably the 
Milindapanha, come tantalisingly close to the Mahayana position and 
may be interpreted as promoting the view that everything which can 
be articulated is only conventionally true. From lack of evidence 
we should not push this too far, but may note that both the Prajnapti— 
vaTdins and Harivarman seem to be moving towards a resolution of 
their respective truth and linguistic doctrines in a Mahayana-1ike 
direction. In their case we have more reason to put forward as a 
possibilty the idea that they hold that what can be articulated is 
ultimately non-existent, while that which is ultimately the case 
must be inexpressible.
This is the general position we have arrived at through the examination 
of Hinayanist sources. In the next chapt-er we must examine what
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the authors of Mahayanist works have to say on the subject. We 
shall then be in the position to judge whether or not there was 
a continuity of thought on this particular point, shared by all 
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Chapter Six
The Two Truths and the Three Natures
On the basis of the previous chapter’s investigations we are now in
the position to investigate any distinctive features of the truth 
formulations of the Mahayana. In the process the veracity of the 
commonly held belief that Madhyamaka and Yogacara hold differing 
doctrines in this respect may be tested.
The theory of two truths is found in the Prajnaparamita literature 
though explicit statement of it is not common. Murti's statement 
that:-
"The doctrine is already well-developed in the Astasahasrika 
and other Prajnaparamita texts ..." (1)
is therefore something of an exaggeration. It seems that the terms
samvrti- and paramathasatya are not in fact contrasted in the earliest
( P )
texts of this corpus. While we have noted in the previous chapter
that they were extensively used by some of the schools of the Hinayana  ^
it is to Nagarjuna that we turn for the first rigcrous treatment 
of this particular doctrine. However before doing so let us examine 
the Praj'n apaTramita literature a little more fully, particularly 
since these texts are considered authoritative for the Madhyamaka 
and the Yogacara.
It is certainly the case that the Prajniparamit a distinguishes between
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the understanding of the wise, and that of ordinary people: —
"Those who course in duality cannot grow in merit. All the 
foolish common people are supported (nisrita) by duality, and 
their merit cannot grow. But a bodhisattva courses in non­
duality." (3)
In other words the understanding of non-enlightened persons is infected 
by false dichotomies which arise from ignorance (avidya). The enlight­
ened person however has developed a non-dual form of knowledge
lA-
(advayajnana) which avoids the distortions imposed on the minds of 
the common folk. We have met with such a notion before.
<A- _ _
Another important notion in the Prajnaparamita literature concerns 
the relationship between words and the entities that they signify.
Now the entities in question are termed dharmas and Conze tells us
\A — — —
that the ontological status of dharmas in the Prajnaparamita literature
may be considered in a five fold manner. They are non-existent,
they are devoid of a mark (laksana) , they are isolated (vivikta) ,
they have never come into existence, and finally their existence
(A )
may be understood to be purely nominal. What is meant by the
last member of the list is that dharmas are merely words, being nothing
more than conventional expressions (vyavahara) for the purpose of
discourse among the unenlightened. In like manner therefore the
(5)
Buddha may be said to be "the same as speechless silence . However
this does not seem to mean that the entity "the Buddha is totally 
non-existent as this would entail nihilism, but rather the word 
"Buddha" itself cannot be held to be a true entity. Such an interpretation 
is upheld by another quotation:-
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"... words are merely artifical constructions, which do not 
represent things (dharma)... (they are) adventitious designations, 
which are imagined and unreal." (6)
From the fact that words are said to be adventitious (agantuka) 
designations one may infer that while the relation between a word 
and the thing it putatively signifies does not hold up to examination, 
nevertheless one is not justified in negating the existence of the 
thing denoted. If this is the case then here again the Prajnaparamita 
is expressing a theory which has already been met with earlier in 
our investigations concerning the proto-linguistic doctrines outlined 
in the Milindapanha, .and the more fully worked out accounts of the
z' — l/\ _
Bahusrutika-Vibhajyavada ( Prajnaptivada)tand finally Harivarman 
in the Satyasiddhisastra. As we have also seen, these doctrines 
harmonise quite closely with the two-truth system of thought, so
i/V—  —  —
we may be justified in saying that the Prajnaparamita literature 
certainly contains implicit reference to the conventional (samvrti) 
and the ultimate (paramartha) truths.
The text of the Pancavimsatisihasrikapra jnaparamita sutra (P), 
which was at some stage revised according to the divisions of the 
Abhisamayalankara contains a section known as "The chapter preached 
at the request of Maitreya", (Byam shus-kyi le'u). It is found 
in one Sanskrt and three Tibetan rencensions, all of which are in 
close agreement, although it is totally missing from all the Chinese 
sources. These facts combined with the apparently distinct nature 
of the doctrines contained in the chapter have led some scholars 
to assert that it is a later interpolation. Let us now analyse 
these claims in some detail.
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The chapter starts off by putting forward the idea that things (dharmas) 
may be said to possess three aspects.
"Maitreya, that which is imagined form (parikalpitam rupam) 
should be seen to be without substance (adravyam). That which 
is discerned form (vikalpitam rupam), because of its substant­
iality (sadravyatam), should be viewed as substantial, although 
it never exists independently (svatantra). That which is the 
essential nature of form (dharmata-rupan) should be seen to 
be neither substantial nor non-substantial, being an appearance of 
ultimate reality) (paramartha prabhavitam)." (7)
Each of these aspects is elaborated during the course of the chapter. 
With regard to the first:
"Maitreya: (If 0 Bhagavat, all dharmas have no own being), 
how then should the Bodhisattva, who courses in Prajnaparamita 
train in all dharmas, ie. from form to the Buddhadharmas? Being 
asked thus, the Bhagavat replied: He should train in the fact 
that all (things from form to the Buddhadharmas) are mere names 
(namamatra)." (8)
This first part of the teaching seems to be a reiteration of the 
designation-only (prajnaptimatra) which we have already noted plays 
an important role in some schools of the Hinayana, and Tsong-kha-pa 
confirms this interpretation when commenting on the above quotation, 
in his Legs-bshad snying-po. He understands the above to imply
that names are something adventitious (agantuka) to the entity they 
are supposed, by the unenlightened, to signify. In other words, 
it is not the real existence of form (rupa) that is being negated, 
but rather the existence of form (rupa) in so far as it is merely 
a conventional designation (nama-samketa-svabha) . As far as the 
statement "this is form" is concerned therefore, this is nothing 
but a nominal designation (nSmaprajnapti) , but this should not lead
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us to negate the form (rupa) itself which is the basis (asraya) 
of the designation (prajnapti).
In its own treatment of this first aspect the sutra tells us
"From form etc. to Buddhadharmas exist by way of worldly social 
agreements and conventional expression (vyavahara) but not from 
the ultimate point of view (paramarthatah)». (10)
Translated into modern technology, what the author seems to be getting 
at here is the idea that language forms a net which has been cast 
about reality. This net possesses a certain coherence and is conducive 
to social intercourse, but is itself a mere meta-structure which 
obscures the concrete beneath it. Only reality can be said to exist 
ontologically.
Tsong-kha-pa draws parallels between the three aspect doctrine of 
the Prajnaparamita and a similar notion to be found in the Sandhinir- 
mocanasutra. In this latter text the aspects are referred to as 
marks or characteristics (laksana) and with regard to the first 
it says that it consists in :
"Determination by means of names and conventional terms (nama 
samketa-vyavasthapanam) of self nature (svabhava) and specifications 
(visesa) in the sign of something conditioned (samskaranimitta) 
in speaking of form (rupa) etc.
This is interesting because a virtually parallel passage exists 
in the Maitreya chapter. In this passage the first aspect, imagined 
form (parikalpita-rupa) is said to be:
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"False imagination (parikalpana) with regard to the entity which 
is the sign of something conditioned (samskaranimittavastu) as 
having self-nature (svabhava) of form etc. based on the name 
(nama), notion (samjna), designation (prajnapti), conventional 
term (samketa) or expression (vyavahara) ie form etc." (12)
Unscrambling this rather complex terminology it appears that both 
texts accept an entity which underlies designation. This entity 
or property (vastu) is the sign of something conditioned. The problem 
with signifying such an entity (vastu) nominally is clearly stated.
By the use of language a self nature (svabhava) or substance is imputed 
to that entity which it does not in fact possess. False imagination 
(parikalpana) therefore, the first of the three aspects, results 
in the false attribution of self nature (svabhava) to conditioned 
things.
This is made clear when we look at the second of these aspects. 
This is termed discerned form (vikalpitam rupam) and the Maitreya 
chapter defines it in the following way:
"Discerned form is the stable state (avasthanata) of that entity 
which is the sign of something conditioned in its true nature 
(dharmata) and merely discerned (vikalpamatra). Having depended 
on the discernment there is a verbal expression ... 'this is 
form' ". (13)
A distinction is being made in the reference to these first two aspects 
which in modern terminology we would term one between as perception 
and^perception. On the difference between these two Leibniz tells us:-
"The passing state ... is nothing other than what is called 
perception, which must be carefully distinguished from apper­
ception or consciousness... " (14)
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Perception is a momentary contact with an external object which in 
the instant it takes place precisely mirrors that object on the surface 
of consciousness. Apperception follows on, immediately shaping the 
mirror image in such a way as to make it cohere with all past images.
In other words as soon as the mirror image is received it becomes 
modified by the processes of consciousness and ceases to be a unique 
individual. As Leibniz says, it becomes confused. If we apply these 
ideas to an interpretation of the first two aspects then the discerned 
form (vikalpita rupa) may be said in some senses to conform with 
the initial perceptual image. As we have seen it represents a stable 
state (avasthanata) of the entity which is a sign of something conditioned 
(samskara-nimittavastu), or rather it is in complete correspondence 
with the true nature (dharmata) of the entity (vastu). This is why 
it is said at this point to be merely discerned (vikalpamatra) , since 
no process has so far taken place to disturb, modify or confuse its 
stability. The attempt to fit it into a coherent picture which will 
be amenable to treatment by language however gives rise to the imagined 
form (parikalpita rupa) or the form which has self-nature (svabhava) 
attributed to it.
The Sandhinirmocanasutra gives the second aspect the title - the 
dependent characteristic (paratantralaksana) since the first aspect 
is dependent upon it and it acts as the support for the imagined 
characteristic (parikalpita-laksanasraya) . For this sutra the dependent 
(paratantra) is the dharmic world itself, although this world is 
not comprised of individual dharmas possessing self nature (svabhava) 
as believed by the ignorant, but a plenum of mutually conditioned 
things in a constant state of flux.
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This second aspect then has a substantiality (sadravya) which the 
first does not possess, but this substantiality is not produced from 
the sum of a multiplicity of individual self-natures (svabhava).
Summing up a discussion on the first two aspects, Tsong—kha—pa says:—
"We negate the basis, which is constituted by name which is 
not postulated as being by means of conventional expression.
On the other hand, we do not totally negate, in general, the 
place [or property (vastu)] of the basis which is constituted 
by name". (15)
Tsong-kha-pa is clearly using the partial (paryudasa) negation which, 
as we mentioned in Chapter Two, can be inferred from Nagirjuna's 
method in MMK. In this case the name itself is totally negated 
as constituting an entity, while the entity which is signified by 
the name is nevertheless affirmed.
Let us move on to the third aspect mentioned in the Maitreya chapter 
where it is called the true nature of form etc. (dharmata rupa).
This true nature of form is said to be equivalent to the true nature 
of things (dharmanam dharmata) the dharma element (dharmadhatu), 
suchness (tathata), the reality limit (bhutakoti) , eternally and 
constantly devoid of self-nature (nihsvabhavata) and is equivalent 
to the absence of the first aspect (parikalpitarupa) from the second 
(vikalparupa) . The Sandhinirmocana sutra calls it the accomplished
characteristic (parinispanna-laksana) and corroborates what has 
been said. The parinispanna is simply stated to be the middle aspect 
(ie, paratantra) eternally devoid of the first aspect (ie.parikalpita) 
which is itself said to be devoid of self nature (nihsvabhava) and 
consequently without correspondence to anything absolute (aparinispanna).
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To summarise, the three aspect doctrine seems to concern the nature 
of things, and the possible understandings of those things by people 
of differing degrees of spiritual development. The doctrine itself 
hinges on the second aspect which is referred to variously as the 
discerned form (vikalpita rGpa) or the dependent characteristic 
(paratantralaksana). Now, from what has been said this second is 
identical with the third, once imagination has Deen destroyed, 
imagination, as the result of ignorance (avidya)t leads to the con­
struction of an external world constituted of substantial entities. 
The extirpation of this world—view destroys subjectivity and 
objectivity which are functions of the imagined nature (parikalpita). 
Speaking of this purified aspect of the dependent nature (paratantra) 
the sutra informs us that;-
"Whatever is discerned form, because of its substantiality, 
is viewed as substantial, although it never occurs as an indep­
endent reality (svatantravrttah) ( 1 8 )
This means that there are real phenomena still present once ignor­
ance has been uprooted and the mental concepts associated with it 
have been suppressed. However these phenomena can no longer be 
presented as external existents. Reality is no longer seen as 
independent or other to self. There is in fact total union of self 
and other. This is the accomplished nature (parinispanna).
In a sense the v/jKalpitarupa/paratantrasvabhgya may be seen as the 
basis for the arising of the other two, with the important proviso 
that ultimately there is no real separation between it and the 
parinispanna  ^ there merely appaars to be separation of the two 
under the conditions of ignorance. Under such conditions the imagined 
(parikalpita) aspect operates abstractively in the sense
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specific items from the flux of existence, conjuring up discrete 
existents when there are,in reality, no such things. On the other 
hand the Maitreya chapter tells us that the third aspect represents 
the total absence of the first. Under such a conditions things are 
seen as they truly are (yathabhutam) and hence free from the 
superimposition of individual self-natures (svabhava). This vision 
of things is said to be ultimate (paramartha), devoid of language
and consequently inexpressible {nirabhilapyi), the true nature of 
thlngs (dharmSnimdharmata) and suchness (tathati), amongst other 
synonyms. As we shall see subsequently these are the usual synonyms
employed by the Mahiyana when talking about ultimate truth (paramartha-
satya).
Earlier in this thesis we noted a Leibnizian parallel to the first 
two aspects of this three nature theory. Such a parallel becomes 
more prominent in the works of later Yogacarins, particularly in the 
writings of Uignaga and DharmakTrti. In their attempt to work out a 
thorough going theory of knowledge they hold that perception (praty- 
pk§a) consists of one pure moment of sensation which is immediately 
followed by subsequent moments of thought activity in the minds of 
the unenlightened. uJhile the first moment" is uncontaminated and 
in the enlightened provides true knowledge, further moments will 
distort the image in a direction determined by the past actions 
and predilections of the perceiver. This distorted image finally 
coheres into a speculative theory of reality which because of its 
mistaken premises inevitably leads to suffering when applied to 
the "real" world. Such a situation is clearly described as parikalpita 
svabhava in the three-natures theory. Now for DigrTSga the initial 
moment of perception is pure since mental contamination is not yet 
at work. This will correspond to the dependent nature (paratantra).
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Since the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity have not arisen^ 
in this initial stage knowledge may operate in a context where 
externality is not a function. Now DignlSga holds out the possibility 
of all moments being like this.This will of course be equivalent to 
the attainment of nirvana since all thought construction will have 
stopped and things will be seen as they are (yatfiabhutam). Such 
knowledge, though one must be careful to distinguish it from con­
ventional knowledge dependent on dichotomy (prapa'nca) and therefore 
subjectivity and objectivity, is the accomplished nature (parini^- 
panna).
Using the above interpretation gives the impression that the three- 
natures theory may be used to provide a soteriological scheme for
the aspiring Buddhist. Parikalpitasvabhava will represent the start­
ing point of the path in ignorance; paratantra represents the bedrock 
of this samsaric condition but at the same time signifies those 
moments of pure sensation at ths base of everyday experience which 
may be met with more powerfully in meditation; parinispanna finally 
corresponds to the end of the path in which nothing but pure sans- 
atin exists and there is no knower and nothing known, ie. nirvana.
Now since the Maitreya chapter is not found in all the recensions
A— — a, _
of the Prajnaparmita text is question, and particularly since the 
doctrine of the three aspects corresponds closely to the trilak^apa 
teaching of the Sandhinirmocanasutra which is understood by Buddhist 
tradition to be authoritative for the Yogacaras, many scholars have 
considered it to be a later interpolation in a body of text which 
is at doctrinal variance with it. As Obermiller puts it:-
"As this differentiation appears to be identical with the teaching 
of the three aspects of existence, as we have it_in the Sahdhinir- 
mocana, the Yogacaras consider the Pancavimsatisahasrika to 
be a text, the main standpoint of which is quite the same as 
that of the said Sutra, ie a Yogacira work". (19)
Bu-ston, in his history of Buddhism confirms such a point of view
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by maintaining that the chapter containing Maitreya’s questions 
was never retrieved by Nigirjuna during his visit to the realm 
of the Nagas, as was all the rest of the Prajnipiramiti literature.
The foremost modern scholar on the subject, E. Conze, goes along 
with the consensus when be points out that:-
"A modern historian, on the other hand, cannot fail to note
that this Maitreya chapter" differs radically from the remainder
of the Prajnaparamita in vocabulary, style and doctrinal content." (20)
If we disregard the testimony of Bu-ston, since the only evidence
to support his claim is mythological, both Obermiller and Conze
take their standpoint on the basis that the chapter in question
somehow differs doctrinally from the body of the text. This is
not a view however that has been universally shared by the Buddhist
tradition. Tsong-kha-pa, for instance, sees the Maitreya chapter
(21 )
as quite compatible with the rest of the text. Now many commentators
before Tsong-kha-pa, who wrote from a Madhyamaka point of view, 
held that while the body of the sutra was written as direct meaning 
(nitartha), the Maitreya chapter has only an indirect meaning (neyartha) 
and consequently needs further elaboration by a qualified teacher. 
Tsong-kha-pa disagrees. For him the whole of the text has a direct 
meaning (nitartha). However he was still at pains to make a distinction 
between the three aspect theory and the three self-nature (trisvabhava) 
doctrine of the Yogacara. As we have already seen though, he does 
equate the teachings of the Maitreya chapter and the trilaksana 
theory of the Sandhinirmocana sutra. He must therefore be led to 
an implicit denial that the Saiidhinirmocanasutra is agama for the 
Yogacara, otherwise he would have to accept that the trilaksana 
and trisvabhava doctrines are the same, and if so that the Yogacira 
teachings must be in accord with the three aspects of the Maitreya 
chapter. He fails to do this explicitly and to a certain extent
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this puts him in an awkward position. This is because he wants
to maintain a distinction between the Madhyamaka and Yogacara teachings
on this point. How far is he justified in making such a distinction? 
Let us turn to an examination of Nagarjuna's understanding of reality
to see whether this will throw light on the distinction.
One must first of all see Nagarjuna's teaching in its correct context. 
The doctrine of two truths (satyadvaya) is first brought up in Chapter 
XXIV of the Karikas. They are in fact brought forward in argument 
with an opponent who asserts that since Naglrjuna teaches everything 
to be empty (sunya) certain consequences of a nihilistic nature 
follow. These consequences include the rejection of the existence 
of the Four Noble Truths, the impossibility of true knowledge (parijna), 
the pointlessness of developing any spiritual discipline (bhavana) 
and the incoherence of the triple jewel (triratna), ie the Buddha, 
the Dharma and the Sarigha. Nagarjuna responds by saying that his 
opponent has misunderstood his particular doctrine of emptiness 
(sunyata) and therefore the charge of nihilism will not hold. What 
Nagarjuna seems to mean here is that the opponent has confused empti­
ness with non-existence, and when Nagarjuna claims dharmas to be 
empty (sunya) this does not entail the fact that for him they are 
devoid of existence. He merely wishes to point out that dharmas 
are empty of something and this something is in fact self-nature 
(svabhava).
It is to elaborate this argument that Nagarjuna introduces the two 
truths.
"The teaching of the Dharma by various Buddhas is based on
two truths; namely the worldly conventional truth and the ultimate
truth." (22)
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and he goes on to add that the teaching of the Buddha is profound
(gambhira) precisely because it makes the distinction between two 
(23)
truths. This gives the impression that Nagarjuna considers
the Buddha to be the initiator of this specific doctrine, and does 
not therefore claim it as his own development. This also confirms 
our work in the previous chapter, in which we identified a two fold 
theory of truth in the writings of the Sthaviras.
It is also clear that, for Nigarjuna, the two truths follow directly 
on the establishment of the doctrine of emptiness (sunyati) since 
his first comment to his critics is that:-
"... you do not understand the real purpose of sunyata, its 
nature and meaning. Therefore there is only frustration and 
hindrance (of your understanding)." (24)
As a consequence,
"If you perceive the various existences as true beings from 
the standpoint of self-nature (svabhava), then you will perceiv 
them as non-causal conditions". (25)
and since Nagarjuna, as evidenced by the mangalasloka of MMK, holds 
fast to the central Buddhist doctrine of causality or dependent orig 
ination (pratityasamutpada), he claims that the opponent has not 
grasped the fundamental Buddhist revelation. By taking things as 
possessing self-nature (svabhava) the latter has precluded the poss­
ibility of them being causally efficient, and hence contributing 
to the flux of existence. Nigarjuna's position therefore is that:
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Any factor of existence (dharma) which does not participate 
in relational origination (pratityasamutpanna) cannot exist. 
Therefore any factor of experience not in the nature of sunva 
cannot exist". (26)
Nagarjuna has effectively turned the opponent's criticism upside 
down and directed it back at him. The opponent has accused Nagarjuna 
of nihilism and Nigirjuna has shown that by maintaining self-nature 
(svabhava), causal efficiency in the moral order and in the dharmic 
world is consequently negated. The opponent under such an attack 
becomes the nihilist, while Nagarjuna in maintaining the existence 
of things, though empty (sunya) of self-nature (svabhava), can go 
on, as he does, to show that his teachings are conducive to the practice 
of the Buddhist path, the operation of the Four Noble Truths etc.
Nagarjuna does not feel himself to be a nihilist therefore, and would 
agree with someone who maintains the existence of the world in a 
general way, though not necessarily in every specific detail. There 
is no particular reason therefore why he would disagree with the 
realistic claim of the suttas that:
"... because of the sensitive surface of the eye as support, 
and the four originating material elements as the object, there 
arises eye consciousness. By the meeting of those three arises 
contact." (27)
although he would of course object that neither eye, external object 
or eye consciousness could be possessed of self-nature (svabhava) 
for such a situation in his view of things would itself preclude 
any contact. Since Nagarjuna does show some sympathy towards realistic 
thought, though obviously his particular version of it, how then
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are the two truths to be understood?
In the first place they are not mutually exclusive since the absolute 
can only be understood with the conventional as its basis.
"Without relying on everyday common practices (ie.the conventional 
truth) the absolute truth cannot be expressed. Without the 
absolute truth, nirvana cannot be attained." (28)
Since the two truths appear to have a certain dependence on one another 
it does not seem likely that they are designed to fulful the function 
performed by the two categories of a dualistic system such as Samkhya 
or Cartesianism. For instance, Samkhya deals with two mutually exclusive 
realities primordial matter (prakrti) and souls (purusa)][ ?not a 
single reality which can be treated in a twofold manner. The two 
fundamental principles of Samkhya may, one must admit, be termed 
truths in the ontological sense of the word,, such diS uihen the 
word truth is used as a synonym for being. Certainly the Sanskrit 
term for truth (satya) may have such a connotation since it contains 
within itself the word for being (sat). Under these circumstances, a u \ e i  
since Samkhya puts forward the notion of two mutually incompatible 
spheres of being^one may be justified in claiming that it teaches 
two truths. However^this is not the sense given by Nagarjuna to 
his notion of two truths (satyadvaya). He is not a dualist and does 
not, as all Buddhists do not, recognise two entirely independent 
ontological realities. Rather^he recognises two epistemic orientat­
ions towards one reality^which may be termed the orientation of
the ordinary person, and the orientation of the enlightened person.
This is made clear by his references to the states of samsara and
- 171 -
nirvana.
Samsara is nothing essentially different from nirvana. Nirvana 
is nothing essentially different from samsara. The limits 
of nirvana are the limits of samsara. Between the two, also, 
there is not the slightest difference whatsoever." (29)
It does appear therefore that Nagarjuna wishes a link between the 
two truths on the one hand and samsara and nirvina on the other.
Now samsara and nirvina are said to be identical since they have 
the same limit (koti), which must mean that they refer to the same 
world seen in the first case under the condition of ignorance (avidyi) 
and in the second through wisdom (prajna). It becomes clear therefore 
that the conventional truth (samvrtisatya) must be closely connected 
with samsara while the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) must similarly 
perform the same function as nirvana.
Sarpvrtiis defined in CandrakTrti's commentary on MMK in three senses. 
It is said to be (a) the obscuration of the true nature of things 
through ignorance, (b) reciprocal dependence and finally (c) social
C
convention involving the world of ordinary language and translation.
(31)Samvrti also, according to Sprung , involves the belief in a 
person, ie. conceptions such as "I" and "mine"^and existence understood 
in terms of the defilements (klesas). We may add to this by also 
noting that samvrti is particularly associated with defilement (klesa) 
by the imputation of self-nature (svabhava) to dharmas through the 
co-operation of language. In consequence information obtained through 
verbal transaction, though having a pragmatic value is, from the 
ultimate point of view, untrue.
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The Blessed One has said that elements with delusive nature 
are untrue. All mental conformations (samskara) are delusive in 
nature. Therefore, they are untrue". (327
When Nagarjuna talks about elements with a delusive nature, what 
he means are things to which self-nature is attributed. He is not 
therefore totally denying the existence of things in the above statement. 
We have already seen how the Buddhists assmg a pragmatic truth 
value to attemps to articulate ultimate reality. The Parable of 
the Raft in M/i,173 shows this clearly, in that the Buddhist teaching 
is promulgated so that it may be used as a vehicle to help on the 
path, though from the ultimate point of view it is without meaning 
and in the end must consequently be abandoned. The articulation 
of Dharma then pertains to the path and this is why Naglrjuna says 
that the conventional truth (samvrtisatya) is the basis (asraya) 
of the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) in MMK.XXIV 10. The artic­
ulated Dharma may be said to contain within itself the seed of its 
own transcendence since it hints at the ultimate reality of things 
which is inexpressible.
V x -  i.None of this is particularly novel. As Nanananda comments, m  the 
context of the Pali canon,
"However the Buddha, for this part, was content to treat all 
of them ( ie. teachings) as sammuti ( =samvrti). For him, they 
were merely worldly conventions in common use, which he made 
use of without clinging to them". (D.i,202). (33)
Nagirjuna would interpret such a statement as indicating the fact 
that the Buddha, while he recognised the substantialising tendency
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connected with language resulting in the attribution of self-natures 
(svabhava), was forced to use such language for the purpose of leading 
the unenlightened towards enlightenment. In fact when one comes 
to understand that these putative self-natures implicated in the 
realm of discourse are empty (^unya), then all views concerning 
the nature of things are uprooted for good. The notion of emptiness 
(sunyata) then merely indicates the non-existence of self-natures 
and should not be taken as yet another view concerning the status 
of the world etc. This is what Nagarjuna means when he says:-
"Emptiness (sunyata) is proclaimed by the victorious ones as
a refutation of all view points. It is said (therefore) that
those who hold emptiness as a view point are incurable (asadhya)". (34)
The second or ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) is not a view point
since it is not arrived at through the artifices of language.
(35)Sprung considers it to be synonymous with many of the terms
which are normally employed by the Mahayana in referring to reality 
as it really is. The terms in question include sunyata, tattva, 
dharmata, nirvana. A number of things may be said to give an under­
standing of paramartha, though it must be borne in mind that for 
the Madhyamakas it is fundamentally inaccessible through language.
Of course we should remember that this notion is not peculiar to
X
the Madhyamakas but as we have noted more than once, is found in
the earliest strata of Buddhist thought. Acknowledging these strictures,
and therefore using worldly convention, we may intimate, and no
more, the structure of the ultimate truth. However, as with the
treatment of nirvana, the language we must use is predominantly
apophatic.
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Paramartha may be said to involve the cessation of concepts such 
as "I" and "mine":-
If the individual self (atman) does not exist, how then will 
there be something which is "my own"? There is lack of poss­
essiveness and no ego (ahamkara) on account of the cessation 
of self and that which is "my own". (36)
Since samvrti is tied up with and conditioned by the workings of the 
unenlightened mind and motivated by ignorance (avidya), paramlrtha
must be a state in which dichotomies (prapanca) and thought constructions
(vikalpa) has come to rest. The wandering of the mind (cittagocara)
(3 7 )
ceases and one achieves nirvana • One understands the true nature
_ / oo \
of things (dharmata). This is really so (tathyam), a state of
peace (santa).
"Not conditionally related to anything else, peaceful, not elab­
orated by dichotomous thought, without thought construction, 
undifferentiated: such are the (true) characteristics of reality." (39)
It is liberation from the tyranny of the conventional (samvrti). 
Paramarthasatya is incapable of being taught or proved, though it 
may be hinted at through the spoken word. We meet with statements 
such as these time and time again in the Mahayana sutras. For example 
the Pitaputrasamagamasutra tells us:-
"This much should be understood, the conventional_and the absolute... 
Among these (two) convention was seen by the Tathagata as worldly 
usage, while the absolute is inexpresible, unknowable, non-exper- 
iential, imperceptible, unrevealed, unmanifest ... not deed> 
not doer... not gain, not loss, not pleasure, not pain, not fame, 
not infamy, not form, not without form. (40)
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The ultimate truth is free from the duality associated with the 
conventional and as such is not dual (advaya) . It is therefore 
devoid of prapanca.
Now, as we have already said, the ultimate is dependent on the conv­
entional for its expression, even though in the apophatic sense 
the objection can be raised as to whether there is any real way 
in which two truths can be said to "exist". Lindtner has found 
the seed of such an objection in the Mahavibhasl.
"A very early piece of evidence to this effect has found its 
way into the Mahavibhasa where objections were raised whether 
the relative (samvrti) exists in a relative sense (samvrtitah), 
or in the absolute sense (paramarthatah). Whatever the answer, 
only the absolute (paramartha) exists, and thus the theory 
of two truths is absurd." (41)
Kumarila was the most prominent non-Buddhist to criticise the two 
truth doctrine of Naglrjuna, actually quoting MMK.XXIV-8 in his 
Slokavarttika. He maintained that it was totally nonsensical
to have two separate truths. If paramartha is ultimately true then 
for him, it follows that samvrti is not a truth at all, but would 
be better described as untruth (mithya). Kumarila makes the point 
that the Madhyamaka claim to teach two truths is actually misleading, 
because, what they in fact put forward is one truth (ie paramartha) 
together with one falsehood (ie.samvrti).
Amongst the Madhyamikas, it is Bhavaviveka who first takes up the 
challenge of these criticisms. Bhavaviveka probably lived c500-570 
AD ^^)^ ancj consequently occupies an intermediate positio in the
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history of Madhyamaka thought between Nigarjuna himself and Candrakirti. 
Now Bhivaviveka has been unfairly treated by many scholars of the 
Madhyamaka who have based their understanding of Nagarjuna’s seminal 
works on the commentaries of Candrakirti. The main thrust of their 
argument is directed at Bhavaviveka's attempt to answer the objections 
of Kumarila and others of the same ilk. Bhavaviveka tries to show 
how Nagirjuna's statement in MMK XXIV 8 that the ultimate truth 
has the conventional truth as its basis (asraya) is true. Nonsense 
would be made of the Buddhist Dharma should no connection be possible, 
as the opponents claim. Now we have already noted that Nagirjuna 
answers exactly the same criticism in his VigrahavyavartanI when 
he replies to an opponent's objection that if everything is empty 
then surely his (ie•Nagirjuna's) words are empty and hence his teaching 
meaningless, by maintaining that:-
"... if there is the self existence of good dharmas, while not 
being related to something else, there would be no state of 
a spiritual way of life. There would be neither vice nor virtue, 
and worldly practical activities would not be possible". (44)
In other words it is precisely because all dharmas, and particularly 
the concepts of Buddhist Dharma, are empty of own-being that they 
are efficient, and since they are efficient they have the capacity 
to lead towards liberation. This is in total conformity with MMK.
XXIV.8, so it does appear that Bhavaviveka's attempt at exegesis 
has a basis in the writings of his master. It is surprising therefore 
that Bhavaviveka's contemporary, the Prasangika Buddhapalita, and 
his later follower Candrakirti, should both choose to disregard the 
objections of Kumarila et,al.dismissing: -
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"such controversies as symptomatic of obsession (graha) and
themselves retain a non-committed attitude" (45)
towards ontology and epistemology. On such evidence it is not surprising 
therefore to hear E. Conze say of the school of Bhavaviveka, the 
Madhyamaka-Svitantrika, that they:-
"... have upheld the well-nigh incredible thesis that in 
Madhyamaka logic valid positive statements can be made." (46)
Again Murti tells us that the Svatantrikas are:
"... against the correct standpoint of the Madhyamaka". (47)
Now the second objection here is quite clearly incorrect as we have 
seen by reference to Nagarjuna's own works. Ccnze's statement is 
more complex, since it is coloured by an implicit assumption that 
the interpretation of the Prasangika ^and particularly Candrakirti^ 
is the correct understanding of Nagarjuna's position. Now the Prasangikas 
make a distinct and radical separation between the two truths.
In their writings they emphasise the fundamental contradiction between 
the absolute and human understanding and consequently stress the 
notion, found in Nagarjuna that paramartha completely transcends 
thought and language. Bhavaviveka does not disagree here but since 
in this form the doctrine is open to the previously mentioned criticism 
of Kumarila, he modifies it somewhat.
The most sympathetic work of exegesis on Bhavav: veka has been carried 
out relatively recently and mostly by Japanese scholars. One of
their manraber, Kajiyama observes:-
" M  though yearning for the absolute truth is naturally accompanied 
by negation of the relative and conditioned knowledge ... 
a question should in this context be reflected upon: that is,
whether the system of the relative knowledge can be, so far
as the phenomenal wonldis concerned, recognized as valid or 
not, though it is always delusive from the absolute point of 
view. This very problem seems to have been a fork which divided ... 
the Madhyamaka Itself into the Prasangika and the Svatantrika”. (48)
Bhavaviveka takes the view that relative knowledge does have value 
and is efficient with respect to the Buddhist path. To avoid the 
radical disjunction between the two truths characteristic of the 
Prasahgikas he makes a distinction between two forms of the convent­
ional ((samvrti 1; the real I tathya) and the erroneous (mi thy a). In 
_ f4Q)
the Prajnapradxpa ‘ he tells us that while water may be said to 
be real {tathya) from the conventional point of view, the water in
a mirage Is not so and Is In fact false (mithya) from the same point
of view. He bases such an opinion on Nagarjuna*s statement that 
"everything Is so, or not so" ^. By making this point Bhavaviveka 
succeeds to a certain extent In deflecting the criticism of Kumarila - 
the Buddhists do accept a conception of falsehood, but In a more 
particular sense than that used by their opponents. Something is 
false (mithya! If It does not exist front the conventional {samvrti) 
sense; such as water In a mirage(or the horns of a hare.
Bhavaviveka does not stop here - he also allows that ultimate truth
(paramarthaI may be similarly divided into an ultimate truth which




"Bhavaviveka grades ultimate reality into two kinds, ie supra- 
mundane ultimate reality and mundane ultimate reality. The 
former has no attributes (nirlaksana) and is inexpressible. 
However the words and deeds of the arya who has some experience 
of paramartha differ from those of worldlings ... In other 
words, the words and deeds of the arya based on ultimate reality 
should be pure and true knowledge of the world (tathya-samvrti- 
j nana) .11 (51)
This does not imply that for Bhavaviveka the expression of truth
by an arya is the highest of truths since he still admits the inexpress-
_ . _ (52)
ible paramartha of the Prasangikas. In his Madhyamakarthasamgraha
he in fact states that the truth formulations of the Hinayaha and
the herectical systems both belong to the paryayaparamartha which
gives the impression that he considers all spoken truth to be of
a provisional nature.
The most important aspect of his system however is his linking of 
tathyasamvrti with paryayaparamartha. The following chart shows 





The tathyasamvrti provides the connecting link between the two truths. 
This is the connecting link which the Prasangikas do not possess^ 
which leaves them open to the criticisms of the likes of Kumarila.
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To fully appreciate this particular point though we must look at 
something Bhavaviveka says in his Madhyamakahrdayakarika. In this 
text the realjconventional knowledge, or true knowledge of the world 
(tathyasamvrtijnana) is said to "correspond to the direction of 
the real object (bhutarthapravivekanugunyati), MHK.111-7c-d."
This strongly indicates the fact that^for Bhavaviveka,a real world 
does exist which provides the basis for both enlightened and unenlight­
ened points of views; a position^which we have already found in the 
Maitreya chapter of the Pancavimsatikasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra, 
and implicitly in Nagarjuna. It is Candrakirti and the other Prasangikas> 
then^who somehow seem out of with mainstream Mahayana thought. ,
Because they maintain a strict adherence to an inexpressible absolute 
(paramartha) f while at the same time rejecting the conventional (samvrti) 
absolutely, it seems as though the mid-term which links the two together 
is absent from their system^exposing them to criticism. This is the 
result of remorselessly pushing the logico-linguistic transcendality 
of paramartha over samvrti to its limit^and leads to a seeming rejection 
of the Buddhist notion of reality (tattva? which is the basis of the 
two points of view. If we cast our minds back to our prior discussion 
of logic in Chapter Two this again is the reason why the Prasangikas 
are forced into total negation (prasajyapratisedha) while Bhavaviveka's 
negations take the partial form (paryudasapratisedha)•
If we now turn back to Conze's astonishment that Bhavaviveka was able 
to make positive statements we can see more clearly his partisan view. 
Since he follows Candrakirti in his interpretation of the Madhyamaka 
he will not accept the paryayaparamartha of BhSvaviveka even though
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Bhavaviveka admits that this is only a provisional stage on the way 
to aparyayaparamartha. This attitude incidentally is also at the 
root of Conze's contention that the Maitreya chapter of the Prajni- 
paramita is a later interpolation - he follows the interpretations 
of a 7th century AD writer!
Tsong-kha-pa on the other hand was a Svatantrika-Madhyamaka and bases 
his interpretation of the Maitreya chapter on the work of Bhavaviveka. 
This chapter, together with the rest of the Prajnaparamita literature, 
therefore, has a direct meaning (nTtartha) . At last we are able to 
fully assess the content of the nTtartha/neyirtha distinction and 
clearly relate it to the two truth doctrine, since Bhavaviveka provides 
the key to do so. It is not quite the case, as some scholars have 
insisted and as we have already noted in the previous chapter, that 
nTtartha and neyartha are respectively synonymous with paramlrtha 
and samvrtisatyas. The point that Bhavaviveka makes is that it is 
the ultimate truth which can be inferred (paryayaparamartha) which 
must equate with statements of direct meaning (nTtartha) while the 
truth which is in conformity with real conventional knowledge 
(tathyasamvrti) is of an indirect meaning. Such a distinction allows 
for falsehood or totally untrue statements in the shape of the false 
conventional knowledge (mithyasamvrti), while still allowing that 
at the highest level (aparyiyaparamartha) the true nature of things 
is inexpressible (anabhilapya). The relationship between the nitartha/ 
neyartha formulation and the two truth doctrine is therefore more 
complex than some scholars have believed and this error on their part 
has led, in some cases, to a presentation of Mahayana Buddhist doctrine
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which is open to the objections of people taking the stance similar
to that of Kumarila.
Conze and Iida actually record a conversation with a Tibetan lama, 
Dezhung Rinpoche, who repeats Bhivaviveka*s interpretation. (54) 
Briefly, he equates the understanding of ordinary people (prthagjana) 
with conventional truth (samvrti) and that of the aryas with the 
ultimate truth (paramartha). However for the arya full understanding 
or paramirtha only comes with Buddhahood. An irya between the first 
stage (bhumi) of a Bodhisattva and Buddhahood itself has recourse 
to a subisidary level of paramartha (rnam-grahs-pa* i don-dam bden pa 
ie. paryayaparamartha). Dezhung Rinpoche goes on to say that the
scriptures therefore must be understood by people of differing levels 
of attainment in three separate ways:-
(i) By hearing about them (srutamayi) one grasps their general 
sense
(ii) By thinking about them (cintamayl) one comes to a greater under­
standing of their significance
(iii) By meditating on them (bhavanamayi) one has direct experience 
face to face (mnon-sum-gyi-rtogs-par 1gyur).
This all fits quite clearly with Nigarjuna*s teaching of MMK.XXIV.
10 where paramartha is said to have its basis in samvpti. Though 
an enlightened person knows that the summum bonum of the Buddhist 
path lies beyond conceptual thought and is "silent", to lead others 
to enlightenment he promulgates a teaching (neyartha) which when 
inspected deeply (nitartha)leads to its own abandonment. This is 
the ultimate paradox of the Buddhist Dharma.
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While the neyartha/nitartha distinction therefore refers to differing 
levels of attainment with respect to the promulgation (Dharma), 
the two truth dis tinction refers to differing levels of understanding 
of reality (tattva). Samvrti and paramirtha both have efficiency 
through their reference to an ontological basis ;ie. Mowy
we have seen that Tsong-kha-pa accepts the Maitreya chapter as the 
closest approximation to ultimate truth (paryayaparamartha = nTtartha) 
possible through language. He therefore endorses the three aspect 
doctrine as the correct interpretation of the two truth notion of 
Nagarjuna. We have shown independently that this is so. T song-kha-pa 
is unhappy however to identify this doctrine with the three nature 
(trisvabhava? teaching of the Yogacara even though for them, as for 
Tsong-kha-pa, the Sandhinirmocanasutra is agama and seems to deal 
with just such a doctrine. Funnily enough Conze is less dogmatic 
on this point, allowing that there may be a close correlation between 
the three aspects of the Maitreya chapter and the trisvabhava of 
the Yogacara since the chapter in question concerns:
"... a doctrine of the three svabnavas which may or may not, 
be identical with the -Yogacarin division into parikalpita, 
paratantra and parinispanna". (55)
Now is the time to examine the doctrine of three natures and to determine 
whether Tsong-kha-pa is right in maintaining a distinction between 
the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara on this matter. As we have already 
noted, the notion of three natures (trisvabhava) finds scriptural 
authority in the Sandhinirmocanasutra and plays a major role in the 
Lankavatarasutra. It is howeve ° in the writings of Vasubandhu and 
Asahga that we find it treated in a systematic manner.
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Before examining the writings of these authors however, it will be 
worthwhile to pause to consider the origin of the Yogacara. The 
tradition retold by the Tibetan doxographer Bu-ston is that Asanga, 
while residing in the Tusita heaven, had five treatises revealed 
to him by the Bodhisattva Maitreya, which he promptly wrote down 
on his return to earth. According to this account Maitreya is the 
mythological founder of the Yogacara ^ though to Asanga must go the 
credit for composing the seminal texts. Recently however certain 
authors, and particularly H. H i ^ 6  ^ and G. Tucci have suggested
that rather than being a mythological character, Maitreya was in 
fact an historical personage and the true founder of the school.
Since they bring no true historical evidence to bear in their discussions, 
reaching conclusions on the basis that since the writings generally 
ascribed to Asanga are heterogeneous and consequently it would be 
convenient to posit another author besides Asanga, the theory of 
the historicity of Maitreya is not proven. Obermiller on the
other hand is of the opinion that Asanga is the author of the works 
ascribed to him, the differences in doctrine presented representing 
his need to treat different topics for different classes of readership.
We have already seen that the same is true of Nagarjuna. It is 
therefore much more likely that the real reason for associating 
these particular works with the name of Maitreya is the heavenly 
sanction they would receive from such a connection.
More importantly for us is another connectin. We have seen that
A_ _ _
the Maitreya chapter of the Prajnaparamita contains one of the earliest
explicit formulations of the three aspect doctrine. Now one of
the fundamental characteristics of the Yogacara is its own exposition
- 185 -
of exactly such a doctrine. Would it not therefore be quite feasible 
to suggest, assuming this section to be earlier than the Yogacara, 
that the connection with Maitreya in the case of some of Asanga's 
works is not with any heavenly Bodhisattva but rather with the character 
in the Prajnaparamita? Is it not possible that the development 
of such a doctrine by the Buddha, based on Maitreya's promptings, 
strongly linked Maitreya's name with the trisvabhava teaching in 
the sense that Buddhist tradition considers him the originator of 
its exposition?
The three nature (trisvabhava) doctrine of the Yogacara concerns
the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhava)^the dependent nature
(paratantrasvabhava)^ and the accomplished nature (parinispannasvabhiva)
(59)a doctrine which, for Asanga , derives its scriptural authority 
through the Vaipulyasutra, the Abhidharmasutra and the Ghanavyuha.
It receives more thorough treatment however in the Bodhisattvabhumi, 
the Mahiyanasamgraha, and the Madhyantavibhanga of Asanga, and the 
Trisvabhavanirdesa and the Trim^ika both ascribed to Vasubandhu.
With regard to these natures then Asanga gives some synonymns.
"The imagined, the dependent and the accomplished are taught 
respectively to be objects (artha), the imagination of the unreal 
(abhutaparikalpa) and the non-existence of duality (dvayabhava). (60)
Sthiramati, commenting on this stanza, goes on to say that the imagined 
(parikalpita) nature represents objects (artha) in so far as they 
are constructed through the processes of thought, appearing as self 
existent entities (svabhava). Once such a process has been accomplished
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a subject/object dichotomy (grabya-grihaka) is set up which leads 
to the belief in self and objects as independent existents. It should 
be noted at this point that such a position does not in itself entail 
Sthiramati and, hence by implication, Asanga is putting forward an 
idealistic posture since this would assume that they wish to go further 
and state that external objects are caused by subjective thought processes. 
This is not so. All they are saying is that the self and objects 
as imagined (parikalpita) are in fact devoid of any self existence 
or own being. The third nature, the accomplished (parinispanna) 
therefore is the total non-existence of those factors which lead to 
the false view of things entailed by the first. Parinispanna must 
in consequence be an absence of parikalpita, and since the latter 
establishes the subject/object dichotomy, parinispanna is said to 
be devoid of this duality (dvayabhava) .
All this is quite consistent with doctrines we have already noted 
in connection with the works of Nagarjuna and earlier writers. For 
him the unenlightened mindfthrough thought construction (vikalpa), 
creates false dichotomies (prapanca) leading to the belief in a world 
constructed of building blocks (dharma) eentai-n-ing own-being (svabhava)
The enlightened mind however is empty (sunya) of such concepts and 
the task of someone on the Buddhist path is an attempt to accomplish 
the enlightened state. The conclusion of the path therefore coincides 
with the awakening of gnosis (prajna) which is a non-dual knowledge 
(advayajnana) We have noted that all previous writers have acknowledged^ 
albeit implicitly, a reality (tattva) which gives efficaciousness 
to these two forms of knowledge. We may now correlate what we have 
so far discussed before going to to look at the second or dependent
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nature (paratantrasvabhSva) of the YogicSra. For Nigirjuna the unenligM.
ened world view coincides with the conventional truth (samvrtisatya)
which he equates with samsara. This is quite clearly the first or 
imagined nature {parikalpita) of the Yogacara. Similarly for Migirjtina 
the enlightened world view is the ultimate truth (paramartha), a 
non-dual gnosis which equates perfectly with the third or accomplished 
nature (parinispannasvabhava) of the Yogacara. This is nirvana.
Now, again consistent with Nagarjuna's position, nirvana and samsara 
are not two separate ontological realms of existence. He says there 
is no difference between the two, and we have suggested the reason 
for this is that they both represent epistemic orientations towards 
one reality (tattva).
In the above quoted stanza of Asanga it seems the same position 
is being adopted. For him the second nature Cparatantra) is also 
called the imagination of the unreal (abhutapari-kalpa). To understand 
this notion we must quote Asanga again.
"The imagination of the unreal (abhutaparikalpa) exists. JXhere 
Is no duality (dvayam) In It. There is emptiness {sunyata)
and even in this there Is that." {61}
Now, commenting on this curious stanza, Kochumuttam asserts that 
there are four clear statements contained In it.
"{I) an assertion of the imagination of the unreal (abhutapari-
kalpo’sti) . , ,
(ii) a negation of duality {dvayam tatra na vidyateJ 
*(iv) an assertion of the co-existence of the imagination of 
the unreal (abhGtaparikalpa) and the emptiness (sunyata)
(tasyam api sa vidyate). (62 3'"
* aS5.rfc.s- ^  ^
This is a clear indication that for Asanga the dependent nature 
(paratantra) does exist (asti) though it is clear that its existence 
precludes an implication of duality (dvayam) . It is in fact empty 
(sunya) of such a dichotomy. This is the true sense of emptiness 
(sunyata) in the Yogacira system.
Here abhutaparikalpa (^ paratantra) is pivotal. It is an uncontamin­
ated vision of things and as such is identical to the accomplished 
nature (parinispanna). In such a condition all forms of dualistic 
thought are uprooted and one sees things as they are (yathabhutam). 
ujhen thought construction appears there is the imagined nature 
(parikalpita). This interprets reality as external to self and 
composed of substantial entities (dharmasvabhava). In reality things 
are empty (sunya) of any imputed own-being (svabhava).
All of this is quite consistent with our inter­
pretation of Nagarjuna.
This doctrine is reiterated in the works of Vasubandhu. In the 
Trisvabhavanirdesa we are told:
’’That which is known as the dependent (paratantra) depends on 
causal conditions. The form in which it appears is the imagined 
(kalpita.h) for it is merely an imagination. The perpetual absence 
of the form in which it (ie. paratantra) appears is to be understood 
as the accomplished nature (parinispanna) for it is never other­
wise". (63)
Similarly in the Trimsika Vasubandhu says:
"The accomplished (parinispanna) is the latter s (ie.paratantra) 
perpetual devoidness of the former (ie- pari a .pi a
In an interesting article on the Paratantrasvabhava, N. Aramaki 
has found a number of meanings of this concept as presented by Asanga 
in his Mahayanasamgraha. Among such meanings the most important from 
our point of view is that it is (i) the base for the appearance of 
all entities (sarvadharmapratibhasasraya) , (ii) dependent origination 
(pratityasamutpada) and (iii) pertaining to suffering and pertaining 
to cleansing (samkiesamsiko vyavadanamsikas ca) .
At the moment we will postpone an examination of position (ii), 
is. the identity of pratityasamutpada and paratantra, until the next 
chapter which deal with the former concept in some detail. Let us 
now clarify positions (i) and (iii). lie note that paratantra is 
referred to as both a base (afsraya) for the appearance of things, 
and that state which gives coherence to the twin notions of bondage 
and release. In fact positions (i) and (iii) are mutually inter­
connected and may be explained with reference to what has already 
been said about the three-natures
Paratantra may, in a sense, be considered under two aspects. In its 
first it is contaminated by imagination with the result that a world 
of appearance (pratibha^a) is constructed. Appearances are imputed 
to possess own—being or substantiality when from the ultimate point 
of view they do not exist. uJe have seen that appearances cannot come 
into beig without some indeterminate form of existence at their
AT
basis. This is why paratantra in its imagined aspect is called the 
base (asraya) for the appearance of all entities. Since one is
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trapped by imagination into a false view of things leading to 
suffering paratantra may also be said to pertain to suffering.
Looked at in its second aspect, in which it is uncontaminated by 
the above processes, paratantra is identical to the accomplished nature 
(parinispannasvabhava) . This may then be referred to as the aspect 
pertaining to cleansing.
Asanga puts these notions in the following manner:-
The dependent (paratantra) is on occasion the dependent, on 
occasion the same is the imagined; and on occasion the same 
as the accomplished". (69)
and "Samsara is referred to the dependent nature in its aspect of 
defilement. Nirvana referred to the same in its aspect of 
purity". (70)
Expanding, paratantra may in a sense be held as the basis for the 
arising of all the pairs of concepts which define the distinction 
between enlightenment and unenlightenment, be they nirvana/ 
samsara, purity/defilement, paramartha/samvrti, bliss/suffering, 
self/non—self etc. ^   ^ As Sthiramati has pointed out, it is impossible 
to accept something as relative or absolute without recourse to an 
underlying substance. The only stipulation we need to make is
that this basis (a~sraya) must not be assumed to have equality of 
relationship with both elements of the pair. Taking nirvana/sapsara 
as an example it is clear that samsSra represents a falling away 
from the basis; a failure to understand it as it is. Nirvana on the 
other hand is complete identification with the basis since objectivity 
and subjectivity do not exist at this point. The first aspect then 
reflects disunity in a way that the second does
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uJe may conclude this chapter by noting a surprising similarity of 
outlook shared by the Yogacara and Nadhyamaka< It has been generally 
concluded that the two systems are not in harmony, particularly over 
their respective three— nature and two— truth formulations. It is hoped 
that the above examination has demonstrated that this is not the 
case. In N a g a r j u n a 1 s system we have shown that the two truths 
implicitly suggest the existence of an ontologically indeterminate 
existence realm. In consequence N'ag'ar juna is saved from a charge of 
nihilism.
The mechanics of the Yogacara three-nature doctrine precisely mirrors 
this, the only difference being that the mid-term (if we may refer 
to it so) is explicitly included. This makes no difference on close 
examination,though it has the tendency to open the Yogacara to the 
unjustifiable charge of holding to a positive depiction of reality.
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Chapter Seven
The Nature of Reality
We have reiterated many times the fact that Buddhism steers a middle
course between the extremes of nihilism (ucchedavada) and eternalism
(sisvatavlda), since an adoption of either of these two positions
inevitably leads to the rejection of the efficaciousness of the
Buddhist path (marga). Since the Buddhists consistently maintain
such objections it is hardly surprising that^with regard to causation,
a similar rejection of the extreme positions of Indeterminism
(yadrcchavada) and Strict Determinism (niyativada) should be upheld.
In the Nikiyas these doctrines are associated with Makkhali Gosila
and Purana Kassapa respectively, the former maintaining that neither
the unenlightened nor the enlightened state has any cause (hetu),
while the latter holds to the belief that the "... past, present
(1 )
and future is unalterable and fixed". Since both of these
contemporaries of the Buddha deny a positive basis on which a person 
can exert themselves to gain enlightenment, both of their teachings 
are called "teachings without a basis" (ahetuvada) in the Nikayas.
This is because^while the Indeterminists hold that things may arise 
without cause or reason (adhiccasamupanna) or in other words are 
entirely random, the Strict Determinists felt that all the factors 
in the causal process where completely determined since the beginning 
of time. Both doctrines consequently make nonsense of both the 
desire to obtain enlightenment through gradual stages, and the claim 
of the Buddha to have accomplished such a stat in such a manner.
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Since the Buddhist must hold a doctrine of causality which allows 
for the fact of enlightened and unenlightened states he must be 
more flexible than his two opponents’ positions allow.
The Buddhist doctrine of arising in dependence or dependent origination
(paticcasamuppada; Sanskrit = pratTtyasamutpada) possesses the above
mentioned adaptability since as we shall see it provides both a
picture of the world based on causally conditioned entities and
allows for the successful operation of the Buddhist path. The first
point which we must make clear however is the status of dependent
origination. Since it does, as we have already noticed, help to
explain the understanding of the deluded and the wise, is it purely
(2 )
subjective? Jayatilleke certainly does not think that this 
is so, holding that Buddhist scripture itself assigns an objective 
status to causality. The sutra itself says:-
"Causation (paticcasamuppado) is said [to have the character­
istics of] objectivity (tathata), necessity, invariability 
and conditionality.” (3)
It is interesting to note in passing that Jayatilleke gives "objectivity"
as his translation for the term tathata, a term to which we will
refer again in due course. We shall be in a better position to
judge whether or not this is a justifiable translation shortly,
but at least it is clear from this scriptural excerpt that, even
in the Nikayas, tathata is given as a synonym for causation or,
as we shall normally translate the term, "dependent origination"
(p aticcasamuppada).
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Other sections of the Rikayas clearly confirm the fact that dependent 
origination is not an entirely subjective phenomenon, since it is 
said to exist independently of its cognition
"What is dependent origination? On account of birth arises 
decay and death. Whether Tathagatas arise or not, this element 
(dhatu) exists as the fixed nature of^things (dhammatthitata), 
the normal order of things (dhammaniyainata) or conditionality 
(idappaccayata). This the Tathagata discovers and comprehends 
and having comprehended and discovered it, he points It out, 
teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, 
clarifies it and says "look!" " (4)
Even If Buddhas do not exist and dependent origination is not discovered, 
this process remains the key principle which keeps the world In 
being. This certainly does not Indicate a subjectively idealistic 
world picture since the process appears to remain in force whether 
it is cognised or not. We may note in passing again, that dependent 
origination seems to be being considered as synonymous with the 
element (dhatu) about which we shall say more later.
What we can say at this point In our examination of the concept
paticeasamuppada In the Nikayas is, firstly that there Is no evidence
to suggest that the causal process referred to Is subjective - this
supports Jayatilleke; rather it seems far more likely that the concept
- .
of paticeasamuppada is conjoined an ontologically existing sphere. 
Secondly the central Buddhist notions of tathata and dhatu are 
Intimately connected with it. With regard to the second point,
It does seem likely that, through association, the concept of dependent 
origination must itself be a central Buddhist doctrine.
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Such an idea is confirmed by the evidence. One of the most famous 
stanzas of the Nikayas equates the central content of the Buddhist 
teaching (dharma) with the realisation of the fact of dependent 
origination:
"He who sees dependent origination sees the Buddhist teaching.
He who sees the Buddhist teaching sees [the nature of] dependent 
origination." (5)
The nature of existence, as understood from the point of view of
dependent origination (paticeasamuppada), is therefore the discovery
of the Buddha which, with the Four Noble Truths, marks him out as
an enlightened being. The explication of this discovery provides
the substance of the Buddhist teaching. Jayatilleke confirms this
impression through his assertion that some of the earliest parts
of the Buddhist canon stress the centrality of the causal process,
and that these particular sections remain remarkably unchanged when
(6)
translated into the Mahayana context. For instance an early
verse of the Vinaya which tells us that:-
"The great recluse (mahasamano) says that the Tathagata has 
spoken of the cause of things, which arise from causes and 
also of their cessation". (7)
is found in virtually identical form in both the Lankavatarasutra
—- / — (8)
and the Aryasalistambasutra.
While there is little doubt that the concept of paticeasamuppada 
may be regarded as central to the Buddha's teaching, it may
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be safely said that the doctrine was developed in the course of
time. In the earliest strata of the literature the concept is already
prominent. The Sutta Nipata for instance praises "the one who sees 
—  (9)
paticcasamuppa cfa", but in this particular text no mention is 
found of the paticeasamuppada formula which contains 12 members 
(dvadasanga) that is so familiar in later writings. Even in a text 
as early as the Sutta Nipata however an incipient form of this 12 
membered doctrine can be discerned. Nakamura seems to be the scholar 
who has done the most to highlight this particular problem within 
the Suttanipata. As he points out:
"There [ie.the Atthakavagga of the Suttanipata] the theory 
is not set forth in a systematized way, each link (or item) 
in the same pattern, as in the case of the Twelve Link Dependent 
Origination, but rather in a crude, disorderly form which betrays 
its primitive character". (10)
What is of particular interest to us is the way this incipient formula 
begins. Before the various linkages are enumerated, the first of 
the classical linkages, ignorance (avijja), is announced in the 
following way.
"The world (loka) is shrouded by ignorance (avijja). On account^ 
of avarice (veviccha) and sloth (pamada) it does not shine . (11)
Reading the metaphor, what seems to be the point here is that the 
incipient paticeasamuppada formula has as its terminus ad quern 
the world (loka) . Once ignorance (avijja), the terminus a quo, 
is aroused the other links follow on  inexorably, producing a vision 
Of things which is not entirely in accord with how they really are.
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The implication is that when ignorance is eradicated the world will 
appear in its pristine glory; it will "shine". Again we cannot 
get away from the fact that once again a doctrinal formulation containing 
reference to paticeasamuppada strongly indicates the existence 
of a world (loka). In one way we must disagree with Nakamura's 
interpretation of this verse however. He holds that, "the term 
world (loka) means "human beings" collectively". This seems
unlikely, for such an interpretation of the verse would ultimately 
lead to the charge of subjective idealism against its author. lh£- reo-Sc.n 
this is because^ if the term world (loka) refers solely to a subjectively 
human world view, then^even should such a world be capable of being 
cleansed of ignorance (avijja) and its concomitants, the result 
would still be entirely subjective. As we have already noted, 
the dependent origination doctrine may not readily be interpreted 
subjectively since it exists whether it is discovered by a Tathagata 
or not. Given this, it would seem that in the present context, 
the term world (loka) is not tied to a purely human realm, but 
rather refers to an objectively real existence realm, though it 
must be remembered that since it will be impossible to determine 
it as X or not -X, it is not objective in the conventional sense. 
Again^this interpretation would appear more feasible in the light 
of the fact that the term crops up in a context in which subtle 
doctrinal points are unlikely to be dominant since the Sutta nipata 
is one of the most ancient Buddhist texts. In view of this^Nakamura's 
translation of loka appears unduly technical.
In an atempt to more clearly understand the Buddhist theory of 
causality, let us now turn to an examination of the fully developed
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12 link version found in the Nikayas, bearing in mind that while 
this represents the classical form of the doctrine, there are other 
formulae, buried in intermediate strata of the canon, in which 
the total of links do not add up to twelve. The twelve links or 
factors are laid down in the following section of the Majjhima 
Nikaya:-
"When this is that is; through the arising of this that arises, 
namely [1-2] Conditioned by ignorance (avidya) are karmic 
formations (samsk'ara); [3] conditioned by karmic formations 
is consciousness (vijftana); [4] conditioned by consciousness 
is name and form (namarupaj; [5] conditioned by name and form 
are the six [internal] bases of consciousness (sadayatana), 
the [five physical organs and the mental organ]; [6] conditioned 
by the six bases is contact (sparsa); [7] conditioned by contact 
is feeling (vedanaj; [8] conditioned by feeling is thirst (trsna) 
or desire; [9] conditioned by thirst is grasping (upadana),
[10] conditioned by grasping is existence (bhava); [11] conditioned 
by existence is birth (jati); [12] conditioned by birth is 
old-age and death (jaramarana) and also sorrow, lamentation, 
pain, grief and despair. Such is the origin (samudaya) of 
the whole mass of suffering (duhkhaskandha)M. (13)
The whole process therefore, from ignorance through to old-age and 
death is, according to this version, an explanation of the second 
of the four Noble Truths, since all twelve links are said to bring 
about the origin or arising (samudaya) of suffering (duhkha). However 
as an immediate correlate to this formulation the Buddha goes on 
to enumerate the twelve links in a reverse order, the meaning of 
which is obviously equivalent to the third of the Noble Truths; 
the truth of the cessation of suffering (duhkhanirodha).
"[11/12] Being born, ceasing, becoming old and dying cease ... 
[1/2] Being ignorant ceasing, karmic formations cease. When 
this is not, that is not; This ceasing that ceases ... From 
the ceasing of ignc "ance, karmic formations cease [1/2] ... 
from the ceasing o: being born, old age and death cease [11/12]
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and sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair do not arise ... 
Such is the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering". (14)
It does appear therefore that this twelve linked dependent origination 
formula (dvadasahgikapratityasamutpada) has two sequences. The 
first moves off from ignorance (avidya) which conditions the next 
member, and so on resulting in old-age and death (jaramarana).
In such a way the origin of the world of suffering is explained.
This is compatible with the second Noble Truth. The reversal sequence, 
however, shows the means by which suffering can be eradicated.
By the cessation of ignorance (avidya) the other eleven factors 
are incapable of arising. This is basically compatible with the 
third of the Noble Truths. In fact there are sections of the Nikayas 
in which the Buddha states that the doctrines of suffering (duhkha) 
and its cessation (nirodha) are the heart of the teaching.
"Formerly, and now also, bhikkhus, it is just suffering and 
the cessation of suffering that I proclaim". (15)
This seems to be reiterated in the Buddha's instructions to Udayin 
in which there is an implicit linkage between the two sequences 
of the pratityasamutpada formula (ie. forward and reverse)} and the 
Buddhist Pharma.
"Wherefore, Udayin, let be the past, let be the future. I 
will teach you Pharma. When this is, that is; this arising, 
that arises. When this is not, that is not; this ceasing, 
that ceases." (16)
Now on the connection between the Four Noble Truths and Dependent
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Origination, Lamotte has written an illuminating article. ^1^
He notes the connection between the forward and reversal sequence 
of pratityasamutpada with the second and third truths respectively.
On the four truths he comments:-
"... in dealing with the four Tryasatyas, the Ariguttara (I- 
pp 176-177) reproduces, for the first and fourth, the wording 
of the Sermon of Varanasi, but defines the second by stating 
the Pratityasamutpada in direct order, and the third by the 
PratTtyasamutp^da in inverse order. Under such conditions, 
it is difficult to see how one could acquire knowledge of the 
four Noble Truths without discovering through so doing the 
law of Conditioned Co-production and vice-versa." (18)
From the fact that the texts make a strong connection between the
doctrines of the Four Noble Truths and Pratityasamutpada it is clear
that the discovery of both is the sine qua non of an enlightened
(19)being. The Mahavastu confirms this when it identifies supreme
and perfect enlightenment with knowledge of the Four Noble Truths, 
the complete destruction of the impurities (asrava), the Pratltyasam- 
utpada in direct and reverse order, and the fourfold dharmoddana 
(ie. impermanence, suffering, non-self, peace).
Now it may be noted that the two sequences of pratTtyasamutpada 
do not come into the range of the first and fourth Noble Truths 
and it may be objected therefore that the two doctrines are not 
fully compatible. If we look at these particular truths however 
we shall see that there is no real problem. With regard to the 
former it is clear that it is a bland assertion of a fact, ie.that 
everything is conditioned by suffering. The first truth therefore 
does not have the force of an explanatory statement It is in fact
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the second truth which explains the origin of the first. Thus while 
the first and second members of the Four Noble Truth formulation 
are traditionally held to be separate, it is clear that the first 
without the second has little meaning from a soteriological point 
of view. The second illuminates the first and in a logical sense 
they collapse into one another. Similarly the relationship between 
the third and fourth Noble Truths may be simplified. Since.the 
third, in its connection with the reversed pratityasamutpada formula/ 
explains the mechanics by which cessation (nirodha) comes about, 
the fourth truth may be seen as an elaboration of this fact with 
particular reference to the field of soteriology, for practicing 
the path (marga) is equivalent to the gradual bringing about of 
an end to ignorance (avidya) and its concomitants. In a sense therefore 
one may be justified in regarding the Buddha's earlier quoted statement, 
that he proclaimed simply suffering and its cessation as a
reference to two processes,ie.the arising of ignorance and its cessation. 
In other words the doctrine of pratityasamutpada is quite compatible 
with the Four Noble Truth doctrine and these two must hereafter 
be considered as interchangeable formulations representing the central 
Buddhist understanding of things.
Now each of the twelve links in the classical pratityasamutpada 
formula are said to be:
"impermanent ( anicca), conditioned (sankhata), that which has 
arisen dependently (paticcasamupanna), that which has the nature 
of withering away (khayadhamma), that which has the nature 
of passing away (vayadhamma), that which has the nature of 
fading away (viraghdhamma) and that which has the nature of 
coming to cease (nirodhadhamma)" . 1-21)
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The individual links therefore must not be considered as eternal &  
ultimate existents, but rather as factors which arise through the 
principle of dependency (idappaccayata); the principle by which 
all the factors are related. Since the links are impermanent (anicca) 
they are consequently suffering (dukkha) and not self (anatta) for:
"That which is impermanent is suffering (dukkha). That which 
is suffering is not self (anatta) and that which is not-self 
is not mine (na mama)... In this way one should see this as 
it really is (yathabhutam) with right comprehension". (22)
Now the Abhidharmikas further sub-divided the causal process outlined 
by the 12 linked pratTtyasamutpada in such a way that the whole 
of reality may be understood as the interplay between 75 or so factors 
of existence (dharma), or fundamental building blocks. In consequence 
dependently originated things, cognized through the eyes of ignorance 
(avidya), must for the Abhidharma, be considered as unreal. Such 
false understanding, identified with the forward sequence of pratit­
yasamutpada and hence the Second Noble Truth inevitably leads to 
suffering (duhkha) and its associated conditions of old age and 
death (jaramarana). However^through the abolition of this diseased 
vision of things^the understanding dawns that dependently originated 
things are not ultimately real since they are in fact constructed 
from the true building blocks of reality; ie.the 75 (or so) dharmas.
For the Abhidharma therefore the reversal sequence of pratityasamutpada 
brings about the realization that the world of dependently originated 
things (ie. people, houses etc.) is unreal since the true state of 
affairs is reflected by the causal interplay of the dharmas. When 
the Abhldharmika sees things as they ar< (yathabhutam) he penetrates
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their conventional forms and understands their ultimate dharmic 
reality.
This is not necessarily how the teachings of the Nikayas should 
be interpreted however. This is because as a consequence of his 
theory the Abhidharmika must accept his ultimately real dharmas 
as being devoid of suffering (sukha), permanent (nitya) and possessing 
self (atman). To use Mahayanist language, the Abhidharmist is comm­
itted to the position that the dharmas possess substantiality or 
own-being (svabhava). Such a position was definitely not held in
the early period of Buddhist thought where all things (dhamma) are
(23)
conclusively held to be devoid of self (anatta). It seems
likely therefore that when the Buddha talks about seeing things 
as they really are (yathabhutam), he is not referring to the dharma 
theory of the Abhidharma.
It is clear from the texts that a person is only capable of seeing 
things as they are (yathabhutam) when in a state of mind inaccessible 
to the ordinary person. In other words, seeing things as they are 
(yathabhutam) is not synonymous with ordinary sense perception.
It is a different form of consciousness. Now we are told that:
"It is the true nature of things (dhammata) that a person in 
the state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees what 
really is (yathabhutam)." (24)
Jayatilleke interprets the above to mean that seeing things as they 
are (yathabhutam) is an entirely natural, and therefore not a 
supernatural occurrence. (25) He is therefore saying that the term
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dhammata simply means "it is natural that This may be true
in many instances of the appearance of the word "dhammata" , and 
(26)
in fact Rahula has demonstrated this to be so. However it
is difficult to believe that in this particular instance the Buddha 
is saying that it is natural for people to be in meditative states 
which lead to seeing things as they are (yathabhutam), when this 
is self-evidently not the case. The overwhelming majority of people 
do not see things as they are, according to Buddhism. What is more 
likely therefore, in this passage, is that seeing things as they 
are (yathabhutam) is equivalent to seeing the true nature of things 
(dhammata). This interpretation has the benefit of avoiding Jayatilleke's 
ingenuous rendering, but also corresponds more with further canonical 
references to the connection between yathabhutam and dhammata.
Following on from our previous quotation the Ariguttara Nikaya holds 
that one who sees things as they are (yatha bhutam) experiences 
the knowledge and insight of emancipation (vimutti-nanadassana).
v\tA— (28)
This particular attainment is often synonymous with panna.
One is led to make the conclusion from this, that what is "seen1' 
in panna must be the true nature of things (dhammata). For the 
Abhidharmikas dharmata would comprise the dharmic constituents of 
reality, so that seeing things as they are (yathabhutam) would 
indicate that the person capable of engaging panna has penetrated 
through the outward form into the essential dharmic structure of 
the object. However it is unclear that yathabhutam means such a 
thing in the Suttas. What is more likely is that the vision of 
dharmata is a vision of reality in which ignorance (avidya) has 
been uprooted, so that things are 10 longer obscured, but revealed 
in their true state, ie.as they are (yathabhutam). Such an understanding
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is certainly contained in metaphorical form in the Nikayas. The
statement
” ... just as if a man possessed of sight were to observe the 
reflection of his face in a basin of water disturbed, shaken, 
tossed about by wind and full of ripples, but fail to know 
and see (his face)as it really is (yathabhutam)." (29)
gives the impression of a distinction between a distorted and undist­
orted vision of the face, leading us to infer that seeing things 
as they are (yathabhutam) means seeing things unencumbered by any 
defect. Now while the Abhidharmic world view obviously coincides 
with this notion to a certain extent, there is no evidence in the 
Nikayas that a view of things devoid of distortion implies the 
knowledge of the dharmic constitution of reality. Rather the sense 
being conveyed is one in which a form of the correspondence theory 
of truth holds good. However this is a correspondence theory with 
a difference, the difference being that knowledge only corresponds 
with the external object once a process of meditative training 
has been undergone. Before such training the external object will 
be distorted through ignorance and its concomitants. Keith recognises 
this when he says that:
"The Buddha, like the sage of the Upanisad, sees things as 
they truly are(yathabhutam) by a mystic potency, which is 
quite other than reasoning of the discursive type." (30)
We have already noted that:
"... mental concentration is the cause of knowing and seeing 
things as they are". (31)-'
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and that such knowledge is sometimes referred to as panna (prajna). 
We may conclude this argument by asserting therefore that panna 
reveals things as they are (yathabhutam) and that this knowledge 
is knowledge of the true nature of things (dharmata). Since such 
knowledge is totally unobstructed by ignorance (avidya), and its' 
concomitants, it is ultimately true:
"Knowing things as they are, wherever they are, is the highest 
knowledge." (32)
It comes about through the application of a form of practice which 
leads to the destruction of the forward sequence of the pratTtya- 
samutpada. Taking up Keith's notion of a "mystic potency" however, 
one must not assume that such a vision corresponds to the Upanisadic 
realisation of the absolute primacy of the monistic Brahman. For 
the Buddhist prajna reveals a real world independent of thought 
construction (vikalpa), and false dichotomy (prapanca), both of 
which are engendered by ignorance (avidya). Since ignorance has 
been eradicated the knowledge of things as they are (yathabhutam) 
indicates:
"... what exists as "existing" and what does not exist as 
"not existing"." (33)
In other words the reversal sequence of pratityasamutpada through 
the destruction of ignorance, destroys the misconception of reality 
but does not negate reality itself, neither does it replace reality 
with an ontological absolute : uch as Brahman.
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The canon recognised three forms of prajna(34); that arising from 
the teaching (^rutamayi), that based on reflection (cintamayi) and 
that born from meditation (bhavanamayi) though only the last of 
the three brings about a total and complete freedom from samsara.
Commenting on that prajna which arises through meditative activity, 
which he calls wisdom devoid of impediment (prajna anasrava) , Yaisomitra
maintains that in such a state the object is perceived directly
—  —  —  _  (/\*—
(pratyaksarthatvat), excluding any inductive knowledge (anumanikajnana). It
— VA—
is non-subjective (adhimoksikajnana), has an object which is real 
(bhutarthatvat) and is consequently pure (visuddha).
One must conclude, from all that has been said, that an objective 
world, sometimes referred to as the true nature of things (dharmata) 
or its synonym dharmadhatu, is revealed to the knowledge of one 
who has completed the Buddhist path, which consists in engaging 
the reversal sequence of pratityasamutpada.
A hint that the true nature of things relates to a world independent
of thought, is contained in the Buddha’s condemnation of the idealistic
viewpoint of Sati Bhikkhu,who contends that:
"In so far as I understand the Pharma taught by the Buddha,
it is this consciousness (vinnana) itself that runs on fares
on, not another". (36)
Now since Pharma is itself a synonym for pratityasamutpada, as we 
have already noted, it seems equally true that the latter should 
not be understood as the running on of vijnana ie. in a subjective 
light. It seems that Jayatilleke (37) was correct to assign an
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objective existence to pratityasamutpada. In its forward sequence 
it is the cause of a distorted vision of the world equivalent to 
that of an unenlightened being, while in its reversal sequence it 
reveals the true nature of things (dharmata) consistent with the 
vision of an enlightened being. This true nature of things is 
sometimes referred to as element (dhatu) or suchness (tathata).
Let us now turn to the Mahayana understanding of pratityasamutpada 
to determine how^or if,it differs from what has already been,stated.
In the case of Nagarjuna there is much to recommend the view that 
pratityasamutpada is for him central. He opens MMK by stating:-
"I bow down to the Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught 
the dependent origination, free from dichotomous thought and 
auspicious (Isivam), being without destruction or production, 
neither created nor eternal, neither differentiated nor undiff­
erentiated and without coming or going." (38)
Expanding this key statement one may say that Nagarjuna accepts 
the teaching we have already discussed in which the central event 
in the career of the Buddha was the discovery of dependent origin­
ation (pratityasamutpada). Nagarjuna elaborates the doctrine by 
stating that pratityasamutpada should not be understood in a dogmatic 
sense since this method relies on the construction of false dichotomies. 
Implicit in such a position is the idea that one must maintain a 
middle course in order to come to a true understanding of pratltya- 
samutpada. This idea is made explicit in the course of MMK so that 
at one point the Buddhist path is actually connected to pratltyasamut- 
pada in the sense that c rrect understanding of this concept is
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the goal:
"Dependent origination we call emptiness. This is a meta­
phorical designation and is, indeed, the middle path". (39)
any attempt to put into words such a realisation being nothing but 
metaphorical designation (prajnaptirupadaya).
When it comes to a precise understanding of pratityasamutpada it 
is clear that Nagarjuna rejects the doctrine of the Sarvastivadin 
Abhidharma. We have noted that the latter depends upon the presuppos­
ition that each factor of existence possesses substantiality or 
own-being (svabhava). The problem with such a view is that the 
causal process implied in the pratityasamutpada doctrine runs into 
difficulties. If things are totally self-existent, how can they 
be causally related to anything else? This central paradox of the 
Abhidharmika system therefore is at the crux of Nagarjuna*s argument 
as presented in MMK, an argument which rejects the innovations of 
the Abhidarmikas while at the same time preserving the doctrines 
on pratityasamutpada which we have already isolated from the Nikayas. 
Thus Nagarjuna tells his opponent, who one assumes must be putting 
forward to Abhidharmic position,
"At nowhere and at no time can entities ever exist by origin­
ating out of themselves, from others, from both, or from a 
lack of causes ... In relational conditions the self-nature 
of entities cannot exist." (40)
Since one must accept dependent origination, and hence causality, 
[this being axiomatic to the whole Buddhist system]?the idea of
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self-existent entities (dharmasvabhava) must be rejected. Entities
must consequently be empty (sunya) of self nature (svabhava). The
opponent seizing on his opportunity contends that if Nagarjuna denies
the self existence of entities, then he must accordingly accept
the non-existence of the Four Noble Truths. In other words Nagarjuna
appears as a nihilist. This is an unreasonable charge. In the
first place denying the own-being of something by claiming that
thing to be empty (sunya) of own-being does not necessarily imply
that it is non-existent. The state of being devoid of own-being
(nihsvabhavata) is not a synonym for non-existence Nagarjuna responds
to his opponent by stating that it is he who does not understand
the true significance of emptiness ('sunyata). Nagarjuna maintains 
that:
"Any factor of existence which does not participate in relational 
origination cannot exist. Therefore, any factor of experience 
not in the nature of sunya cannot exist". (41)
In fact only the realisation of the emptiness of self existence of 
entities (dharmas) really allows the positing of dependent origination 
at all, since the system of the Abhidarmikas^by adherence to own-being 
(svabhava) makes nonsense of the Four Noble Truths.
"If everying were of the nature of non-sunya, then there would 
be neither production nor destruction ... Where could suffering 
in the nature of non-relational origination arise? ... The 
extinction of suffering in terms of self-nature does not happen ... 
If the way to enlightenment possesses self-nature, then its 
practice will not be possible." (42)
The acceptance of such a doctrine precludes the notion of Buddhahood
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"According to your assertion, anyone who is not a Buddha in 
virtue of self-existence cannot hope to attain enlightenment 
even by serious endeavour or by the path of the Bodhisattva" . (43)
By implication the Abhidarmika falls into the same camp as those 
teachers such as Makkhali Gosala and Purana Kassapa whose teachings 
are without a basis (ahetuvada). Further, by asserting own-being 
(svabhava), the Abhidharmikas negate the possibility of a graduated 
path to enlightenment and preclude the notion of causality as such, 
since,
"From the standpoint of self-existence, the world will be removed 
from the various conditions and it will be non-originative, 
non-destructive and immovable". (44)
At the end of the chapter dealing with the Four Noble Truths in MMK, 
Nagarjuna affirms the central idea we have already discussed with 
reference to the Nikayas, ie. that the pratTtyasamutpada formula is 
interchangeable with the Four Noble Truths. Nagarjuna accepts the 
centrality of these two doctrines and goes on to add that without 
an understanding of pratTtyasamutpada the 4 Truths will remain a 
mystery:
"One who rightly discerns dependent origination will, indeed, 
rightly discern suffering, its origination, its extinction, 
and the path to enlightenment." (45)
The implication in all of this must be that whether one understands 
reality to be comprised of entities such as people, mountains, houses etc. 
(ie. the commonsense view), or of more fundamental building blocks
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such as the dharmic constituents of reality (the position of the 
Abhidarmikas), one is still attached to an essentialist view of 
things. These views both rely on the idea of self existent entities 
possessing own-being (svabhava) which Nagarjuna has shown to be erroneous 
since it does not conform with the central discovery of the Buddha - 
that things are mutually dependent. This being so the world view 
of a person holding such a conception is deluded. Only understanding 
reality in terms of pratTtyasamutpada working on the basis of entities 
(dharma) devoid of own being (nihsvabhavati) leads through eradication 
of ignorance (avidya) to the seeing of things as they are (yathabhutam)
In MMK, the twelve fold formula of pratityasamutpada is dealt with 
in the traditional manner, first in the forward sequence and then 
in the reverse. Once again the forward sequence, beginning with 
ignorance, is understood to lead to samsaric states of existence.
"Those who are deluded by ignorance create their own threefold 
mental conformations in order to cause rebirth and by their 
deeds go through the various forms of life (gati)." (46)
the threefold conformations (tridhasamskarah) being of body, speech 
and mind. The process initiated by ignorance (avidya) leads inexorably 
on to old-age, death etc. as we have seen it do in the formulae of 
the Nikayas. Nagarjuna adds:
"Consequently, the ignorant creates the mental conformations 
(samskarah) which form the basis of samsaric life. Thus the 
ignorant is the doer while the wise, seeing the true state of 
things (tattva), does not create." (47)
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The initiation of the reversal sequence of pratityasamutpada is 
a necessary preliminary for someone to enter the state of the wise. 
Through this process one understands the true state of things (tattva). 
The uprooting of the links in pratityasamutpada, a gradual process 
brought about through the cultivation of the Buddhist path, leads 
to the extinction of the states of existence characterised by suffering.
"when ignorance ceases mental conformations (samskarah) do 
not come into being. The uprooting of ignorance is dependent 
on the knowledge (jnana) of practicing (bhavaqa) [the Buddhist 
path]. By the cessation of every [link of pratTtyasamutpada] 
none functions. Thus this single mass of suffering is completely 
extinguished." (48)
From what we have said, with regard to Nagarjuna's understanding 
of pratityasamutpada, it seems clear that he follows very closely
the exegesis found in the Nikayas. Both sources regard the doctrine 
as central to the Buddhist experience and both regard it as essential 
to the understanding of the enlightened and the unenlightened state.
If one could isolate any innovation in the doctrinal development 
of the former it would merely be in his implied negative criticisms 
of the Abhidharmikas and his consequent introduction of the notion 
of emptiness. While both the Nikayas and Nagarjuna recognise the 
unenlightened state as being characterised by ignorance (avidya), 
dichotomous thought (prapanca), thought construction (vikalpa) etc.; 
Nagarjuna adds the proviso that the enlightened state may not be 
understood by the Abhidharmic fallacy since all things must, once 
ignorance has been uprooted, be devoid of^or empty of (sunya) all 
conceptions, including the notion of own-being (svabhava). Only 
then will the true objective state of things (tattvag dharmata g.
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tatha ta be seen as they are (yathabhutam). For Nagarjuna then, 
this is the meaning of emptiness (sunyata), which, we have noted 
already, he uses as a synonym for pratityasamutpada. As Yamada
says:
"Emptiness (sunyata), then, is not another entity or absolute 
on which dharmas are based or from which phenomenal existences 
originate, but it is a ... principle of how the most concrete 
things exist in the matrix of factors of existence, which 
are related interdependently and which are present at the 
eternal now and boundaryless here." (50)
When one turns to the doctrine of dependent origination (pratitya­
samutpada) in the writings of the Yogacara, one is immediately 
conscious of the desire amongst modern scholars to maintain a radical 
distinction between the understanding of this concept by Asahga 
and Vasubandhu^and that of the Madhyamaka. Stcherbatsky, for instance, 
maintains that Asanga's Madhyantavibhanga was written to indicate 
the middle course between the extremes of the Madhyamaka and the 
Sarvastivada. However Stcherbatsky has no textual basis on which 
to form such an opinion. Sthiramati, commenting on the text reveals
that the two extremes being avoided by Asahga are firstly the blanket
_ _ (5 1)
denial of everything (sarvapavadapratisedhartham) and secondly
the belief that form (rupa) etc. is substantial (dravyata) and
hence existing independently of the mind and its concomitants
(52)
(cittacaittah). The first extreme is clearly the extreme
of nihilism (ucchedavada), which we have already shown is itself 
avoided by the Madhyamaka, so Stcherbatsky is quite incorrect in 
asserting that Asanga's doctrine is at odds with the Madhyamaka 
on this point. There is more reason for maintaining that the second
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position is one held by the Sarvastivada, but it seems far more 
likely that when Sthiramati points out that Asanga's doctrine avoids 
extremes he is merely indicating that, along with all other mainstream 
Buddhist authors, he steers a middle course between the nihilism 
and eternalism of the non-Buddhist systems. There is no evidence 
that it is in Asanga's mind to condemn the doctrines of other Buddhists.
Asanga's position on pratityasamutpada is actually tied up with a 
concept we have already dealt with. This is the imagination of 
the unreal (abhutaparikalpa). This term steers clear of the two
(53)extremes since it is said to exist, though it is free of duality.
In other words, the concept of abhutaparikalpa. Is not nihilistic, 
since it is an existent, yet at the same time It is non-eternal 
because it is devoid of the subject/object (grahyagrahaka) dichotomy 
which gives rise to the notion of eternal, substantial entities 
containing own-being (svabhava). It is devoid, therefore, of the 
imagined nature (parikalpita svabhava). At another place abhuta
(5 4 )
parikalpa is given as a synonym for paratantra svabhava - the
dependent nature; the second of the three natures expounded by the 
Yogacara.
We have already dealt with the three natures in the previous chapter. 
loJe found that paratantra has a pivotal role in the theory. It can 
be externalised through imaginative activity as the imagined nature 
(parikalpitasvabhaTva), or in its pristine condition it is necessarily 
uncontaminatad; this circumstance being referred to as the accom­
plished nature (parinispannasvabhava). The accomplished of course 
represents a level of knowledge in which independent existence of
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self and other are precluded and there is perfect union of knewer 
and known, epistemology and ontology, m  this state things are seen 
as they are (yathabhutam). This is conveyed by the Trimsika;-
"The accomplished nature is the latter’s (ie.the dependent 
nature's) perpetual devoidness of the former (ie.the imagined 
nature)." (55)
Reality (tattva) may of course be incorrectly cognized 
through the eyes of ignorance, or, conversely, purged of ignorance 
so that it is seen as it is (yathabhutam). One would expect the 
latter manner of "seeing" to be described by words such as tathata, 
dharmata, sunyata etc. if what we have already noted with regard 
to the pratityasamutpada doctrine has also been taken up by the Yogacara.
This is in fact so. Let us concentrate our attention on one text:
the Madhyantavibhanga. This text has an unusual version of the 12 
limbed formula. Asanga maintains that:
"This world (jagat) is defiled by (i) being concealed, (ii)
being raised, (iii) being led, (iv) being seized, (v) being
completed, (vi) being trebly determined, (vii) enjoying, (viii) 
being attracted, (ix) being bound, (x) being orientated and 
(xi - xii) being subjected to suffering." (56)
and Vasubandhu, in his commentary (bhasya) on these two verses, gives 
the traditional 12 members of the formula as alternatives to the 
ones^above making it perfectly clear what Asanga is talking about.
This discussion takes place in the context of the dependent nature 
(paratantra = abhutaparikalpa) when contaminated by the imagined
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nature (parikalpita). Under such circumstances:
"The imagination of the unreal (abhutaparikalpa) is citta as 
well as caittas belonging to all the three worlds." (57)
since the imagination of the unreal (abhutaparikalpa), like the 
dependent nature (paratantra) is the basis for the arising of ign9rance,
as has already been remarked in the previous chapter. This
quotation is in fact highly reminiscent of a section of the 
Dasabhumikasutra which is considered canonical by both the
Madhyamaka and Yogacara. That the triple world is synonymous with 
an unenlightened world view contaminated by the implication of own- 
being (svabhava) to entities which is itself conditioned by ignorance 
(avidya) is brought out by Sthiramati's commentary on this verse.
"Citta and caittas operate with reference to the own-nature
and qualities of the things which though unreal are imagined." (59)
In fact exactly the same sentiments are expressed in the opening 
stanza of Vasubandhu's Uimsatika". Let us now ascertain what relation­
ship, if any, the three-nature doctrine has with the concept of 
dependent origination. As we have already noted, particularly with 
reference ot the mangalasloka of MMK, dependent origination defines 
the ontological condition of things prior to thought. This state of 
things is so whether a Buddha exists or not. Using Whiteheadian 
terminology we may be tempted to suggest that for the Buddhist 
reality is a process.
uJe know that another way in which pratTtyasamutpada is prse nted in 
the literature is as a forward and reverse sequence, respectively 
defining the processes of bondage and release. Je are now in the
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position to reconcile what appears, on the surface, to be two 
irreconcilable notions* Pratityasamutpada, in the first sense of 
ontological process, is objectified as a mass of discete, substantial 
entities* This movement away from initial integrity is put in train 
by ignorance (avidya) and leads to suffering (duhkha). This is the 
forward sequence of the formula. However through taking the approp­
riate measures (ie. following the Buddhist path) an individual may 
destroy his ignorance and restore the original integrity. This 
involves initiating the reversal sequence and leads to nirvana. In 
this state no differentiation exists and consequently nirvana is 
not to be assumed to be a form of knowledge in which external reality 
is presented to the senses, for in this state epistemology and 
ontology have been transcended.
"From the non-perception of the duality [of subject/ 
object] there arises the perception of the dharmadhatu.
From the perception of the dharmadhatu there arises 
the perception of unlimitedness". (60)
and this is unsurpassed enlightenment. Here l/asubandhu identifies 
the perception of the dharmadhfatu with the purging of imagination 
from reality. The imagined nature corresponds to the forward sequence 
of pratTtyasamutpada. The extirpation of imagination returns the 
dependent (paratantra) to its pristine condition as the accomplished 
(parinispanna), for the accomplished is nothing more than tha dep­
endent in its non— contaminated form; completely devoid of all 
dichotomies. The accomplished nature then represents the dawning
tA _
of prajna which Vasubandhu terms supramundane knowledge (lokottara- 
jnana) since it transcends the world view presented by the imagined 
nature. Having disrupted the false dichotomies on which such a 
world view is based this supramundane knowledge^or state of realis­
ation's
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”... the pure element (anasravadhatu), incomprehensible,auspicious 
and unchangeable, being delightful it is the emancipated body 
(vimuktikaya) which is also called the dharma of the great sage." (61)
The accomplished nature (parinispannasvabhava) of the Yogacara is 
therefore a concept quite interchangeable with the completion of 
the reversal sequence of pratityasamutpada, both representing identical 
forms of spiritual attainment. The reversal sequence likewise merely 
restores the integrity of the initial, indeterminate and undiff­
erentiated condition of things. All the synonyms that we are accustomed 
to associate with this state, from our earlier researches, are found
with reference to the accomplished nature. Vasubandhu for instance
says that^since it is totally devoid of any false dichotomies^it 
reveals:-
"The ultimate state of things (dharmanam paramartha) and this 
is also (called) suchness (tathata)". (62)
At this stage one realises that up to now one has taken products
** - -of discursive thought to be real (vijnaptimatrata), attains an 
understanding of things devoid of thought construction (nirvikalpajnana) 
and sees things as they are (yathabhutadarsana) .
Ule noted in the last chapter that Asanga held pratTtyasamutpada and 
paratantra to be synonymous. It is now clear why this is so. They 
both operate in a way that makes sense of the worldly discrimination 
between the ignorant and the enlightened state. Ignorance is a 
separation from them; enlightenment is the re— establishment of unity.
The explanation of these two states is undertaken with either 
pxatTtyasamutp"ada or paratantra at the basis in all the Buddhist 
writings we have examined, be they the Nikayas, Nagarjuna, Asanga 
or V/asubandhu.
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All our authors therefore recognise the centrality of pratityasamutpada/ 
paratantra that unpredicable state of things which provides the rationale
for the arising of bondage/release, svabhavata/sunyata, samsara/ 
nirvana, defilement/purification, samvrti/paramartha, duhkha/sukha, 
parikalpita/parisnispanna, etc. The first half of each set rep­
resents an epistemic falling away and consequent objectification 
of the real state of things, while the second, as the uprooting
of the first, reveals things in their ultimate stats where the dis­
tinction between epistemology and ontology no longer holds.
Because of the inherent contra-dictions of language the state referred to by the 
second part of the pair is inexpressible (anabhilapya) and can never
be known in the way things of the world are known, since true under­
standing transcends the subject/object dichotomy. Since it is empty 
(sunya) of all predicates one can only speak metaphorically about it;
"Suchness, the extreme limit of existence, the uncaused, absolute­
ness, the dharmadhatu; these are summarily the synonyms of
emptiness". (64)
or use the apophatic terminology characteristic of negative mysticism.
It is clear that the doctrine of pratityasamutpada provides the 
key to the understanding of the two fold truth, the three nature 
teachings, and their eventual harmonisation. Pratityasamutpada 
is reality as such, unpredictable in terms of existence or non-existence.
This is confirmed by the Buddha's statement that it exists independently 
of the rising of a Buddha, by Nagarjuna's mangalasloka of MMK which 
merely reiterates the previous statement, and by the Yogacara doctrine 
of the dependent nature (paratantra). In its defiled state this
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base proliferates in 12 stages, according to the twelve fold pratTt­
yasamutpada formula, through the agency of ignorance. This gives 
rise to samsara, the imputation of own-being (svabhava) to entities^ 
the conventional truth (samvrtisatya)^  or the imagined nature (parikalpita)^  
since all are synonymous. However when the 12 stages are reversed, 
ignorance is uprooted. Hence nirvana, the ultimate truth (paramartha- 
satya) and the accomplished nature (parinispanna) are achieved.
Here again these are all synonymous. Having achieved such a state 
one understands things as they are, devoid and therefore empty (sunya)
of the previously imputed own-being (svabhava). They are then seen
as mutually dependent (pratityasamutpada).
When all is said and done the understanding of the distinction between 
saipsara and nirvana etc. can only come about as the result of following 
the Buddhist path and not through philosophical discourse. As Nagarjuna 
has it:
"All perceptions as well as false dichotomies are [essentially] 
of the nature of cessation and quiescence. No dharma whatsoever 
of any kind was ever taught by the Buddha." (65)
For the enlightened reality itself is not an object of knowledge
for such knowledge would presuppose articulation. The gnosis of the 
the Buddha has no object. The Buddha is ultimately silent.
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Chapter Eight
The Problem of Idealism
There are many sections of the Pali Tripitaka, which on casual scrutiny,
leave the impression that an idealistic line is being put forward.
The opening stanza of the Dhammapada, for instance, asserts that
things (dharmas) are dependent on mind (manas); this mind being primary
(1 )while dharmas are secondary. Similarly, at another point we hear 
that:-
"By mind (citta) the world is controlled, by mind it is eman­
cipated. By this one element, of the mind alone, are all things 
secured." (2)
or again
"0 Bhikkhu, the world is led by mind (citta), by mind is it 
drawn along. When mind has arisen it (ie.the world) goes under 
its sway." (3)
There is a strong flavour here of a doctrine which we find much repeated 
in the Mahayana, finding its classic formulation in the Dasabhumik- 
asutra, to the effect that:-
- (A)
"This triple world is nothing but mind (cittamatram)".
Now we have just stated that the evidence of such quotations is not 
sufficient to make the charge of idealism stick and it will be our 
present task to examine this problem in a little more detail.
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The opening stanza of the Dhammapada continues by claiming mind (citta)
(3 )
to be the base for defilement and purification , a doctrine which
is supported by reference to other sections of the Tripitaka. Thus
"By the defilement of the mind (citta) are beings defiled; by 
the purification of the mind (citta) are beings purified." (6)
l/\ —•
We understand from this therefore, that the mind (citta/manas/vijnana -
(7 )since according to the Buddha all terms are synonymous ) 
itself, is capable of understanding things from the defiled or the 
purified point of view depending on its own condition. This is 
entirely in conformity with the understanding we arrived at in the 
last chapter during our consideration of the general features of 
the pratTtyasamutpada formula in both the Hinayana and the Mahayana. 
Things (dharma) themselves are not totally constructed by mind, but 
rather the mind has a structure which permits two basic epistemological 
orientations towards an external reality. As we have reiterated 
many times already, when the mind operates under the condition of 
ignorance (avidya), then the world picture becomes distorted as the 
result of a complex of karmic causes - this is the aspect of defilement; 
however when ignorance has been eradicated the mind operates in its 
wisdom (prajna) mode, where transformations of one kind or another 
cease to come into being and things appear as they are (yathabhutam).
What becomes apparent is that Buddhism, since it accepts the possibility 
of a revolution in the way we actually see the world, may not be 
easily defined in terms abstracted from Western philosophical jargon. 
This is because Western systems both secular and religious generally
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fail to accept the notion of the perfectibility of man to the extent 
employed in the East. Buddhism, in consequence, may only be so 
defiled when small portions of it are examined in vacuo. In a partial 
sense we may decide that the Buddhist understanding of the workings 
of the unenlightened mind approximates to certain sense-datum theories 
of contemporary philosophy, while again we may feel that the treatment 
of the enlightened state is conducive to a more realistic interpret­
ation. However the overall package presented by Buddhist thought 
as a whole has a structure quite different to that of mainstream 
Western thought. We will be wiser therefore to treat this pattern 
of thought in a different manner.
For the Buddhist, external reality exists, but not in a way which 
can be usefully articulated from the soteriological point of view.
The mind similarly exists, though the precise nature of its form 
of existence is likewise problematic. The mind does seem to possess 
a variable structure. We may imagine it as a mirror which, under 
certain conditions [ie.those conducive to wisdom (prajna)3, produces 
an accurate image of externality. However should conditions become 
inappropriate, the structure of the mirror loses its immaculacy, 
becoming dislocated and distorted, consequently producing images 
much the same as those generated by the crazy mirrors popular in 
fairgrounds today. Extending our metaphor a little more, we may 
add that the clear, uncontaminated mirror would be responsible for 
a pure reflection while the distorted mirror would appear intimately 
connected with defilement, ie. a distorted reflection, along the 
lines already noted in our Buddhist context.
The early Buddhists themselves employ just such a system of metaphors
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to account for* the enlightened and unenlightened states. In the 
Nikayas we may note as an important seminal statement the fact that:-
"This mind, 0 monks, is luminous though contaminated by advent­
itious defilements; that mind, 0 monks, is luminous since it 
is cleansed of adventious defilements". (8)
The notion of a naturally luminous mind is a metaphor quite analogous
to the clear mirror we constructed above and was in fact an image
used not only by the Sthaviras but also the Mahasamghika, Andhaka 
(9)and Vibhajyavada. A very similar idea, found in the Chinese
Agamas, also has its root in the Pali Tripitaka.
"Beings are defiled by the impurities of the mind and purified 
by the cleansing of the mind". (10)
The cleansed mind of this verse is undoubtedly the same as the luminous 
mind (prabhasvara citta) of the previous extract and it is interesting 
in this connection to note that Monier-Williams, in his Sanskrit-Englisk 
dictionary, gives "enlightened" as one of the meanings of prabhasvara.
It seems reasonable to assume then that the term "luminous" is a 
metaphor for enlightened when in connection with the notion of mind, 
and there is therefore no good reason to hold the prabhasvara citta 
to be some sort of monistic absolute with a strongly idealistic 
flavour, such as Sankara's Brahman. This would be totally unexpected 
anyway considering the traditional opposition of Buddhism to the 
Upanisadic systems.
Another synonym for the enlightened mind, very often associated
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with prabhasvara citta is the innate mind (citta prakrti). Takasaki 
holds that such a concept was rejected by the Sarvastivada^but was
nevertheless accepted by many schools including the Theravada,
_ _  ___ ( 1 1 ) _
Vaibhasika, Vatsiputriya and the Mahasamghika. The Astasahasrika
C*. —  _  —
Prajnaparamita actually equates the two in the statement that "the
(12 )
innate nature of mind is luminous" , and doctrines describing 
the mind (citta) in this manner are found throughout the history 
of the Mahayana, as well as in the earliest texts.
Other longer recensions of the Prajnaparamita" extrapolated from 
the luminous mind (prabhasvara citta) concept to the notion that 
the mind is devoid of the contamination of the defilements in its 
enlightened state.
"Sariputra said, "What is it that the luminous mind consists 
of?" Subhuti replied, "The luminosity of the mind 0 Sariputra 
is such that it is neither associated with passion nor non­
associated with it. It is neither associated with hate, delusion, 
the irruptions, the obstructions, the residues, the hindrances 
and the false views nor non-associated with them." (13)
It is interesting to note here that we have a neither ... nor 
relationship between the luminous mind and the various contamimants 
and May makes the pertinent comment:-
"De telles formules contradictoires apparaissent frequemment 
dans les Prajnaparamita et dans les ouvrages Madhyamika", elles 
s'y referent toujours au rapport sui generis qui existe entre 
la verite empirique et la verite absolue. Dans le cas partic- 
ulier, la pens£e (citta) peut-etre associee, en verite' relative, 
avec les passions qui, rappelons-le, sont adventices (agantuka), 
c 1est-a-dire existent exclusivement sur le planjju relatif. ^ 
Mais, en verite absolue, l ’autonomie de la pensee, sa limpidite, 
sa luminosity sont parfaites. On retrouvera dans le Vijnanavada 
ce double point de vue, applique au vijnana". (14)
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May indicates the connection between this particular line of thought 
and the two truth doctrine of the Madhyamaka. There is also an 
implicitly continuous development to be drawn out here. From May's 
statements one may trace a coherent line of thought leading from
—  IA _  _
the Nikayas, through Prajnaparamita and Madhyamaka which reaches
its conclusion in the Yogacara/Vijnanavada. This is of course the
line of development we have argued for throughout this thesis.
While Nagarjuna does not himself make the connection between the
conventional truth (samvrti) and the mind contaminated by adventitious
defilements (agantukaklesa), it is abundantly clear, particularly
with reference to what has been said in Chapter Six above, that
the conventional is the mentally constructed. This seems to be
_
the gist of the Prajnaparamita texts, in particular the later ones 
when samvrtiis mentioned, and is certainly the sense of the Yogacara 
notion of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhava). In its uncontam­
inated, innately luminous, condition the mind reveals things as
    v A ___^
they are (yathabhutam) which the Prajnaparamita & Madhyamaka term 
the ultimate point of view (paramartha), and the Yogacara (and 
incidentally the Maitreya chapter of the Prajnaparamita) calls 
the accomplished nature (parinispannasvabhava). Since we have 
noted that, in their representative works, the authors of these 
"schools" acknowledge an intermediate ontological term which gives 
efficaciousness to the two states of mind, we must conclude that 
the doctrine of luminous mind (prabhasvaracitta) does the same.
In other words, while it may be understood that the innate character 
of the mind is such that it gives an accurate picture of the world, 
this does not preclude the ubiquitous possibility that such a state 
of the mind may be adversely conditioned such that the picture
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accessible becomes far from accurate.
In another Mahayana text, the Samadhirajasutra, the concept of
the luminous mind is linked to the inverse pratityasamutpada formula
such that the luminosity of mind only appears once the conceptions
(samj na) which give rise to name and form (nama-rupa) etc. have
(15)
been suppressed. This clearly supports our viewpoint and,
with what has already been said so far, conclusively demonstrates 
the fact that the luminous mind is not a monistic absolute besides 
which all other existents have a dream-like status. It is rather 
an epistemic condition of mind, in which the processes associated 
with the unenlightened state have ceased. This being so it is 
sometimes referred to as no-mind. Quite apart from textual evidence 
the doctrine cannot be in any way indicative of monism or idealism 
on grounds purely connected with internal consistency. If one 
accepts, and this appears to be axiomatic in Buddhism, that the 
vast majority of sentient beings, since they are bound to the cycle 
of birth and death (samsara) and subsequently labour under the 
conditions of ignorance (avidya), are unenlightened while at the 
same time holding out the possibility of enlightenment, one is 
consequently forced to hold that there must be two possible states 
of mind; one veridical, the other not so. Now we noted in the 
previous chapter that Buddhism rejects those teachings without 
a basis (ahetuvada), such as the IjTvaka doctrines, which suggest 
that things came about independently of causes. Since the luminous 
mind (prabhasvara citta), though possibly innate, is still never­
theless only fully operative in a small minority of sentient beings 
(ie.the enlightened), it cannot be a state of mind shared by all,
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for the corrolary of this would be that all beings are enlightened, 
which we have already admitted is axiomatically not so. The ignorant 
being moves to a state of wisdom (prajna) by means of a gradual 
process, this being the Buddhist path, and not through no cause 
at all. This being so the luminous mind, since it is not fully 
shared by all in its fully operative sense, cannot be an all encomp­
assing psychic entity like Jung’s collective unconscious, but must 
refer to the condition of an individual's mind at a certain stage 
of spiritual development.
It may be argued that the contaminations of its luminosity, since 
they are adventitious (agantuka), are never essentially part of 
the mind and in consequence its innate nature is never really 
defiled. Such a position would undoubtedly be adopted by some 
Vedantist schools but this idea sits poorly on the Buddhist tradition. 
Firstly, preserving the innate nature of mind deemphasises the 
disjunction between the enlightened and unenlightened state which 
as we have noted is axiomatic, and secondly, although it seems 
possible on the surface to construct a number of idealist positions, 
both monistic and pluralistic, from such a doctrine one is still 
left with the problem of the defilements. Since they come from 
without they may not be mental phenomena and one is left wondering 
what status they have. By accepting both an external reality, 
and individual minds capable of two fundamental epistemic orient­
ations to that reality, some of the problems we have encountered 
disappear, since adventitious defilement may then be resolved to 
be the result of a mind, in its delusory mode, making initial contact 
with external reality. Of course this begs the question of how
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the delusory process started in the first place, but this and questions 
of a similar order, are never seriously entertained by the Buddhist 
tradition. The story of Malunkyaputta1s questions and the Buddha's 
refusal to answer proves this point. Rather than speculating on 
questions concerning origins the Buddha relates a story of a man 
who, rather than accepting treatment for his ills, prefers to ask 
questions and consequently dies.
Before turning to the complex problem of whether in the Yogacara
the doctrine of mind gives rise to idealism, let us deal with one
further doctrine of early Buddhism which has sometimes provoked
such a charge. This is the teaching concerning the "limb of existence"
(bhavanga). Now this term only occurs in one section of the Pali
(16) — 
canon where it is said to precede reflection (avajjana) in
the process of perception, but it is nevertheless extremely wide-
tA
spread in post-canonical writings, particularly the Milindapanha, 
Visuddhimagga and the Abhidhamma commentaries. However^the main 
purpose of the doctrine is to demonstrate that there is a continuous 
mental stream persisting throughout an individual's life processes 
which can be used to explain memory, the survival of a being throughout 
numerous lives, and the karmic consequences of past actions.
A doctrine which only accepts the momentary sequence of self-contained 
points of consciousness is of course unable to do this adequately.
The recognition of the need for such a concept can be found in
W\lA_
canonical references to the stream of consciousness (vinnanasota), 
which seems to perform the same function as bhavanga does in the 
later literature.
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"... he understands a man’s stream of consciousness (vinnanasota) 
as uninterrupted at both ends and supported both in this world 
and in the other world". (17)
It is the vinnanasota?then^which allows the progress from one existence 
into another while still retaining an idea of continuity, and this 
concept seems, in the early literature, to provide the psychological 
counterpart to the stream of existence (bhavasota), a notion which
"give(s) expression to the Buddhist philosophical concept 
of flux, of life considered as a flowing stream, never the 
same for any two consecutive moments (Si15 & Siv. 128)". (18)
However, there is little evidence in the early material that the 
authors had given much thought to the implications of their theories 
of mind. For instance, we find little speculation concerning the 
problems raised by the condition of mind of a person in deep sleep 
or deep meditation, and its subsequent coherence with the standard 
theory of vinnanasota. In other words, if the mind is a sequence 
of thought points, never the same for any two consecutive moments, 
how does it become re-established once the flow is interrupted by 
deep sleep^etc.?
Such speculation was common among the Brahmanic thinkers who held 
that the state of deep, dreamless, sleep (susuptavastha) coincided 
with the primordial state of things (pragavastha); the corrolary 
being that a state such as deep sleep, since it corresponds with 
truth, is ultimately real.
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"when a man sleeps he becomes united with that which is, Somya; 
he has gone into his own self." (19)
One cannot help but speculate, although there is little hard evidence 
to support such a view, that the Buddhist notion of bhavanga represents 
an attempt to explain deep psychological processes in response to 
Brahmanic argumentation, without at the same time falling into the 
absolute monist position of the Upanisadic sages. The latter would 
have been quite out of the question as the Buddhists would have 
been
"... anxious to avoid making of bhavanga an unrelated, anoetic 
consciousness. To regard mind as the source of consciousness 
would be alien to the spirit of early Buddhism. Mind was always 
a conditional relationship. There could be no such thing as 
unconditioned mind... Consciousness always involves reference 
to an object". (20)
It is in the Milindapanha iciOOUD) that the problem seems first
to have been tackled. Replying to the King's inquiries about the
psychology of dreams and sleep, Nagasena states that, for a man
entered into a state of deep sleep, his thought (citta) has gone 
(21 )
into bhavanga. Now it should be noted that^in this example^
the term bhavanga is only used with reference to the problem of dreams 
and deep sleep and it would be unjustified in this instance to extend 
its use to questions concerning the carrying of karmic effects throughout 
long periods of time or the continuity of consciousness in the cycles 
of samsara. Bearing this in mind, one may spot an important difference 
between the theory of bhavanga and Upanisadic notions. For the 
Brahmanic tradition a person in deep sleep is united with the true 
nature (svarupa) of Brahma q which is pure being (sat). (22) However
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in the present theory when the mind (citta) has gone to bhavanga 
in the condition of deep sleep, such a state is merely a limb or 
aspect (ariga) of the universal flux of becoming (bhava). As 
Sarathchandra points out:-
"The word [ie bhavanga] had ... the necessary dynamic import 
to distinguish it from the ideas of soul in the Upanisads 
and other systems of Indian thought". (23)
Bhavanga therefore avoids reference to any soul-theory through its 
close association with the dynamic theory of causation (pratityasamut- 
pada) characteristic of Buddhism, while at the same time providing 
the possibility of understanding the continuity of consciousness 
and its concommitants. It does in fact seem probable that the elabor­
ation of a comprehensive theory of mind along these lines was precipit­
ated by arguments with rival schools, since:-
"For the Buddha the matter was of no consequence. He was only 
intent upon showing that empirical consciousness was evil and 
could be stopped and that intuitional consciousness [ie prajna] 
could be cultivated. He was not concerned with the problems 
of survival, and as far as it mattered to him, deep sleep 
might have been a mere physical state. But it was not possible 
for his adherents to maintain silence in the face of persistent 
questioning, particularly when all other systems were developing 
an elaborate metaphysic of their own." (24)
Now it would be a great mistake to take bhavanga to be equivalent 
to a permanent subconscious state as understood by contempor'ary 
Western psychological theory. In the Abhidharmic texts, in which 
the term appears frequently, it is quite clear that bhavanga is 
cut off when ratiocination takes place. Bhavanga merely represents
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mind in a passive condition, free from any thought processes (vTthimutta). 
When the mind becomes active bhavanga becomes cut off (bhavangupaccheda) 
and a new state known as the process of cognition (vithicitta) takes 
over. Bhavanga therefore is not a condition of mind underlying 
the cognitive processes, and therefore once cognitive processes 
begin, bhavanga ceases, only to return when cognition has ceased.
Here we have a connection with the concepts of luminous mind (prabhas-
varacitta) and innate mind (cittaprakrti) , since when in a state
— • - - (25)
of bhavanga or vithimutti the Kathavatthu holds that the mind
is in its natural condition (pakaticitta), while the commentaries
(26 )identify it as shining (pabbassara) and natural (pakati). It
appears that bhavanga represents a pure, uncontaminated phase of 
mental activity to be distinguished from those periods in which 
cognition is actively taking place, which for the un-enlightened 
person by definition involves ignorance (avidya) and consequently 
produces karma. Abhidharmic treatises confirm this. We find that 
they hold the consciousness of a new-born child to be of the essential 
nature of bhavanga which flows undisturbed after birth until it 
is disrupted by the first burst of conscious thought precipitated 
by perception. From them on all conscious activities follow the 
same pattern. Thus according to the Abhidhammatthasangaha:-
"When a visible object enters the focus of vision, at the first 
moment of its existence, it would have no effect on the percipient(1). 
Next there is a vibration of the stream of bhavanga (bhavarigacalana) 
for two moments, and a consequent interruption of the flow 
(2,3). There is no bhavanga any more, and instead there begins 
a conscious process, the first step of which is the moment 
of adverting (avajjana 4). In the subsequent moments^there 
follow in succession the visual impression (cakkhuvinnana,
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5), recipient consciousness (sampatticchana, 6), investigating 
consciousness (santTrana 7), determining consciousness (vott- 
habbana, 8), seven moments of full perception (javana, 157^ 
and finally two moments of retention or registering consciousness 
(tadarammana, 17). This completes the seventeen moments and 
after that bhavanga begins to flow again until it is interrupted 
by a stimulus". (27)
Now the exact period of time, supposed by the Abhidharmikas to be 
17 thought moments taken for this process to be completed^is of 
no particular importance to our present enquiry. However^the basic 
structure of this schema is, since it confirms our previous work. 
Bhavanga is disturbed by an external stimuli which ultimately leads 
to a period of full perception (javana). Now javana is held to 
have the property of volition (cetana); in other words it gives 
rise to future karmas. In fact the relevant texts break down the 
seven javana moments into three groups depending on their power 
to generate future karmas. The first moment of the seven is said 
to be weakest since it lacks any sustaining force and the karmic 
effect of this must necessarily operate in the present life only.
The last moment is second weakest, its karmic effect only having 
the power to extend to the immediately subsequent life. The effects 
of the five remaining moments however are strong and held to operate 
at any time in the life continuum up until the final passing away 
(parinirvana).
What is of interest in this doctrine from our point of view is the 
basic structure given to cognition. The flow of bhavanga is interrupted, 
initiating a process which leads progressively to karma generating 
perception (javana), after which the stream of consciousness lapses
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back into bhavanga. This description must refer to the process 
undergone by a mind conditioned by ignorance (avidya), since for 
an enlightened being the twelve factors of pratityasamutpada have 
been uprooted and future karmas are not produced. One must assume, 
therefore,that for an enlightened being who sees things as they 
are , javana is either inoperative , or that it operates but without 
leaving any dispositions which lead to future action. Deciding 
this question is complex and leads us back to the essential difference 
between the Buddhist and Upanisadic concepts of mind.
(28)
S. Z. Aung makes the comment that some authorities on the Adhidharma
are of the opinion that javana never obtains in the dream process.
(29)
Sarathchandra points out that dreaming is "regarded as a cognitive
process with the exception that it occurs through the door of the 
mind" (manodvara) rather than as in the previous example in which 
it takes place through the door of one of the five external senses 
(pancadvara), ie.the eye. Dreaming,therefore,according to Aung’s 
authorities,would not be karma generating since j avana does not 
obtain,even though a thought object is held to have been presented 
to consciousness through the door of mind (manodvara). In such 
a theory dreaming must approximate to the state of understanding 
available to an enlightened being, since both seem capable of cognitions, 
though neither generates karmas as a consequence. The Abhidharmika 
tradition of Sri Lanka does not agree with this. In its view,
the obtaining of javana is not dependent on waking or dreaming but 
rather on the intensity of the stimulus involved in initiating a 
process of cognition. In other words karma may obtain whether someone 
is awake or asleep.
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The overall impression of bhavanga related doctrines is that they 
represent an attempt to address some of the objections raised by 
Upanisadic theories of mind without generating identical theories 
under a different guise. Unfortunately accepting the challenge 
of the soul theory of the Brahmanas while at the same time proposing 
a personal continuity represented by bhavanga, leads anyone who 
pursues that path of argumentation, three-quarters of the way towards 
the Upanisadic position. The only way to camouflage the close 
proximity of the two is for the Buddhist to propound a concept which 
remains deliberately difficult to pin down, and this seems to be 
what happened. Bhavanga was postulated to explain psychic continuity 
during deep sleep and subsequently the carrying on of karmic factors, 
yet it is said to be cut off (bhavangupaccheda) during cognition; 
so how can it represent a "life continuum"? It corresponds to the 
function of the Upanisadic soul (atman) in that it is undisturbed
in deep,dreamless sleep but differs since it ceases to exist when 
cognition arises. Under most conditions, when bhavanga is cut off 
by a stimulus which leads to cognition, processes take place which 
result in the generation of future acts. However when ignorance 
(avidya) is uprooted this does not appear to happen, yet someone 
having reached such a state is said to see things as they are 
(yathabhutam), implying that there is cognition, though it is non-karma 
generating. In the state of undisturbed bhavinga the mind is said 
to be innate (prakpti) and shining (prabhasvara) yet this may be 
blemished by adventitious defilements (agantukaklesa). By its imprecise­
ness bhavanga clearly has become a device to protect Buddhist notions 
of moral and psychic continuity, while at the same time rejecting 
the soul theory of the Upahisads ,
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It seems clear that some idea of mental continuity probably pre-dates 
the rise of the Mahayana. What then does Nagarjuna have to say on 
the subject? There is actually little positive evidence for Nagarjuna's 
adherence to a doctrine of psychic continuity in his writings, but 
there again, there is no evidence to suggest the opposite. We have 
noted that time and again he supports traditional postures
and there is no reason to think that he does otherwise in this case. 
Certainly^it was common for schools of the proto-Mahayana to develop 
notions which served the same purpose in their system that bhavanga 
does in the systems we have already mentioned. The Mahasamghikas 
for example^held to the idea of a root consciousness (mulavijnana) 
visualised as the support (asraya) of the visual consciousness
tA . —
(caksurvijnana) and other sense consciousnesses in much the same 
way as the root of the tree provides support for its leaves, branches 
etc. Along similar lines the MahTsasakas distinguished between
three different groups of skandhas. The first were held to be 
instantaneous (ksanaskandha), the second to endure throughout a 
lifetime (ekajanmavadhiskandha), while the final group were supposed 
to endure until the end of samsara (samsarakotinisthaskandha) ie. 
until pari-nirvana is achieved. In his Karmasiddhiprakarana, Vasubandhu 
notes these doctrines and holds these particular conceptions to 
fulfill the same function as the idea of bhavanga (which he attributes 
to the Tamraparnlyas). Ultimately they are synonymous with his 
concept of a store-house consciousness (alayavijnana).
-  >A -  _  iA -
"Dans les sutras du Tamraparniyanikaya, ce Vijnana |ie. alayavijnana) 
est nornm'e" bhavangavijlriana; dans les sutras du M ah as amgh ik an ik ay a, 
mulavijnana; les MahTsasakas le nomment samsaranisthaskandha" . (32)
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Commenting on these various attempts to introduce continuity into 
psychic processes over extremely long periods of time Conze holds:-
"All these theoretical assumptions are attempts to combine 
the doctrine of "not-self" with the almost instinctive belief 
in a "self", empirical or true. The climax of this combination 
of the uncombinable is reached in such conceptual monstrosities 
as the "store-consciousness" (alayavijnana) of Asanga and 
a minority of Yogacarins, which performs all the functions 
of a "self" in a theory which almost vociferously proclaims 
the non-existence of such a "self". The "store-consciousness" 
is a fine example of "running with the hare and hunting with 
the hounds". (33)
_  t A -
Conze's judgement that the doctrine of alayavijnana is a conceptual
monstrosity clearly derives from his Prasangika leanings and a
strong opposition to Brahmanism in any shape or form. However
are his opinions borne out by textual evidence? As we have already
said Nagarjuna*s known writings contain no treatment of conceptions
such as bhavanga, while his only possible criticism of the Yogacara
notion of alayavijnana is to be found in the almost certainly
(34)
incorrectly attributed Bodhicittavivarana which contains
a seering wholesale indictment of Yogacara doctrines as such.
This seems particularly strange considering the fact that there 
is no evidence to support the use of the term Yogacara as a denot­
ation for a school of thought at the time of Nagarjuna. CandrakTrti, 
writing at least 400 years after Nagarjuna^does certainly quibble 
with the Yogacara. His opposition is based on the fact
that^from an ultimate point of view>there is no Buddhist teaching 
at all.
"What hearing and what teaching (can there be) of the syllable- 
less Dharma ? Nevertheless the syllableless (anaksara) is
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heard and taught by means of superimposition (samaropa)." (35)
From his point of view the ultimate doctrine cannot be articulated,
although at the conventional level (samvrti) articulation can convey
pragmatic truths. In other words all articulated truth must by
definition be conventional. He claims that the Yogacara disregard
such a convention by holding their doctrines to be true from the
ultimate point of view. By doing so, they are led astray. In fact
throughout his critique of the Yogacara he never disagrees with
their doctrine from the point of view of conventional truth
(sanvrtisatya) , he does not hold it to be lAcarrc-cfc or -^oAse ,
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on the road to no position. As Olsen says:-
"... it might be said that for Prasarigika Madhyamika all terms 
of justifiable provisional meaning, whether alaya or cittamatra,
or tathagatagarbha, can be defended as pragmatically useful
conventional truth, but the terms of final, explicit meaning 
are always negational : emptiness, non-origination ... No 
positive statement whatsoever can have final meaning." (36)
The criticism would be all very well if the Yogacara of Vasubandhu/ 
Asariga held the views attributed to it by CandrakTrti, but this 
is just not so. They do in fact agree with him that all dogmas 
must be, by definition, non-ultimate. They hold that the ilayavijnana 
itself be overthrown on the path to nirvana and the idea that the 
doctrine of Vijnaptimatra or cittamatra implies the ultimate and 
sole existence of mind as CandrakTrti, and many modern scholars 
along with him suggest, is laughable, as will be demonstrated by 
investigating the relevant materials.
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For Vasubandhu the alayavijnana performs a similar function to that 
of bhavanga in other schools. It explains the continuity of thought 
after deep sleep and demonstrates how the mind can maintain its 
functioning after the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti).
In fact in his Karmasiddhiprakarana he uses the fact of nirodhasamapatti 
as his prime proof for the existence of the store-consciousness
_ K , —  —
(alayavijnana). For him this samapatti is a state with mind (sacittaka) 
as against the position of the Vaibhasikas who hold it to be non­
mental ( acittaka) - the complete annihilation of mind and mental 
activity. To account for the rising of the mind after such an experience 
the Vaibhagikas maintain that the power of the thought moment prior 
to nirodhasamapatti is sufficient to explain the continuation of 
thought once this state has ceased. Vasubandhu objects to such 
a contention. He holds that the samapatti is a state which is
acittaka in the sense that the six categories of consciousness 
A-
(sadvijnanakaya) do not proceed, but is sacittaka in the sense that 
an underlying consciousness, the maturing consciousness (vipakavijnana), 
does continue to operate. This maturing consciousness (vipakavijnana)
—  iA-
is a synonym for the alayavijnana and this quite clearly performs 
the task that bhavanga accomplishes in other systems.
-  V » _
Rahula has conclusively demonstrated that the idea of an alayavijnana
—  —  (38) —
is not itself a novel idea for the Yogacara. The term alaya
is found many times in the Tripitaka of the Theravadins. Asanga
himself maintains that the idea is known in the Sravakayana, which
is his general term for the Hinayana, and he refers to a passage
(39)
from the Ekottaragama to back this point up. Lamotte nas been
able to find the parallel passage in the Pali.
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"Mankind are fond of the alaya, 0 bhikkhus, like the alaya, 
rejoice in the alaya; with the Tathagata they pay honour to 
the Dhamma, they listen and pay an attentive ear to perfect 
knowledge." (40)
Actually the term alaya crops up a number of times in the Pali canon
and the commentaries explain it to mean "attachment to the five 
(4 1 )
sense-pleasures". The alaya then is craved after by mankind
and involves implication in the world of sense enjoyment. Consequently
it has no ultimacy. In fact the expression "uprooting of the alaya"
~ (A2)(alayasamugghata) is employed in the Pali as a synonym for Nirvana
- - (43)while in another place Nirvana is said to be "without alaya" (analaya)
Alaya is destroyed on the path to nirvana according to these early
teachings. Since it does not survive the process of enlightenment
it cannot be said in the ultimate sense to be truly existent. We
have seen that bhavanga is a concept of the same order. It provides
a continuous background on which to explain "personal" identity
throughout existences, though since its operation is associated
with the generation of karma one must assume that in the enlightened
state it either ceases to function, or its mode of functioning is
dramatically altered.
In his analysis of vijnanaskandha Asanga makes the following observ­
ation:
"What is the aggregate of consciousness (vijnanaskandha)?
It is mind (citta), mental organ (manas) and also consciousness 
(vijnana). And there what is mind (citta)? It is the 
"alayavijnana containing all seeds (sarvabijaka) impregnated^ 
with the perfumings (vasanaparibhavita) of the skandhas, dhatus 
and ayatanas,.. What is the mental organ (manas)? It is the 
object of alayavijnana, always having the nature of self notion
-  2 5 ^  -
(manyanatmaka) associated with the four defilements, viz., 
the false idea of self (atmadrsti), self-love (atmasneha), 
the concept of "I am" (asmimaha) and ignorance (avidycT) .. .
What is consciousness (vijftaha)? It consists of the six groups 
of consciousness (sadvijfianakHya), viz.visual consciousness 
(caksurvijnana), auditory (drota) - olfactory (ghrana) - gustatory 
(jihva) - tactile (kaya) and mental consciousness (manovijnana)."(44)
Vasubandhu offers an identical scheme though he has it that manas% 
etc. are all evolved from consciousness by a process known as the
4A _  —
transformation of consciousness (vijnanaparinama). This transformation 
(parinama) or maturation (vipaka) also takes place in three stages,
_  IA_
the first being the alayavijnana which is said to contain all the 
seeds of defilement (sarvabijaka).
—  A  —
"It (ie.alayavijnana) exists as a flow, (ever changing) like 
a torrent. Its cessation occurs in attaining arhat-ship". (45)
This seems much the same as the Hinayana notion of bhavanga. The 
alayavijnana is a repository of karmic seeds due to reach fruition 
before parinirvana. It therefore provides the necessary psychic 
continuity without at the same time assuming the proportions of 
the Brahmanic self‘it ceases to function at the attainment of arhatship.
The statement that it flows onwards like a torrent links us firmly 
into the traditional understanding of mind as in a state of cont­
inuous flux. Commenting on the idea of evolution (parinama), Sthiramati 
maintains:
"Transformation means change (anyatharva). At the very moment 
at which the moment of cause comes to an end, the effect, different 
from the moment of cause, comes into being. This is transformation."(46)
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Sthiramati is simply reiterating the classic notion of the mind 
in a condition of ignorance (avidya). It is conditioned by the 
cause-effect relationship implicit in the forward sequence of the 
pratityasamutpada formula.
Going on to the second and third transformations, Vasubandhu repeats
what Asariga has already said. He does^however,add that the mind
organ (manas), the second transformation, is entirely absent in
nirodhasamapatti and for an adept on the supra-mundane path 
(47)
(lokottaramarga), while with regard to the six groups of conscious­
ness which comprise the third transformation, the mind consciousness
A —
(manovijnana) is continually in operation apart from certain exceptions:
"The five vijnanas rise in the root vijnana (mulavijnana =. 
alayavijnana) in accordance with the circumstantial cause 
(pratyaya), either together or alone; just like waves in the 
water. At all times there is the rise of mind consciousness 
with the exception of unconsciousness (asamjnika), the two 
kinds of attainment (ie asamjnisamapatti & nirodhasamapatti)  ^
unconscious sleep and faint". (48)
/
While this may certainly held for the Trimsika many scholars have
felt less convinced of the position of its companion work, the
Vimsatik'a. In his dicussion of this text Dasgupta, for instance
claims it to teach that;-
"...all appearances are but transformations of the prin­
ciple of consciousness by its inherent movement and none 
of our cognitions are produced by any external objects 
which to us seem to be existing outside of us and gener­
ating our ideas." (49)
Similarly, and more recently, May claims:-
'25te~
"La Vitpsatika sst une sorte d1 introduction au systems, 
plutot critique que constructive* • .Avant d'exposer en 
detail sa propre doctrine de 1 'idealisms absolu,
1' auteur s'attache a refuter les objections..." (50)
The latter author maintains that Vasubandhu is constructing a system
of absolute idealism, thereby repudiating the possibility of the
existence of things independent of consciousness, while the former,
though less explicit on this point, gives implicit affirmation to
such an interpretation throughuot the rest of his essay.
More convincingly, in view of our own interpretation, Kochumuttam
has argued that while Vimsatika containsj-
"A strong polemic against belief in objects (artha), it 
is very easily mistaken for a polemic against belief in 
things as such." (51)
Kochumuttam goes on to suggest that the correct way to understand
Vasubandhu's epistemological position in this text is as a trans-
(52)
formational theory of knowledge . What he seems to mean here is
that Vasubandhu holds knowledge to be, in some sense, a transform­
ation of independently existing realities. In such a way Vasubandhu 
avoids the unwelcome consequences of subjective idealism and the 
realistic theories of the Vaisegikas and Kashmira—Vaibhfasikas, both 
of whom he argues against in the Virtisatika^  .
One of the principal problems for the realist is making sense of 
dreams, illusions and hallucinations. Vasubandhu accepts that such 
experiences can be fully coherent, being determined both as regards 
fspace and time. Such coherence he explains to be the result of the 
maturation of impressions (vasansT) in consciousness itself. It does 
not therefore require appeal to extra—mental entities to explain 
extra— sensory experiences. The overall message of the early part 
of the Vitpsatika then is that the correspondence theory of know­
ledge will not hold in these special circumstances. It follows that:-
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Experience does not guarantee one-to-one correspondence 
between concepts and extra-mental objects#•• Experience 
starts not with extra-mental objects, but with conscious­
ness, which alone can supply the forms of subjectivity 
and objectivity which are necessary presuppositions of 
any experience in the state of samsara.” (53)
The most important section of the Vimsatika deals with a doctrine 
common to all our authors, be they Nag"arjuna or Asanga. This is the 
notion of the non—substantiality of persons and things (pudgala— 
dharmanairaTtmya). Vasubandhu tells us that when the Buddha spoke 
about the 12 bases of cognition (ayafcana) > six of which are supp­
osed by the Abhidharmikas to be external (bahyayatana), the Enlight­
ened One spoke with a hidden meaning;-
"Conforming to the creatures to be converted the World- 
honoured One with secret intention said there are bases 
of cognition, visual etc., just as (there are) beings 
of apparitional birth.” (54)
in other words, the naively realistic belief that there are sense
organs and corresponding objects is not true from the ultimate
point of view. The purpose of the Buddha’s secret intention is
further expanded;-
"By reason of this teaching one enters into the non-sub­
stantiality of person; again by this teaching one enters
into the non-substantiality of things with regard to
their imagined nature.” (55)
Expanding on this in his autocommentary (vrtti) Uasubandhu intro­
duces the important distinction between the imagined (parikalpita) 
and the ineffable (anabhilapya) natures of things:—
"The theory of the non-substantiality of dharmas does 
not mean that dharmas are non-existent in all respects, 
but only in their imagined nature. The ignorant imagine 
the dharmas to be of:the nature of subjectivity and 
objectivity,etc. Those dharmas are non-substantial with 
reference to that imagined nature and not with reference 
to their ineffable nature which alone is the object of 
the knowledge of the Buddhas...Thus through the theory 
of representation-only (yjjnaptimatra) the non-sub­
stantiality of dharmas is taught, not the denial of their 
existence." (55)
His critique of the atomic theory of the Uaisesikas and the
notion of aggregates peculiar to the Kashmira-Uaibhasika school of 
Buddhism in stanzas 11 — 15 of Vimsatika indicates Vasubandhus view 
that all speculative theories, such as the above, are generated oy 
the imaginative tendencies of the mind and do not therefore corr­
espond with reality. It is worth noting here that this is precisely 
the same assessment of speculative thought as is found in Nagarjuna's 
condemnation of the own— being of dharmas (dharmasvabh'ava) in MMK 
C h .15.
The sense of Uiipsatika 15;-
"Perception (can occur without extra-mental objects) just 
as it happens in adream, etc. At the time that perception 
occurs the corresponding object is not found. How can 
one then speak of its perception." (57),
is simply, as Kochumuttam concludes:-
"...the object arrived at in perception is never the thing- 
in-itself, but only the image constructed by the mind." (58)
In the light of the foregoing, and since Vasubandhu has affirmed 
the existence of the ineffable nature of dharmas which is the object 
of the knowledge of Buddhas alone, we can with some degree of cer­
tainty claim that our interpretive scheme of two epistemological 
orientations to an indeterminate ontological existence realm fits 
this text. It is clear then that the imagined natures (parikalpita 
atmana) and the ineffable natures (anabhiVapya atmana~) correspond 
to the parikalpita and parinippanna svabliai/as of the trisvabhava 
theory of the Yogacira, bearing in mind our often repeated proviso 
that parinigpanna is the complete identification with the ontolog­
ical existence realm (=paratantra) when the latter is free from the
the contamination of the imagined (parikalpita). It is interesting
( 59)
to note here that Kochumuttafo sees such a doctrine as here presented 
in Vimsatika as a seminal influence on the fully developed theories 
of the PramaTna of Dignaga and DharmakTrti. This school holds that
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the moment of perception (pratyakga) is essentially pure and devoid 
of imagination (kalpariapodha). It is consequently incommunicable. On 
the other hand such a situation is not able to stop at this point 
for the unenlightened. A process follows initial perception leading 
to distortion by the action of a multitude of thought constructions 
(vikajpa). We have noted previously that Liebnitz makes exactly the 
same distinction • In the context of our overall thesis Vasuban— 
dhu's distintionbetween two states of knowledge is entirely approp­
riate and we can therefore agree with Kochumuttam's suggestion that 
the epistemology of Vimsatika* constitutes a transformation theory 
of knowledge. For th8 unenlightened transformation results in a 
world view with a status approximate to a dream. A Buddha on the 
other hand is awake and sees things as they are (yathabhiutam):-
"...the apparent object is a representation. It is from 
this that memory arises. Before we have awakened we can­
not know that what is seen in the dream does not exist."(61)
Since the awakened state is a possibility, and the object of cog­
nition in this state (if one can speak of cognition in its normal 
sense in such an elevated condition) is the ineffable nature of
dharmas we suggest here that the Uiirisatika here gives tacit support 
to an indeterminate ontological existence realm as the source of 
both the enlightened and unenlightened state.
jn the final stanzas of the text Vasubandhu explains the mechanics 
of operation of ignorance while at the same time demonstating
conclusively that he is not a solipsist. It is clear then that in
v.18 there is an explicit statement that a plurality of individual, 
though mutually conditioning, streams of consciousness do exist
and that this situation is itself responsible for the ignorant
world picture of the unenlightened*-
~ 2.6© -
•‘The representations of consciousness arg determined by 
mutual influence of one(individual) on another...’• (62)
which the autocommsntary (vytti) glosses:-
11...because a distinct representation in one stream of 
consciousness occasions the arising of a distinct repres­
entation in another stream of consciousness, each becomes 
determined, but not by external objects.” (63)
This strikes a surprisingly modern tone in the writings of such an
ancient writer, though l/asubandhu quickly reverts to a more magical
view of things by suggesting in the next few stanzas, again to
justify the existence of a plurality of individual streams of
consciousness, that a magician may have the ability to cause another
being to have a particular dream through thr power of the former’.s
thoughts ^ .
Vasubandhu concludes his Vimsatika in a sober manner, noting that;-
"This treatise on the mere representation of consciousness 
has been composed by me according to my ability; It is not
possible however to discuss this (theory) in all its aspects.
It is known only to the Enlightened One.” (65)
He seems therefore to accept the constraints put on him by the re­
course to language, and if the text appears as possessing an 
excessively idealistic flavour-this seems to be principally because 
he has allowed himself to expand provisional talk more fully than a 
strict Prasangika would permit.
There is no question here of a doctrine suggesting the sole existence 
of mind (cittamatra), as is so often attributed to the Yogacara. 
Vasubandhu has not left the mainstream of Buddhist thought to suggest 
that perception arises through no cause, or even that the causes 
for the arising of perception can be contained entirely within the 
mental sphere. This is not subjective idealism. Vasubandhu clearly 
points out that the sense consciousnesses.,or evolved consciousnesses 
(pravrttivij*nana) only arise in accordance with a cause (pratyaya).
The cause is objective, as it has already been shown to be throughout 
the history of the development of Buddhist doctrine. In fact this
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theory of the threefold evolution of consciousness bears a striking 
resemblance to the theory of cognition discussed in connection with 
bhavanga. We saw in the latter theory that an external stimulus 
caused a perturbation in the flow of bhavanga giving rise to a series 
of changes which led to both perception (with concomitant distortion) 
and its consequence: the generation of karma. The karma generated 
by such a process "abides" in bhavanga as the cause of future actions 
up until the time of parinirvana at which time bhavanga seems to 
cease. Exactly the same sequence is maintained in the Yogacara 
system. An external stimulus provokes the evolution of alayavijnana, 
the resulting process "perfuming" (vasana) this root consciousness 
(mula-vijnana) in such a way that it acts as a store of all the 
seeds (sarvabija) of previous actions until arhatship is attained, 
at which point the alaya itself comes to an end.
That this must be so is backed up by Asanga quoting with approval 
an excerpt from the Samyuktagama to the effect that the five skandhas 
are devoid of self (anatma) , etc. This corresponds with the
usual statement that the skandhas, and in this case we are dealing 
particularly with vijnanaskandha, are marked by suffering (duhkha), 
impermanence (anitya)^and and non-self (anatma). Now since he 
clearly shows the alayavijnana to be but one, even though the most 
fundamental, evolute of the vijnanaskandha, we must assume that 
for Asanga the alaya itself is conditioned by these three marks 
of existence. Alayavijnana then is just the Yogacara term for 
the stream of consciousness (vinnanasota) we have already encountered 
in the early literature. It progresses like a stream, never the 
same from moment to moment, in a constant state of flux conditioned
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by ignorance until its momentum is impeded by the effort to destroy 
that ignorance but putting the pratityasamutpada into its reversal 
sequence through the application of the Buddhist path. This leads 
to a revolution at the basis (asrayaparavrtti), ie. a revolution 
in the alaya.
Until this point has been reached cognition is still contaminated
with the adventious defilements and one does not realise the true
w —
meaning of representation only (vijnaptimatra). Only the achievement
lA, —  —
of vijnaptimatrata is true enlightenment and in such a state one 
finally understands that all previous understanding was subjective
—  CA —
(cittamatra, vijnaptimatra) since it was based on thought construction 
(vikalpa), dichotomous thought (prapafica) etc. generated by a mind 
conditioned by ignorance after contact with external realities.
In such a condition thought constructions were taken to be real, 
and things were not seen as they are (yathabhutam). Enlightenment 
consists in the destruction of this subjective world view which 
results in the three domains of existence (tridhatu). All the 
original authorities we have examined, be they Hlnayanist, Nagarjuna, 
Vasubandhu or Asanga hold to such a position. Enlightenment then 
is the destruction of the diseased mind in its manifold forms but 
at the same time may not be understood as total non-existence.
IA
Vasubandhu sums up such a realisation in his treatment of vijnapti- 
matrata:
"This is no-mind(acitta) and no-perceiving, and this is wisdom 
(jnana) beyond this world. This is the revolution at the 
basis (asrayaparavrtti) at which the two fold wickedness^Cthe 
defilements of emotic7 and intellects klesavarana and jneyavarana]
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are removed. This is the realm of no out-flow (anasrava).
It is inconceivable, virtuous and unchangeable. This is bliss, 
the body of emancipation. It is said to be the dharma (body) 
of the great sage." (61)
This is clearly nirvana. Vasubandhu actually agrees with CandrakTrti
that in the last analysis it is inconceivable (acintya), and in
consequence inarticulable. It is the total suppression of the
working of the vijnanaskandha since it is no-mind(acitta), but
at the sametime Vasubandhu avoids the implication that it is non-
w —
existence, since he holds such a state to represent wisdom (jnana).
As the result of the destruction of the avaranas no further defile­
ments are produced. For Yamada:
K  _  lA  _
"Here the vijnana turns into supra-mundane jnana, transcendental 
wisdom in the higher level of the religious realm. In the 
jnana there is no more conceptualisation regarding Self and 
Elements.” (bS)
There is nothing here that Nagarjuna could have any objection to 
on our interpretation?and I believe we have clearly shown that 
whatever differences there may have been between the early period 
of Buddhist thought and that reflected by Nagarjuna and the brothers 
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CONCLUSION
It is now possible to construct a model (represented diagramatically 
in the attached fold-out diagram) to explain the interconnections, 
and hence the essentially identical structure, of the Madhyamaka 
and Yogacara understanding of the enlightened and unenlightened 
states and their consequent relationship with reality.
There is an ontological existence realm which can not however be 
predicated. Any attempt to do so is doomed to failure since such 
an attempt is ultimately associated with a dichotomised world view 
based on abstractive tendencies of a mind infected by ignorance.
Since language itself is so infected it will be impossible to state 
the precise status of reality. Such a definition is itself dependent 
on basic dichotomies such as existent or non-existent. This being 
so we are forced, bearing in mind what has been said, to refer to 
that state of affairs uncontaminated by the processes of thought 
as an Ontologically Indeterminate Realm. What is clear is that 
this is not to be understood in a monistic sense. The opposition 
Buddhism in general to the Brahmanical systems precludes this.
All the Buddhist authors we have studied acknowledge this realm 
to be dependently originated (pratityasumutpada) in the sense that 
it is not composed of separate entities but rather exists as a flux 
of mutually conditioned processes. It may be understood as truth 
(satya) since it is the ground of being (sat), and is often referred 
to as thatness (tattva). In the Madhyamaka it is not referred to 
by name, for obvious reasons connected with the Madhyamaka theory
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of language, but this does not mean that its presence may not be 
inferred in the writings of Nagarjuna, etc. In fact without such 
an existence realm at the basis of Nagarjuna's system, these teachings 
lose their coherence. The Yogacara is less reticent at providing 
a name, but again clearly recognises the provisional nature of such 
denotation. In line with earlier Buddhist tradition reality is 
characterised in its aspect of dependence and hence, in the Yogacara, 
it is termed the dependent (paratantra).
Now this central,ontologically indeterminate existence realm may 
be understood as the base (asraya) for the arising of the purified 
and the defiled vision of the world. These visions are quite clearly iKe 
enlightened (bodhi) and ignorant (avidya) respectively. The latter 
is intimately conditioned by thought construction (vikalpa) and 
dichotomous mental tendencies (prapanca), which themselves mutually 
condition the language process (namarupa/prajnapti). As a result 
the mind of an unenlightened being (vijnana) misinterprets reality 
as a conglomeration of entities (dharma) each capable of independent 
existence (svabhava). In such a situation the mind continually 
constructs a picture of reality from which there is no escape (samsara), 
which is inherently unsatisfactory (duhkha) and leads to suffering.
Such a situation is elucidated in the forward sequence of the 12-linked 
pratltyasamutpada formula, and is termed conventional truth (samvrti- 
satya) by the Madhyamaka, and the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhava) 
amongst the Yogacarins.
m the other hand all the systems we have examined hold out the 
possibility of emancipation from this vicious circle through the
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destruction of ignorance. By putting into practice the Buddhist 
path (marga)^and in consequence refraining from philosophising, 
unenlightened consciousness (vijnana) may be extirpated, and gnosis 
(jnana/prajna) encouraged to flower. Such a transformation, since 
it is intimately connected with the destruction of the factors associated 
with ignorance and its concomitants, is adequately represented by 
the reverse pratityasamutpada formula. When this process is successfully 
completed one enters nirvana and sees things as they are (yathabhutam). 
Thought construction no longer operates (nirvikalpajnana) and one 
comes to know the true nature of things (dharmata). One is at peace 
(santa). Such a state is of course not knowledge in the conventional 
sense since it is empty (sunya) of the preconceptions, such as the 
dichotomies between self and others, being and non-being, which provide 
the ground for the unenlightened state. It is to be understood as 
the total destruction of all the factors associated with ignorance.
_ )o
Nirvarja then is inaccessible the domain of language and thought.
This is what emptiness (sunyata) signifies. Again both the Madhyamaka 
and Yogacara are agreed on this schema. For the former the enlightened 
state is referred to as the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), while 
for the latter it is the accomplished nature (parinispannasvabhava).
In the writings of both groups this condition is to be understood 
as the complete identification of knower and known such that when 
one talks of this as a state of mind one recognises the provisional 
nature of the statement.
There can be no doubt that what has been outlined above represents 
an ontological and epistemological schema shared equally by Madhyamaka 
and Yogacara and on the basis of this general agreement one will
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be cautious when dealing with scholarly evaluations which highlight 
essential discrepancies between the two. In this thesis then it 
is hoped that a model involving an ontologically indeterminate existence 
realm and two associated epistemological orientations has been succ­
essful in underlining the essential harmony of the thought of Nagarjuna, 
Asariga and Vasubandhu, particularly when seen against the background 
of earlier developments in Buddhist philosophy.
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